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Judicial Review and the Supreme Court:
An Accelerating Curve
ROGER HANDBERG*
The power of judicial review of federal statutes in American constitu-
tional history has the mystique of the Hammer of Thor. Striking a
congressional act down as violative of the United States Constitution
has attracted the interest of several generations of constitutional schol-
ars. The Court, depending upon one's substantive views on the particu-
lar case at hand, is either seen as exercising a great power in defense of
liberty-political or economic-or is perceived as a usurper of the pow-
ers of the political branches of government. Whatever the substantive
events, great controversy and attention have been focused upon this
relatively rarely exercised Court power.' The data presented here indi-
cate that the United States Supreme Court and the present justices on
that Court operate on the assumption that judicial review is not politi-
cally provocative nor in fact an extreme power. This view is one founded
not upon the syllogisms of the justices, but upon their behavior patterns
over the last 175 years (1801-1976). The discussion here is premised
upon a literature (both in the legal and social science disciplines) that
has been greatly concerned with the role of the Supreme Court in pro-
tecting oppressed minorities. Majorities have been identified as cotermi-
nous with the dominant groupings in the legislative and executive
branches of government. Given the increased sense of alienation and
distrust about the federal government present in the populace, one could
legitimately question the accuracy of such an identification.' As a short-
hand notation, legislative majorities can be equated with the popular
majorities, but the fit is not always exact.
*Ph.D.; Associate Professor of Political Science, Florida Technological Univer-
sity.
1. Examples of such discussions include: L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTI-
TUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); and L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1967).
2. Abramson, Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in
America: 1952-1974, 70 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 469 (1976).
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Richard Funston's article, "The Supreme Court and Critical
Elections,"3 developed an elaborate argument about the Court's activi-
ties whenever it acted in what was termed an "antimajoritarian" con-
text: i.e., striking down a congressional statute. The issue examined was
whether "[diuring realignment phases or, as they might be called, criti-
cal periods . . . the tendency of the Court to declare federal legislation
unconstitutional [was] significantly greater than during non-critical pe-
riods of stable party competition." 4 The realignments referred to by
Funston and in this paper are the periods where significant and enduring
shifts in party allegiance occurred in the political electorate. The results
of these realignments could be either the destruction of an old political
party, use of a new political party, or a change in the party's bases of
support. For example, the present party era typified by Democratic
Party dominance grew out of shifts in the late 1920's to early 1930's of
the working-class votes from the Republican to the Democratic Party.
The dramatic shift was best seen in the unionized ethnic Catholic seg-
ments of the electorate.' A period of transition occurred during each
realignment when the old forces still controlled parts of the federal
government. Therefore, the newly dominant political coalition might
take between four and eight years to come to power. The analysis by
Funston was an attempt to refute or to modify Robert Dahl's famous
article which had strongly questioned the Supreme Court's willingness
to defend minorities (oppressed or otherwise).'
In Funston's analysis, the Court was found to behave in a pattern
suggestive of what might be termed a disequilibrium or lag model. That
is: the Court as a whole and the individual justices active during a
particular period of transition hold views that are out of touch with the
new national political majority.7 Through an inevitable process of attri-
tion (retirements and death), the "old" justices are replaced by the new
judicial incumbents whose views are more consonant with the power-
holders in the executive and legislative branches. By the end of a four
to eight year period, the Court (in effect) through membership change
rejoins the dominant political coalition. Exceptions to this pattern occur
3. Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
795 (1975).
4. Id. at 804.
5. H. ASHER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1976).
6. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
7. Funston, supra note 3.
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Judicial Review and the Supreme Court
when justices fail to leave the bench in the normal cycle. A president
makes new appointments on the average of one every twenty-two
months. In the 1930's, the new political coalition was unable to make
an appointment for over four years. In that situation, however, once the
logjam was broken, enough new appointments were made in three years
to constitute a "new" Court.' Professors Canon and Ulmer in a reana-
lysis of the Funston data (with several corrections) concluded that the
null hypothesis of "no difference" between the critical and noncritical
historical periods could not be rejected. Their argument in part was
premised upon the skewness of the data, especially in the critical periods
of electoral realignment.9 The data relied upon are all instances where
the power of judicial review was exercised. Ultimately, Funston's and
Dahl's analyses hinge upon interpretations of the 1930's crisis rather
than upon the broader spectrum of Court activity over the past 180 or
so years.
Whatever the results of that particular dispute, both sides premise
their analyses upon the fundamental assumption that the exercise of the
power of judicial review over federal legislative acts is both an unusual
and potentially provocative action by the Court. The action is unusual
in that the power of judicial review is used relatively infrequently, and
provocative in that the action taken is a direct affront to the "political"
branches."0 This scenario is based upon a perception of the Court's
activities which developed in the early years of the Republic. Imagewise,
the Court is seen as timidly and craftily striking down an act of Con-
gress and then in effect taking shelter against a possible majoritarian
counter-attack. This particular image draws heavily upon the early
nineteenth-century cases, notably Marbury v. Madison" and Dred Scott
v. Sanford.12 Implicit in this scenario are two considerations: first, how
often should the power of judicial review be exercised; and, second,
should the Court speak with a unified voice, i.e., with minimal or no
dissent.
8. C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
9. Canon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1215, 1216 (1976).
10. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS ch. 8 (3d ed. 1975).
11. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court's power to
review legislative acts of Congress).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that Negroes were not "citizens" as
provided in the United States Constitution and therefore not entitled to sue in the courts
of the United States).
12:1978
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Chief Justice Marshall led the Court to exercise the power of judi-
cial review only once during his long tenure in office. Clearly, this
reluctance to move more precipitously was based upon the threat posed
to the Court and especially to Marshall by the Jeffersonian Republi-
cans. Broad areas of public policy were staked out by the Federalist-
dominated Supreme Court, but paths of tactical retreat were always left
open. The traditions established in these early days of the Court were
such that the power of judicial review was relatively rarely exercised.
The second consideration, that of a unified Court, is important in
minimizing the target presented to outside critics. When the Court
speaks as one, the outsider has increased difficulty in focusing his at-
tacks upon the particular policy. An inside critic (in this instance a
dissenting justice) is important because that individual makes criticism
of the decision legitimate. 13 This is also illustrated by the Dred Scott
case,14 where the Court, badly factionalized, undermined the credibility
of its own opinion on what was obviously a sensitive political issue.'5 As
a result of that debacle, the Court's prestige sank to political insignific-
ance until after the Civil War. This concern with unanimity was not
restricted just to questions of judicial review, but also included all ap-
pearances of uncertainty or ambiguity in the law. Chief Justice Taft
probably carried this concern to an extreme, but he was not alone in
his concern with the monolithic image of the law."
Table I attempts to consolidate the Court's history into five time
periods based upon Professor Funston's analysis. 7 These time periods
reflect major shifts in the American political party system. For example,
period one (1800-1828) saw the collapse of the Federalist Party. The end
of period two (1829-1860) saw the rise of the Republican Party to
power, while in period four (1897-1936) a reconstituted Republican
13. An example of the effectiveness of the inside critic was demonstrated by
Justices Burton, Harlan, and Clark's role in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957)(Burton, Harlan, JJ., concurring; Clark, J., dissenting). Their opinions, criticizing
the Court's holding that a defendant is entitled to production of relevant documents
which are to be used against him at trial, contributed to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §
3500, which delineated the procedure to be used in the production of such documents.
Act of September 2, 1957, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). See generally W. MURPHY, CON-
GRESS AND THE COURT ch. 6 (1962).
14. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
15. Scjimidhauser, Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860, 23 J.
OF POL. 615 (1961).
16. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956).
17. Funston, supra note 3.
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Table 1. PERIODS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVITY
Total Votes to A verage per Total Votes to A verage per
Cases Strike Down Decision Uphold Decision
1800-1828 1 6 0
1829-1860 1 7 2
1861-1896 21 156 (7.4) 25 (1.2)
1897-1936 51 361 (7.1) 88 (1.7)
1937-1976 39* 238 (6.1) 65 (1.67)
Source: H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 1975); Canon & Ulmer, The Supreme
Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 1215 (1976); and cases cited in
the United States Reports. The historical periods are based upon Funston's earlier analysis com-
paring electoral realignment and judicial realignment.
*The Federal Election Commission case, Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), was recorded 7
to I even though the vote varied on the four provisions struck down. They key provision in terms
of being an affront to a co-ordinate political branch dealt with appointment of the FEC's member-
ship: Congress was told not to encroach on the presidential power of appointment.
Party continued in power until the Great Depression. 8 The realignment
periods are consolidated with the previous period of electoral stability,
since the realignment period (for the Court at least) is a continuation
of the past. Otherwise, Professor Funston's original thesis has no merit
since realignment would be coterminous for both the electoral and judi-
cial institutions. Professors Canon and Ulmer have adjusted Professor
Funston's time periods to conform more fully to what they see as the
more accurate periods of realignment. 9
In Table 1, the number of cases in which a federal law was nullified
during a particular time period (adjusted to the Canon-Ulmer criteria)
is presented along with the total vote in favor of nullification or support
of the laws and the average number of votes in the majority and dissent.
Data for this analysis are drawn from Professor Abraham's compilation
in The Judicial Process"' and from cases cited in the United States
Reports. One difference that occurs between this analysis and the earlier
studies is that Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.2 is counted twice
18. See W. CHAMBERS & W. BURNHAM, THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS: STATES
OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1967).
19. Canon & Ulmer, supra note 9, Tables 2 and 3, at 1217.
20. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, Table 9, at 288-93.
21. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (White, Harlan, JJ., dissenting), vacated on rehearing,
158 U.S. 601 (1895) (Harlan, Brown, White, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting). While the
Court vacated its original decision on rehearing, the result was the same. However, on
rehearing the Court extended its prior decision by holding that the provisions of the Act
8
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because the first reported decision was 6-2 in favor of nullification while
the second was 5-4 to strike down the Income Tax Act of 1894.2
A power of this reported magnitude should be unleashed relatively
infrequently. This maxim of judicial power is used to explain the relative
rarity of such decisions by the Court. What has been pointed out as a
probably more relevant explanation is that the Court's most important
political-legal function is that of a legitimator or "yea sayer" rather
than as a negative force or "nay sayer." More importantly, the role
of legitimator is supposedly ingrained at least partially into the Court's
traditions as, for example, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.24 The Ashwander rules presuppose or presume the constitu-
tionality of challenged statutes or governmental actions. The burden of
proof is placed upon the challenger. Clearly, in certain substantive areas
of law, this presumption does not hold, especially in civil liberties cases,
notably free speech. Not all justices have accepted this new presumption
of unconstitutionality, but the earlier tradition has clearly been broken.21
which taxed a person's income, whether from real or personal property, were unconstitu-
tional as direct taxes.
22. Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
23. Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973
Wis. L. REV. 790.
24. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis set
forth seven rules which have been used and developed by the Court to avoid passing
upon constitutional questions. Those rules are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions
"is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of
real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals....
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question, of constitutional law in ad-
vance of the necessity of deciding it."
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7, "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construetion of the statute is fairly possi-
ble by which the question may be avoided."
25. See L. LuSKY, supra note 1, for a discussion of United States v. Carolene
9
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This break in tradition is reflected in the time comparison pre-
sented in Table 1. After the initial period for the establishment of judi-
cial review, the Court has increasingly been willing to accept challenges
to the constitutionality of federal statues and to act favorably upon
those challenges. Such challenges are obviously motivated by different
values, as shown by the earlier laissez-faire capitalism of the pre-1937
Court"8 and the civil libertarian values of the post-1937 Court.z2 What-
ever the value orientation, the Court has moved to the position of exer-
cising the power relatively frequently (at least in historical terms). This
activism has persisted even into periods of relative controversy about the
Court's work. For instance, some members of the "old" Court were
willing to push the issue of activism to the point of a constitutional
crisis. During the Warren Court, there were adjustments to the political
winds in terms of activity level, but the overall trend was toward increas-
ing activism. Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been averag-
ing nearly two such actions per term. More impressively, this trend has
held up throughout both the Warren and Burger Courts. The Burger
Court period (1969-1976) has been summarized as one of increased
activity on the part of the Court. In a short seven-year time period, the
Court has"voided provisions in twenty seven federal laws, established a
distinctive record in the areas of First Amendment freedoms and equal
protection and by unanimous decisions delivered some of the severest
blows to presidential power ever recorded in American history."2" Pro-
fessor Dionisopoulos' analysis, based upon a limited segment of Court
cases, is accurate, although generally these two periods in Court history
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in which the Court stated that the presumption of
constitutionality may not be as far reaching when legislation is within a specific prohibi-
tion of the Constitution. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
26. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhardt, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the prohi-
bition of the use of child labor to make products traveling in interstate commerce was
an unconstitutional restraint on commerce and was beyond the authority of Congress).
See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the provision of
the right of coal workers to organize and the allowance of collective bargaining to set
wage and hour agreements in the Guffey Coal Act were beyond the powers of Congress
under the commerce clause).
27. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (declaring § 6
of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, c.1024, 64 Stat. 993 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 785 (1970)), holding that prohibiting a member of a registered Communist
organization from obtaining a passport was unconstitutional as a violation of the fifth
amendment, and of the right to travel).
28. Dionisopoulos, Judicial Review in the Textbooks, Div. OF EDUC. AFFAIRS
(D.E.A.) NEWS 1, 20 (1976).
2:1978
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have presented images much different in terms of substantive policy.29
The Warren Court was seen as the most consistently liberal activist
period in Court history, while the Burger Court has moved in a more
conservative direction. In any case, the trend identified in Table I has
apparently accelerated despite the addition of what have been termed
"judicial restraint" advocates to the Court.3" This activism is accen-
tuated when one considers that the Court deals formally with fewer
cases now than before.3' Apparently, restraint is a sometime thing.
A further concern is most succinctly identified as that of "massing
the Court." 2 Basically, the Chief Justice or other dominant individuals
on the Court are involved in an active effort to maximize support for
the decisions. Game theory could be applied easily in this context, given
the tradeoffs necessary to gain maximum voting support while main-
taining some coherence in the content of the decision. The optimal
strategy is to generate a unanimous Court with no concurring opinions.
In an analogous situation, Professor Ulmer has described the massive
personal effort by Chief Justice Warren required to produce such appar-
ent consensus in one very controversial case.33 Support maximization
or dissent suppression is necessary in order to minimize the vulnerability
of the Court to political or legal counter-attack. 4
Dissenters in a case of the presumed magnitude of one striking
down legislation are to be discouraged or co-opted. Recent examples (in
several policy areas) of this apparent concern about dissent have in-
cluded school desegregation cases until the 1970's and United States v.
Nixon 5 in 1974. In these cases, no federal statute stood in jeopardy,
but the Court operated in such a fashion as to maintain a united front.
In contrast, as is readily apparent in Table 1, the Court has apparently
become increasingly less concerned with controlling or minimizing dis-
sent when it strikes down congressional legislation. Rather, the norms
29. See W. THOMAS, THE BURGER COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1976).
30. S. WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1976).
31. Canon & Ulmer, supra note 9, at 1216; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT at 60, 297 (1928).
32. See D. DANELSKI, THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE IN THE DECISIONAL
PROCESS: W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS (1961); and
W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
33. See Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. OF POL. 689 (1971),
for a discussion of Chief Justice Warren's efforts to bring about a united court in Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. See S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1970).
35. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11
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on the Court are now such that dissenting behavior in these cases follows
the general patterns of dissent on the Court as a whole-a pattern which
was established in the aftermath of the 1925 Judges' Bill and which was
strengthened during the Roosevelt Court. 6
Table 2. DISSENT PATTERN
Unanimous 3 or 4 Total Cases
Votes Dissenting Votes* During Time Period
1861-1896 42.9% (9) 19.0% (4) (21)
1897-1936 37.3% (19) 35.2% (18) (51)
1937-1976 25.6% (10) 43.6% (17) (39)
Total 34.2% (38) 35.1% (39) (11 1)t
Source: H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 1975); Canon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court
and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1215 (1976); and cases cited in the United
States Reports.
*Where only eight or fewer justices participated, two dissenting votes are recorded as equivalent
to the three- or four-vote situation in a nine-person court.
tThe two earlier cases have been excluded from this stage of the analysis.
Table 2 further isolates this trend by focusing upon the declining
percentage of unanimous decisions that occur when a congressional
statute is struck down. Arguments which rely upon the fact that dissent
on the Court is more prevalent than ever before miss the point that
striking down federal statutes is not considered business as usual, at
least according to the conventional analyses of constitutional law and
history. The point made here is that, in fact, the behavior pattern is
similar to the Court's general behavior pattern." In Table 2, the per-
centage of unanimous votes is given along with the percentage of deci-
sions with three or four dissents. Clearly, the Court is moving to a
situation of relative disunity when it moves to strike down the statutes,
either state or federal. This is best illustrated by the discordant note
struck in two recent instances of judicial review. In Buckley v. Valeo s
36. S. HALPERN & K. VINES, DISSENT, THE JUDGES' BILL AND THE ROLE OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (1974). See also PRITCHETT, supra note 8.
37. R. HANDBERG, JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY ON THE SUPREME COURT 1916-1969
(1977), Table 1; G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974).
38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Burger, C.J., White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Blackmun,
JJ., all filed separate opinions) (holding that provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 limiting individual contributions to campaigns were constitutional
despite first amendment objections; but that provisions limiting expenditures by candi-
dates on their behalf, provisions limiting total expenditures in various campaigns, and
provisions limiting the amount which an individual could spend independently of a
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
110 Nova Law Journal 2:1978
the opinion was a per curiam one, with five additional opinions by
individual justices; in National League of Cities v. Usery3 9 the vote was
5-4, with one concurring and two dissenting opinions. None of the jus-
tices appears bashful about either voting against the political branches
or explaining why he did so. In fact, the plethora of opinions makes it
increasingly difficult for the political branches to know what exactly was
decided and why.
What is apparent, however, is that the Court no longer holds to the
view that judicial review is such a terrible power that it should never be
used, and if used, only under certain controlled conditions. Rather, it
appears that elite (both judicial and elected) perceptions of the rules of
the game now accept the probability of such Court action. Disagreement
may occur between the "political" and judicial branches, but the issue
is one of substantive policy rather than of the judiciary's power to act.
This is most graphically illustrated by the Court's decision striking
down the campaign practice reforms which were passed in the aftermath
of Watergate." Congressional reaction was relatively muted and di-
rected primarily at the substantive question of how the reforms should
be revised in order to meet the Court's mandate and what the Congress
saw as political reality. One could argue that the debate over the Court's
power to act goes on, but the real issues are those of its power of
statutory construction and interpretation rather than of constitution-
ality.4
From this perspective, a strong argument can be made that Justice
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander2 was clearly a temporary
avowal of judicial restraint. This view of the judicial function had strong
policy implications in the 1930's, but those policy overtones no longer
hold. Rather, the Court's more recent activities in Baker v. Carr3 and
candidate, but relative to a candidate, were all invalid as impermissible abridgements
of the freedom of speech).
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring; Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
40. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
41. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 50, 56-57 (1976).
42. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
43. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court set forth the following elements describing a
political question:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or for the impossibility of deciding without an initial
13
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
Judicial Review and the Supreme Court2:1978
Flast v. Cohen" indicate clearly the Court's willingness, if not eagerness,
to be policy relevant. The reinterpretation of the political-question doc-
trine in Baker opened up new vistas for Supreme Court activity. More
recently, the Court has backed away from some of the opportunities
that were opened by those cases, but the precedents have only been
partially distinguished, not extinguished.45 In a sense, the Ashwander
rules are a dinosaur of the past, although certain aspects are still main-
tained as convenient. In fact, it appears that Chief Justice Hughes in
1937 won the war but lost the battle, since the institution's ultimate
power of judicial review continues uncontrolled and is increasingly being
used. The only viable controls presently imposed on the exercise of the
power of judicial review are the individual justice's sense of discretion
and the possibility (though remote) of congressional retaliation. Either
the Supreme Court has acquired such sanctity as to be almost beyond
control or it has fallen to such levels as to be the subject only of indiffer-
ence. Given the relatively high prestige of the institution, one could
presume the former more than the latter. As a symbol, the Court may
stand somewhat removed from the political battle, but its actions make
clear that it is an active participant despite the protestations of its
members.
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibil-
ity of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
id. at 217.
44. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing to challenge expend-
itures of tax money which are in violation of the establishment of religion clause of the
first amendment).
45. The Court has not followed through on the potential inherent in Flast. See
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, the Court denied
standing to a taxpayer seeking to compel the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose a
detailed account of its expenditures. The Court distinguished the facts of the present
case from Flast, stating that the respondent did not claim a violation of a constitutional
limitation upon the taxing and spending power, but rather sought to obtain information
about how those funds were spent. Therefore, the Court concluded, there was no
"logical nexus" between the respondent's status of taxpayer and the failure of Congress
to require the detailed report of expenditures. Id. at 175.
1 2:97
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The Federal and State Response to the Problem
of Child Maltreatment in America:
A Survey of the Reporting Statutes
Society's concern with the abuse and neglect of children is not a new
phenomenon,1 but as a result of heightened awareness by professionals
and by the public in general, this problem is receiving new and intense
scrutiny. The issue extends to all members of society and particularly
highlights the relationships existing between the legal, medical, and
social services. Child abuse and neglect arise from a wide range of social
and psychological problems that cannot be managed by any one disci-
pline or profession. Physicians, lawyers, judges, teachers, and others
must work together if the continuing cycle of maltreatment of children
is to be broken.2
While all fifty states3 and Washington, D.C.,4 have child abuse
statutes in one form or another, the legal framework provided for the
protection of children in many instances is fragmented and unnecessar-
ily complex. It is not unusual to find that workers involved with protect-
ing children from abuse are not adequately equipped and trained to meet
the critical demands assigned to them.5 Too often, the only treatment
alternatives available to both child and parent are infrequent and in-
adequate home visits by social agencies, and overused foster care where
the child may be moved from one home to another.
1. For an excellent discussion of the fate of children in history, see Thomas, Child
Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives,
50 N.C. L. REv. 293 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Child Abuse and Neglect]. Child
abuse is deeply ingrained in our cultural history. Many children who were ill or de-
formed at birth were murdered for reasons of maintaining a controlled population. It
had long been an acceptable practice for children to be sold into bondage, tortured, or
murdered.
2. See text accompanying notes 68-78, infra.
3. See note 122, infra.
4. Id. For statistical purposes, Washington, D.C. will be considered a state.
5. Extension of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 1977: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1977-1978) (statement of Arabella Marti-
nez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development) [hereinafter referred to as 1977
Senate Hearings].
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In dealing with child abuse, ope is almost immediately confronted
with traditional societal values which have precluded overt interference
with the "integrity and sanctity of the family and for the privacy of its
interrelationships."' With the emergence of a greater understanding of
the physical and psychological damage caused by child abuse, societal
interest is moving toward an awareness of the need to promote the
health and well-being of children. This concern has made itself known
through the child abuse and neglect legislation enacted at federal and
state levels within the past fifteen years.
1. EARLY HISTORY OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA
It has been suggested that it is the very abhorrence of child abuse
which has made it such a slow-moving area of both federal and state
concern. The idea that a parent, who is supposed to love and protect
his offspring, could be responsible for the child's physical injury or
emotional deprivation is so repulsive that many are reluctant to believe
it. 7 The federal and state governments have also been hesitant to become
involved in the internal mechanisms of the family. This implied hands-
off policy followed by these governmental units is traceable to their
close association with English common law.8 Under the common law,
the right of the father to custody and control of his offspring was consid-
ered almost absolute, even where this was at odds with the welfare of
the child.'
A child in colonial America was ruled over by the father. Parental
discipline was quick, decisive, and severe.10 In a very real sense, the child
6. NAT'L. CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION & WELFARE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT (1976) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
7. D. BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS 13 (1972).
8. The public welfare policy of this country originated with the passage in 1601
of England's Poor Relief Act. It later became popularly known as the Elizabethan Poor
Law. The philosophy which put this legislation into action considered poverty a dis-
grace. The poor and destitute were considered a burden on the rest of society. Poverty
was considered the result of one's own inability to better oneself. Welfare practices in
this country were influenced by these English concepts. The use of physical force with
children was permitted as a normal part of child-rearing behavior. PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 6, at 55.
9. Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child
Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 1055 (1975). See also Note, Custody and Con-
trol of Children, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 460 (1936).
10. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 300.
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was considered little more than the property of his parents." It was not
unusual for a child to be bound out to other households as an indentured
servant or apprentice.'2 The shortage of labor in the American colonies,
as well as the pervasive Puritan work ethic, was reflected by early laws
passed by the various colonial legislatures." These early laws made a
distinction between apprenticeship and servitude, but this was not al-
ways observed." Eventually two forms of apprenticeship evolved. Under
a voluntary apprenticeship, the child and his parents entered into an
agreement on their own initiative. The other form, compulsory appren-
ticeship, resulted from the practice of binding out dependent children,
who had little or no say in the choice of their master or trade. 5 As time
passed, laws were enacted which prohibited the binding out of infants,
but the practice of binding out children beyond infancy continued.
The earliest documented case of child abuse involved a master and
his apprentice. 6 In Salem, Massachusetts, in 1639, a man by the name
of Marmaduke Perry was arraigned for the death of his apprentice. The
evidence given stated that the boy had been ill-treated and subject to
unreasonable correction by his master. 7 However, the boy's own charge
that the fractured skull he suffered was due to a broomstick blow deliv-
ered by his master (which later resulted in the boy's death) was disputed
by testimony that the boy had told another person that he received the
blow from falling out of a tree. The defendant was found not guilty. A
Massachusetts court found another master guilty of extraordinary abuse
of an apprentice; he was executed in 1643.18 Other early cases show the
masters of servant children being verbally reprimanded, having their
chattels confiscated, or even requiring that the children be freed from
11. See 5 FORDHAM L. REv., supra note 9, at 460.
12. Apprenticeships were often used by local governments to ensure that children
were placed in a home environment which could adequately meet their needs. The need
to fully utilize scarce labor was a strong economic factor of the times which overrode
all other considerations. On many occasions, these apprenticeship practices were carried
out by court officials despite the objections of the childrens' economically-disadvantaged
parents.
13. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-
1865, at 122 (R. Bremmer ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as I CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
14. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part II: Historical Overview, Legal Ma-
trix, and Social Perspectives in North Carolina, 54 N.C. L. REv. 743, 745 (1976).
15. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 301.
16. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 13, at 122.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 123.
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indenture because of their ill treatment. 9 In 1700, the colony of Virginia
issued specific laws for the protection of servants against mistreat-
ment.'0
The vast majority of these early cases dealt exclusively with the
issue of a master's maltreatment of child servants. There is no indication
of a similar movement to protect children from abusive or neglectful
parents. Available court action involving the family was limited to re-
moval of the child from an "unsuitable" home environment.2'
"Unsuitable" usually referred to the parents' not providing their chil-
dren with an adequate religious upbringing, or a general failure to teach
them to become productive members of society.22 There were two Mas-
sachusetts cases, in 1675 and 1678, in which children were removed
because of "unsuitable" homes231 The first case involved children who
were removed from the home because the father refused to see that they
were "put forth to service as the law directs. 124 The second case gave
similar justification for the removal of children from the home environ-
ment, with that offense being compounded by the refusal of the father
to attend church services on a regular basis.2
The "societal solution" for disadvantaged children in the cities was
to place them in almshouses. 6 Conditions in these poorhouses were
unsatisfactory for adult paupers, let alone young children.2 1 It was not
19. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 304.
20. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 13, at 127.
21. Id. at 40.
22. Id. The "New England" or public vendue method of pauper relief was an
ingenious and thrifty variant of the apprenticeship practices of the times. The town poor,
the young, and the old were auctioned off to the lowest bidder for their services. The
bidder who had the lowest bid would then accept his payment from public funds and
take the child home as a servant or apprentice. The children usually came either from
poor families or from families which the community felt would raise the children to
become vagrants and undesirables.
23. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 304.
24. 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 13, at 41.
25. Id.
26. By 1800, the system of almshouses in the United States was rapidly becoming
institutionalized. Some 16 states had such a system in extensive operation. The
"almshouse" approach lasted until the end of the 1800's. Reform was slow owing to
the resistance of those who ran the almshouses and had a large investment in the lands
and buildings used. The ease with which children could be placed in such institutions
and forgotten, and the inability to come up with alternative methods of care, also
created a state of inertia against change. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at
304.
27. Id., where it was reported that a large number of children (both poor and
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until the beginning of the nineteenth century that major efforts were
made to provide separate residences for children, and it took nearly 100
more years before broad-based improvements appeared. 8
The near absence of recorded family child abuse cases in the early
history of this country suggests a trend of the courts to allow a child's
parents their own discretion in determining the kind and degree of
discipline in the home. Parents were believed to be immune from prose-
cution unless the disciplining of children went beyond the bounds of
reasonableness in relation to the offense, or was deemed excessive, or
injured the child permanently.? There existed a legal presumption in the
courts which favored the conduct of the parents as being reasonable."
An 1840 criminal case in Tennessee involved parental prosecution
for excessive punishment."1 The court record indicates that the mother
had repeatedly beaten the child with her fists, and that both parents had
systematically maltreated the child. The court, in reversing the mother's
conviction, noted without citing any precedent that the "right of parents
to chastise their refractory and disobedient children is so necessary to
the government of families . . . that no moralist or lawgiver has ever
thought of interfering with its existence. ... 1
A. Nineteenth Century Awakening of Concern
It was not until the second decade of the nineteenth century that
orphaned) were indiscriminately placed with adult paupers, the mentally unbalanced
and retarded, alcoholics, and persons suffering from venereal disease.
28. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1193 (1970), for an examination of the events leading up to the passage of the 1899
Illinois Juvenile Court Act. One of the purposes of the Act was to improve the condition
of children in orphanages, poor houses, and detention centers.
29. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 305.
30. See State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 348 (1837). Even though this case con-
cerned the right of a teacher to punish a child in the classroom, the court interpreted
this right as being coextensive with that of a parent. See also Kleinfield, The Balance
of Power Between Infants, Parents and the State, 4 FAM. L. Q. 408, 413 (1970).
31. Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. 282 (1840).
32. Id. In this case, the question for the jury to determine was whether the
correction of a child by the defendant so far exceeded the reasonable limits of parental
duty and authority as to amount to a trespass and breach of the peace. The court was
of the opinion that this was a conclusion of fact, to be drawn by the jury, rather than a
conclusion of law. The trial court judge had charged the jury in such a manner as to
encroach upon the province of the jury regarding matters of fact. The court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
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public authorities began to interfere in cases of parental neglect. Most
of these reform movements were directed toward children in institu-
tions, however, and were aimed primarily at preventing a neglected child
from entering a life of crime." Probably the most significant and
helpful of these numerous reform campaigns for child protection was
launched by persons connected with the American Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA).
In New York City in 1874, an old woman near death informed a
church worker who lived in a nearby building that she was aware of a
young girl who was being terribly treated by her step-mother. As a last
wish the old woman wanted to tell someone about this "so she could
rest in peace."34 The church worker sought the help of Henry Bergh
who at that time was the president of the ASPCA. Bergh looked into
the matter and soon thereafter decided to initiate an action, not as
president of the ASPCA, but rather as an individual. He did, however,
use the services of two of the Society's attorneys-Elbridge Gerry and
Ambrose Monell-as legal counsel in the matter. 5 The child, Mary
Ellen Wilson, was apprenticed to her step-mother Mary Connolly in
1866. At that time Mary Ellen was less than two years old. The New
York Times printed a number of articles concerning court hearings in
the spring of 1874 which have formed the basis for a case history.
On April 13, 1874, Mrs. Connolly was indicted by the Grand Jury
of the Court of General Sessions for various offenses which included
"five indictments for assault and battery, felonious assault, assault with
intent to do bodily harm, assault with intent to kill, and assault with
intent to maim. '37 Evidence presented at trial by numerous witnesses
33. See Fox, supra note 28, at 1232-33. Fox noted that the concept of preventive
penology rested essentially on the belief that society could recognize the conditions of
childhood that would give rise to adult criminals, and develop techniques such as institu-
tions, foster homes, and specific probation procedures that would be able to arrest the
condition and prevent the crime. It was believed that legal mechanisms could be used
to enact legislation that could carry out these "reforms."
34. 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1866-
1932, at 185 (R. Bremmer ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH].
See also Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 307-10, for a thorough discussion
of the Mary Ellen case.
35. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note I, at 307. See also N.Y. Times, April
II, 1874, at 2, col. 6.
36. The New York Times provides much of the knowledge of this case through a
series of articles which it printed from April 10, 1874, through December 12, 1875.
37. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1874, at 2, col. 4.
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strongly indicated that a severe condition of abuse and neglect had
purposefully been perpetrated against Mary Ellen. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty after only twenty minutes of deliberation. Mrs. Con-
nolly was sentenced to one year at hard labor in the state prison.38 Mary
Ellen was later sent to the Sheltering Arms, an orphanage in New York
City.
One commentator has noted that "some historical and legal confu-
sion has resulted from the close relationship between the animal and
child protection movements in connection with this case." 39 A number
of articles in the legal and social service fields cite the myth of the Mary
Ellen case as an instance where the ASPCA used the laws against
cruelty to animals as the basis for protecting the child.40 In reciting this
myth, these articles concluded that Mary Ellen, as a member of the
animal kingdom, was entitled to the protection of laws originally en-
acted to safeguard animals from cruel treatment. The facts of the Mary
Ellen case clearly demonstrate a state of governmental neglect with
regard to the supervision and protection of children after agency place-
ments had been made.41
In the aftermath of public indignation over the case, Elbridge T.
Gerry, the ASPCA attorney whose services were used by Bergh,
founded the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren (NYSPCC). It was originally organized as a private group and
later incorporated. Legislation was soon thereafter passed in New York
which authorized the NYSPCC and later similar societies to file com-
plaints for the violation of any laws relating to children. A requirement
of this legislation was that law enforcement officials and the courts were
to aid the societies whenever possible.4"
Similar societies were soon organized in other cities throughout the
nation, and by 1922 there existed some 57 Societies for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children, and 307 humane societies concerned with the
welfare of children. With the advent of government intervention into
38. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1874, at 8, col. 1.
39. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 308.
40. The myth of the Mary Ellen case continues to appear from time to time in
social and legal literature. Some recent articles containing the myth include: Daly,
Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283, 284
(1969); Friedrich & Borniskin, Child Abuse and Neglect in North Dakota, 53 N. DAK.
L. REV. 197, 200 (1976); Katz, Legal Research on Child Abuse and Neglect: Past and
Future, II FAM. L. Q. 151 n.1 (1977).
41. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 310.
42. Id. at 310.
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child welfare, however, the number of these societies began to decline
rapidly.13
B. Some Familial Characteristics of Child Abuse
An early commentator on the treatment of children noted that "the
general history of the child . . . moves as from one mountain peak to
another with a long valley of gloom in between." 44 Numerous reform
movements have been inaugurated with the hope of curtailing child
abuse only to fall by the wayside as the shocking facts of abuse and
neglect become avoided or forgotten over time. 5 Concern reawakened
when a pediatric radiologist wrote an article in 1946 which called to the
attention of the medical community an "unrecognized trauma" de-
scribed as subdural hematomas and multiple bone abnormalities in chil-
dren he had treated." Seven years later, in 1953, Dr. Silverman wrote
an article describing multiple fractures due to recurrent trauma.47 By
1955, medical journal authors had begun to recognize that the injuries
previously called "unrecognized trauma" were inflicted intentionally by
abusive parents." Doctors Wooley and Evans wrote an article in 1955
suggesting the possibility of parental or child custodial abuse.4"
The spark in this resurgence of interest in child abuse was not a
case of abuse like the trial of Mary Ellen's guardian, but rather the
advent of a technological revolution which had changed the course of
medicine. The beneficial uses of x-rays by pediatric radiologists have
43. Id. at 313.
44. G. PAYNE, THE CHILD IN HUMAN HISTORY 302 (1916), as quoted in Child
Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 293.
45. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 293.
46. Caffey, Multiple Fractures on the Long Bones of Infants Suffering from
Chronic Subdural Hematoma, 56 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 163 (1946). Subdural hema-
toma is defined as "[a] hematoma (localized collection of clotted blood) occurring
beneath the dura mater (which is the outer of the three membranes covering the brain
and spinal cord)." J. SCHMIDT, 2 ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE S-135 (1975).
Caffey did not explain what may have caused such injuries, only that they were trau-
matic in origin. This gave rise to the phrase associated with such injuries-
"unrecognized trauma."
47. Silverman, The Roentgen Manifestations of Unrecognized Skeletal Trauma
in Infants, 69 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 413 (1953).
48. See, e.g., Bakwin, Multiple Skeletal Lesions in Young Children Due to
Trauma, 49 J. PEDIATRICS 57 (1956).
49. Wooley & Evans, Significance of Skeletal Lesions in Infants Resembling
Those of Traumatic Origin, 158 J.A.M.A. 593 (1955).
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resulted in more sophisticated ways of seeing subdural hematomas and
abnormal fractures. 50
It was not until July 1962, however, that the full impact of physical
abuse was brought to the attention of the medical profession and subse-
quently to the social service and legal professions, as well. 51 At that time,
Dr. C. Henry Kempe and others published the classic paper which
defined the battered child syndrome as "a term used by us to character-
ize a clinical condition in young children who have received serious
physical abuse, generally from a parent or foster parent."-,2 The impact
of this paper was considerable. The concept of child abuse as inflicted
injury in the Kempe paper was admittedly narrow.53 Dr. Fontana pro-
posed a more broadly defined maltreatment syndrome in which the child
"often presents itself without obvious signs of being battered but with
the multiple minor evidences of emotional and at times, nutritional
deprivation, neglect and abuse. The battered child is only the last phase
of the spectrum of the maltreatment syndrome. ''5
Numerous studies indicate that in families with more than one
child, usually only one of the children is singled out for systematic
abuse. 55 Race, ethnic background, and the socio-economic status of
abusive parents have been found to have no correlation with child
abuse.56 Recent studies have found that child abuse and neglect are not
50. The abused child may have fractures distributed about the body. The value
of x-rays rests essentially on the ease with which previous fractures, some of which may
not be fully healed, can be discerned. To the informed physician, a child's skeleton can
reveal a long history of abuse by telltale signs of unaided bond healing. Silverman,
Radiological Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome, in THE BATTERED CHILD
(Kempe & Heifer, eds., 2d ed., 1974).
51. During the early 1960's, th6 contribution of legal scholars to the area of child
abuse literature was confined primarily to nonlegal publications: Gil, The Legal Nature
of Neglect, 6 NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE A.J. 1 (1960); Harper, The Physician,
The Battered Child, and the Law, 31 PEDIATRICS 899 (1963).
52. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, The Battered Child
Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
53. Id. at 19.
54. Fontana, Donovan, & Wong, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children,
269 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1389 (1963).
55. See Note, The Battered Child: Logic in Search of Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
374 (1971); see also Daly, supra note 40, at 290.
56. Note, supra note 55, at 374. But see Newberger & Hyde, ChildAbuse, Princi-
ples and Implications of Current Pediatric Practice, 22 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 695 (1975), where it has been observed that child abuse is associated with
poverty, low birth weight, and social isolation.
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problems of poor and marginal families alone. 7 They are problems
which affect children of all social classes. Yet child abuse in poor and
marginal families is most often reported. One reason may be that the
more affluent families, whose children receive their medical care in
private practice settings, have a different relationship between practi-
tioner and family. These families tend to have their injuries character-
ized as "accidents," which connotes isolated, random events.58 Research
has shown that there is an association between childhood accidents and
child abuse and neglect.5 9 Many child abuse and neglect cases in wealth-
ier homes are misdiagnosed as "accidents." The terms "abuse" and
"neglect" carry important, implicit judgments which doctors are often
reluctant to make.60 As one commentator notes:
It's easier to make the diagnosis of child abuse if you are a physician
in an inner-city hospital room or in a clinic for the indigent. . . . It is
also less painful to report the case, where the family is not paying you
directly, and where you may never see them again.6
Estimates of child abuse and neglect range from projections of
10,000 children abused each year to one million.62 Clear empirical
knowledge as to the number of deaths resulting from child abuse and
severe neglect is also limited. Estimates range from 700 per year 3 to
6,000 per year.64 Because of this wide range of estimates, it is difficult
to draw a conclusion as to the actual incidence of child abuse in this
country.65 The information gleaned from official statistics must be quali-
57. See Daly, supra note 40, at 290.
58. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 44 (statement of Eli Newberger).
59. Id.
60. id. at 53.
61. Id.
62. See Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the Battered Child
Syndrome, 4 FAM. L.Q. 296, 301 (1970), for an early estimate of the frequency of abuse
cases. One commentator has estimated abuse cases in excess of one million. Light,
Abused and Neglected Children in America, 43 HARV. EDuc. REv. 556, 567 (1975).
63. V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYNDROME IN
CHILDREN 6 (2d ed. 1971).
64. Kempe, Approaches to Preventing Child Abuse, 130 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 941,
945 (1976).
65. A number of research projects use what might be termed "statistical al-
chemy" in developing incidence rates for child abuse in this country. The use of local
or regional estimates applied to the national population only yield a distorted, if not
inaccurate, picture of the true incidence of abuse. 1977 SENATE HEARINGS, supra note
5, at 12.
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fled by the fact that they represent only "caught" cases of abuse which
became cases through varied reporting and confirmation procedures."
While physical punishment of children appears to be almost a uni-
versal aspect of the parent-child relationship, very little is known about
the modes and patterns of violence toward children. Numerous studies
have shown that abuse in families may not be as fiaphazard an occurr-
ence as has been previously supposed." One expert believes that this
generation's battered children, if they survive, will become the next
generation's battering parents."8 The most important aspect of this
"cyclical pattern" is that of those neglected and abused children who
survive, many will suffer future emotional and psychological crippling
which will be passed on to succeeding generations. 9 Abusive and neg-
lectful parents have often been found to be lonely, isolated people, with
few friends and little outside contact with society.7° Numerous forms of
dysfunction of the home environment may occur in conjunction with
instances of child abuse.71
The abuse and neglect of children by parents may occur at any age
with an increased incidence in children under three years of age. A large
percentage of these children are under six months of age.72 The lives of
abusing parents are often marked with divorce, extra-marital relation-
ships, alcoholism, poor housing, and financial distress.73 These stress
66. Another difficulty in determining what is an accurate picture of the abuse
problem is relying solely on reported or "caught" cases of child abuse and neglect. Like
the tip of an iceberg, which may only represent 10% of the total mass, "caught" cases
of abuse do not accurately represent the totality of the problem. The statistics used by
many researchers should be prefaced by a statement explaining what they actually
are-"educated guesses."
67. See D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 27 (1971); Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 205.
68. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 502 (statement of Vincent J. Fontana,
M.D.).
69. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 335.
70. See, e.g., Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 205; Note, supra note 55,
at 375; Daly, supra note 40, at 292.
71. Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 202, where it was noted that marital
conflict, social isolation, and the social pressures of financial adversity act in conjunc-
tion with the abuse of children who are members of families with such difficulties.
72. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 505 (statement of Vincent J. Fontana,
M.D.). Very young children are abused more often than older children because they are
usually unable to protect themselves and generally must rely on the help of others.
73. The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect, Children's Division
of the American Humane Association, gathered information on child abuse and neglect
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factors all contribute to the condition that causes the potentially abusive
parent to strike out at a special child during a crisis situation. The
parents' own lack of love, support, and protection makes them unable
to give love, affection, and empathic care to their own children. 74 One
commentator has developed a schema of the life cycle of an abused child
becoming an abusing parent. 75 The schema is entitled the World of
for the calendar year 1975. In examining the figures which follow, the caveats stated in
notes 65-66, supra, should be considered.
I. Reporting: Neglect and Abuse Number Per cent
Total number of reports of 289,837
neglect and abuse
Number of cases investigated 228,899 79.0%
Status undetermined 60,938 21.0%
Of investigated cases of
neglect and abuse: (228,899)
found to be valid 136,504 59.6%
found not valid 92,395 40.4%
II. Alleged Abusers-Neglecters
Natural parents (83.80%)
Step-parents (6.08%)
Adoptive parents (0.10%)
Paramours (1.80%)
I1. Types of Abuse Reported
Physical injuries, minor 30,310 (50.3%)
Sexual abuse 6,372 (10.6%)
Physical injuries, major 1,384 (2.3%)
Burns, scalding 1,578 (2.6%)
Physical abuse (unspecified) 20,557 (34.1%)
Proposed Extension of the Child Abuse and Treatment Act, 1977: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
74. This emotional neglect, or the lack of a warm, sensitive interaction necessary
for the child's optimal growth and development, may have tragic consequences for the
child as he reaches adulthood. The absence of adequate empathic care or mothering
during the first two years of life may cause the child to lack basic trust and confidence.
NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, 1 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 18
(1975).
75. R. Heifer, THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS AND TREATMENT PROCESS 26 (U.S.
Dep't. Health, Ed., & Welfare, Publ. No. (OHD) 75-69, 1975).
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Abnormal Rearing, or the WAR cycle. It views a child from conception
through mating, with the intervening steps illustrating how environmen-
tal factors may largely determine how the child will function in society. 7
The inability of abusive parents to cope with the rearing of their
children has led commentators to suggest that the essential element in
this abuse and neglect is not the parents' intention to destroy the chil-
dren, but rather their inadequacy to nurture them properly. 77 This in-
ability to care for children may cause such children to suffer emotional
as well as physical trauma which, if allowed to continue, will ultimately
threaten their survival. 78
2. THE LEGAL RESPONSE-CHILD ABUSE
LEGISLATION AT FEDERAL AND STATE LEVELS
Without adequate guidance at federal and state levels, little success
can be expected in the areas of preventing and treating cases of child
abuse and neglect. The grim reality of child abuse and the revelations
of research in this area have spurred communities into social action.
Public concern and recognition of need have pressured legislative bodies
into giving attention to the problem at a pace with little precedent in
recent legislative history. 79 The introduction of child abuse legislation in
1963 amounted to eighteen bills, eleven of which achieved passage that
year." California was reputed to be the first state in the nation to have
enacted a child abuse reporting statute, which required certain desig-
nated groups to report known or suspected instances of abuse., In 1964,
ten more states passed reporting laws, with another twenty-six states
76. For a brief examination of the twelve steps of the WAR cycle, see Friedrich
& Borniskin, supra note 40, at 206.
77. Newberger, The Myth of the Battered Child Syndrome, 40 CURRENT MED.
DIALOG 327 (1973).
78. Id.
79. See Daly, supra note 40, at 284-85, where she suggests that the rapid pass'age
of the child abuse reporting laws was due to a combined mass media response to the
problem. This resulted in an outpouring of public attention on the subject which com-
pelled legislatures to enact state reporting laws.
80. D. GIL, supra note 67, at 21-22.
81. California was reputed to have an earlier statute, but it did not specifically
relate to children. The old law required reporting of any injuries by any person in
violation of any penal statute. For a discussion of the 1963 California Act see McCoid,
The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L. REV.
1, 21-22 (1965).
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doing so in 1965.82 Some of the laws enacted by state legislatures be-
tween 1963 and 1967 were hastily conceived and reflected public indig-
nation against parents who abused their children. Most of these early
statutes, however, accurately saw the need for protective social services
on behalf of the child victims.83
These laws were characterized by many differences in form and
substance. They also contained many similarities, due in large measure
to suggested legislative guidelines developed by various private and gov-
ernmental agencies which promoted mandatory reporting laws.
The most significant of these model acts which motivated the estab-
lishment of reporting laws was one proposed by the Children's Bureau
of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.84
This legislative model acted as a catalyst in encouraging the states to
require mandatory reporting of cases of child abuse." In 1963, the
Children's Division of the American Humane Association promulgated
its own legislative guideline.86 While the Children's Bureau model re-
stricted its mandatory reporting to physicians, the AHA model ex-
tended such reporting of child abuse or neglect to public or private
welfare community agencies.87 Legislative guides were published by
other medical associations during this period, as well. The New York
County Medical Association suggested legislation that would extend
82. D. GIL, supra note 67, at 21-22.
83. Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L. Q.
245, 310 (1974), where it is noted that the main function of the reporting statutes is to
ensure that various social and protective services of the state are activated to treat the
child and the parents while, at the same time, protecting the child from further harm.
But see Fraser, Independent Representation for the Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13
CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 16, 19 (1976), where he asserted that the purpose of the initial
statutes was misleading. The quick identification of abused children by a mandated
group of reporters, the rapid investigation of reported cases, and adequate treatment
being offered all proved to be too simplistic. Fraser concluded:
In short, persons who were mandated to report did not know that they were so
obligated and furthermore, were not aware of child abuse. Many of the persons
who were able to identify the symptoms and knew of their obligation to report,
refused to do so even though a number of states included a criminal provision
for a failure to report. Finally, effective treatment was not available in most
communities.
84. For the text of this model act see McCoid, supra note 81, at 20.
85. Sussman, supra note 83, at 247; see also Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1967).
86. Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 1, at 331.
87. Id.
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coverage beyond physicians and hospitals to "persons, firms or corpora-
tions conducting a pharmacy.""
Two newer models have recently been promulgated. The first is the
American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project, which
developed a Model Child Abusing Report.89 Even though the final draft
of this model act was proposed after the enactment of the 1974 Federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,9" it does not appear to meet
the scope of that Act's requirements. Another recent addition to the list
of model acts is the model developed by the Education Commission of
the States.9 The primary purpose of this model is to offer state legisla-
tures a guideline on how best to meet the broad requirements of the
Federal Act.
A. Federal Legislation
Government at the national level did not become involved in the
welfare of children until 1912, when, after much debate, Congress pro-
mulgated an act which established the United States Children's Bu-
reau.92 This act became law on April 9, 1912, and authorized the estab-
lishment of a bureau which was charged to conduct research and provide
information about children.93 With the passage of the Social Security
Act during President Roosevelt's first term in office in 1935, 91 the fed-
eral government became more directly involved in child welfare serv-
ices.95 The emphasis was placed upon the "protection and care of the
88. For the text of this model act see Daly, supra note 40, at 312-13.
89. ABA, MODEL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING LAW (Jan. 3, 1975).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 5101-06 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Federal Act].
The House Committee on Education and Labor submitted Report No. 95-609 to the
Committee of the Whole House on September 14, 1977. H.R. 6693, a Bill entitled
"Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Amendments of 1977," passed the House on
September 26, 1977. H.R. 6693 passed the Senate with amendments containing the text
of S. 961 on October 27, 1977, with S. 961 being indefinitely postponed. H.R. 6693, as
amended, extends the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act through the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1982. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, CHILD
ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R. Rep. No. 609, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 HOUSE AMENDMENTS].
91. EDUCATION COMMISSION ON THE STATES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
MODEL LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES (March 1976).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 191-94 (1970).
93. Id. § 192.
94. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396).
95. Id. § 521(a), 49 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 721), repealed by Social
27 112:1978
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homeless, dependent and neglected children and children in danger of
becoming delinquent." 96
Congress made significant amendments to the Social Security Act
in 196211 which required each state to make child welfare services avail-
able to all children. It provides the necessary co-ordination between
current child welfare services9" and the social services under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program.9 This latter requirement
was to be accomplished by maximizing the use of existing personnel in
providing basic services to those qualified for the programs. This
amendment broadened the definition of "child welfare services" to in-
clude the prevention of child abuse.' °°
Under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act,101 federal funding had
been fixed at $46 to $50 million from 1972 to 1974.102 Of these sums
available for IV-B activities, only $507,000 was spent on activities re-
lated to child abuse. 103 It is clear that the Act purposefully limited itself
to assisting the states through the commitment of funds and research
grants for child welfare programs. Recently, however, the federal gov-
ernment established a mandatory reporting requirement and created a
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect."0 4
Security Amendments of 1967, § 240, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 911, 915 (1968).
96. Id.
97. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
98. Id. § 102(b), 76 Stat. 182-83 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 723), repealed by Social
Security Amendments of 1967, § 240, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 911, 915 (1968).
99. Id. § 105(a), 76 Stat. 186-87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609).
100. Id. § 102(d), 76 Stat. 184 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 721 & 728, repealed by
Social Security Amendments of 1967, § 240, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 911 (1968).
See 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1970) for present definition.
101. Title IV-B of the Social Security Act authorizes child welfare programs
including protective services for children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-26 (1970), as amended by
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 412, 86 Stat. 1492, Social
Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, §§ 6 & 8, 88 Stat. 2348-49, Fiscal
Year Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 94-273, § 22, 90 Stat. 375.
102. H.R. Rep. No. 685, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2763, 2765.
103. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 would require that the Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare establish research priorities for the making of
grants of contracts. Further, the Secretary would be required to submit proposed priori-
ties to the Federal Register at least 60 days before their establishment, for public
comment. 1977 HousE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at 10.
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The Federal Act provides assistance at the national level for the
identification, prevention, and treatment of child abuse and neglect. °"
This legislation went beyond that of a mere reporting statute and
"mandated certain remedial and therapeutic steps be taken upon receipt
of a child abuse report."'0 6 The Federal Act envisions the reporting of
child abuse as the first of a series of steps in a comprehensive plan for
child protection and for the amelioration of the abused child's environ-
ment. Not only does the Federal Act seek to place a greater emphasis
on social worker case work, rather than mere case carrying;0 7 it also
entails having available a trained staff of state and local personnel who
can closely examine every suspected case of child abuse.
The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect is required to
collect and distribute information on child abuse, and also gather infor-
mation toward an annual survey of child abuse and neglect in the nation.
Federal monies are available for specific purposes, which include project
grants and research contracts designed to assist in the identification,
prevention, and treatment of child abuse and neglect."0 ' These funds may
be spent on demonstration programs and the establishment and mainte-
nance of centers which provide additional counseling services.00
The primary benefits of the Federal Act are directed at the state
level. A grant system has been devised that requires not "less than 5
percent of the monies appropriated in carrying out the Act . . . to go
to the states""' for the purpose of developing, strengthening, and carry-
ing out child abuse prevention treatment programs. The Federal Act
also mandates that not less than fifty per cent of the funds available for
any fiscal year must be spent on grants to and contracts with "public
agencies or nonprofit private organizations (or combinations thereof)
for demonstration programs and projects designed to prevent, identify
105. 42 U.S.C. § 5101-06 (Supp. V 1975).
106. Krause, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Legislation in Missouri, 42 Mo.
L. REV. 207, 216 (1977).
107. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 3.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 5101(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 requires that grants made
under the Federal Act may be made for a maximum period of three years. Review of
such grants must be on an annual basis. 1977 HOUSE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at
10.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(a)(4)(Supp. V 1975).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(1)(Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 would permit up to 30%
of funds appropriated for any fiscal year to be used in the form of grants to the states.
1977 HOUsE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at 11.
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and treat child abuse and neglect."''
For a state to qualify for assistance under the Federal Act a number
of rather stringent requirements must be met. These requirements in-
clude:"' (1) implementation of a state program which provides for re-
porting of known or suspected instances of child abuse and neglect; (2)
prompt investigation of reports by properly constituted authorities; (3)
specific administrative procedures and adequate personnel to deal with
child abuse and neglect; (4) immunity provisions for persons reporting
suspected instances of child abuse and neglect so long as such reports
are made in good faith; (5) preservation of the confidentiality of records,
with criminal sanctions being exacted against those who disseminate
such information in an unauthorized manner; (6) co-operation between
agencies dealing with child abuse and neglect cases; (7) public dissemi-
nation of information on the problems, incidence, and other related
information assisting in the identification, prevention, and treatment of
child abuse and neglect; (8) a prohibition against any state cutback in
expenditures appropriated for child abuse and neglect programs below
that of funds designated in fiscal year 1973; and (9) to the extent feasi-
ble, the Federal Act calls for the co-operation of the state agencies with
parental organizations which are combatting child abuse and neglect in
their respective states. The states are also required to appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent an abused or neglected child in a judicial proceed-
ing.113
Even though the Federal Act has been in existence for four years,
not all of the states have been able to comply fully with its provisions
for funding purposes."4 A number of reasons have been cited which
111. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(a)(Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 would authorize that pro-
grams "funded under section 4 of the act shall include service programs and projects,
in addition to demonstration programs and projects." This would permit federal support
for direct services to abused children and their families in lieu of grants given strictly
for research and demonstration projects. 1977 HoUSE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at
10-11.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(A)-(J)(Supp. V 1975). H.R. 6693 does not address
itself to this section of the Federal Act.
113. Id. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (Supp. V 1975).
114. The following is a list of states eligible for federal monies by fiscal year.
Fiscal Year 1974: Hawaii, New York, Tennessee. Fiscal Year 1975: Arkansas, Connect-
icut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Virginia. Fiscal Year 1976: Alabama, California,
Delaware*, Kansas, Louisiana*, Michigan*, New Jersey*, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas*, Washington*. States with an asterisk have been placed in a conditional grant
2:1978 1
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make it difficult for the states to comply with the Federal Act." 5 One
is the time-consuming process of making the substantial changes neces-
sary-both administratively and legislatively-to conform their current
operations and state laws to those required under the Federal Act. Some
states have found the guardian ad litem requirement to be a burdensome
demand on their judicial systems."' Other states are having difficulty
with the definition of child abuse because their statutory definitions of
abuse are not as comprehensive as the Federal Act requires." 7
Questions of an individual's right to privacy and the confidentiality
of records have been raised with regard to the establishment of central
registries."' States which have central registries use them to receive
reports of suspected or known instances of abuse or neglect, establish a
tracking system of abused and neglected children and their families, and
provide a statistical profile of the incidence and social characteristics of
those children and their families."' Some experts believe that despite
procedures in many states which require invalid reports to be expunged
from the system, there exists the danger that they may not be. There
also exists the possibility that unauthorized persons may gain access to
the information in the system.'
B. Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse-
the State Reporting Statutes
The discovery of the bruised and weighted-down body of three-
year-old Roxanne Felumero in the East River of New York City in 1969
set off a public furor when it was learned that just two months prior to
her death her parents had been brought before the New York Family
Court for alleged abuse and neglect. The judge had released the young
girl back to her parent's custody.'' The inability of the courts to prove
conclusively the criminal act of child abuse can lead to just this type of
category. For full eligibility of federal monies each of these states must submit requested
documentation. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 397-98.
115. DHEW Regulations Implementing Pub. L. No. 93-247, 45 C.F.R. § 231;
[1977 Documents Binder]; FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 101.0061.
116. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 182 (statement of Arabella Marti-
nez).
117. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,936 (1974).
118. See text accompanying notes 289-98, infra.
119. See text accompanying notes 184-86, infra.
120. Sussman, supra note 83, at 312.
121. Grumet, supra note 62, at 310.
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unfortunate situation. Protecting a child from abuse is a difficult task,
since the victim of the abuse often will not-or cannot-testify against
his or her assailant. Abuse usually takes place in the privacy of the home
away from public scrutiny, and even when it is reported, it is difficult
to prove in the absence of eyewitnesses. The need to discover and iden-
tify abused children is the primary reason for devising a case-finding
tool such as the reporting laws.
In one form or another all fifty states and the District of Columbia
have child abuse statutes. 22 These laws encourage or require the report-
122. ALA. CODE tit. 27 § 20-25 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. §§47.17.010
to 17.070 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977; ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-827, 13-842 (West Supp.
1957-1977), to be renumbered §§ 13-3619 to 13-3622 (effective Oct. 1, 1979); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-807 to 818 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11161.5 to 11162, 273a (Deering
Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10-101 to 10-1 15 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-38a to 47 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, ch. 9
(Revised 1974); D.C. CODE §§ 2-161 to 183 (1973); FLA. STAT. §§ 827.07-.12, as amended
by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-109 to 111 (1973 &
Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1601 to 1630
(Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2051-2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-3-4.1 to 3-4.1-6 (Bums 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
235A.1-.24 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. §§ 38-716 to 724 (1973
& Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403
(West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3851-3860 (West
Supp. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Replacement
1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A-5IF (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978), as amended by 1977 Mass. Legis. Serv. 623 (West); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 722.621-.636 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.556 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), as amended by 1977 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 462-463
(West); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-24-1 to 24-9 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
210.110-.165 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978), §§ 568.050-.060 (Vernon Special Pamphlet
1978, effective Jan. 1, 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1300 to 1322 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1501 to 1508 (1975), to be renumbered §§ 28-1450 to 1457
(effective July 1, 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.501-508 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 169:37-45 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.8 to 8.73 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-14-2, 13-14-3, 13-14-14.1 to 14.2 (Replacement 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney 1976), as amended by chs. 423, 518 (Consol. 1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 110-115 to 122 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-
01 to 25.1-14 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 843-848 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 418.740-.775
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 40-11-1 to 11-16 (1977); S.C. CODE §§ 20-310 to 310.6 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-10-10 to 10-15 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1201 (1977); TEX.
FAM. CODE tit. 2, §§ 34.01-.08, 35.04 (Vernon 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 55-16-1 to 16-7 (1974 & Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1351-1356
(Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 63.1-248.1 to 248.17 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV.
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ing of suspected or known cases of child abuse. Many include criminal
provisions to punish or rehabilitate those who abuse children and estab-
lish or authorize protective services for children.
(1). A SURVEY OF THE REPORTING STkTUTES
The state reporting laws have undergone considerable change in the
past five years. For analysis purposes, each of the state's reporting laws
may be divided in thirteen basic areas of concern. These areas include:
(1) a statement of purpose; (2) definition of abuse and neglect; (3)
mandatory or permissive reporting of suspected cases of child abuse or
neglect; (4) mandatory reporting to a medical examiner or coroner; (5)
authorized reporting procedures; (6) immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution for reporting; (7) sanctions for failure to report; (8) statu-
tory abrogation of privileged communications; (9) temporary protective
custody; (10) evidentiary use of color photographs and x-rays; (11) the
central registry; (12) failure to provide medical care because of religious
beliefs; and (13) the guardian ad litem. The degree of conformity, the
extent of common agreement, the presence or absence of these thirteen
elements, and the strengths and weaknesses of these enactments will be
reviewed.lu
(a). A statement of purpose. The policy of a state regarding a
specific law is usually found in an intent clause which defines the pur-
pose sought to be served by the legislative act. In that statement, the
legislature expresses the ultimate goals and objectives which it believes
the law should achieve. While the purpose does not have the force of
law behind it, it can serve as a guide for interpreting or resolving doubts
created by language found within the law.
Forty-one states include purpose clauses in their reporting stat-
utes, 2 all directed to the necessity of providing protection to the child
CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010 to 44.080 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-1 to 6-8, 49-6A-
I to 6A-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-21, 14-28.7 to 28.15 (Interim Supp. 1977).
123. This article does not extensively cover the historical development of legisla-
tion in this area. For a thorough discussion of legislative history, see Paulsen, supra note
85, at 1.
124. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 20(2) (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-827 (West Supp. 1957-1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-
10-102 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Cum. Supp. 1978);
DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 901 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973); FLA. STAT. §
12:1978
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and for the prevention of further abuse. These states further provide for
the use of protective services to children.' Twenty-nine states speak to
the non-punitive intent of the law and the desire to preserve the family
unit whenever possible.' Also present in purpose clauses are the kinds
of community resources sought to be marshaled into action on behalf
of abused children. New York calls for the establishment of a child
protection service in each county to investigate reports and provide
protection for the child and rehabilitation for the parents or person
827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
111 (d) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23 § 2052 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-1 (Burns
1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.1 (West 1969); KAN. STAT. § 38-716 (1973); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 199.335(1) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 A (West 1974); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 3851 (West Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (Replace-
ment 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.621 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.556(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1300
(Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.501 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:37 (Supp.
1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.8 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-2 (Replace-
ment 1976); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-
116 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-01 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1977-1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.745 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-1 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1977); TEx. FAM.
CODE tit. 2, § 34.05 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7351 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-
6A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-21 (Interim Supp. 1977).
125. Id.
126. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.010 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (Cum.
Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 901 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973); FLA.
STAT. § 827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-11 l(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.1 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-716 (Cum. Supp. 1977); KY. REV. STAT. §
199.335 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3851 (West Cum. Supp. 1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.621 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
621.556(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.501 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169.37 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-2 (Replacement 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-116 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.745 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-1 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1351 (Cum. Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.010
(Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-I (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 14-21 (Interim
Supp. 1977).
I
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1
acting in loco parentis.2 1 The Louisiana purpose clause directs that its
reporting statute "be administered and interpreted to provide the great-
est possible protection as promptly as possible for such children."'
(b). Definition of abuse and neglect. Since the inception of the
first reporting laws in 1963, the definition of "abuse" has undergone
considerable change. A "child" has been defined as any person under
the age of 18 in forty-seven states,'29 under 17 in one state,' and under
16 in two states.'' New York, until recently, had a dual age require-
ment: it defined an "abused child" as a child under 16 and a "maltreated
child" as a child under 18.132 Some states look to the mental or physical
127. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1976).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (1974).
129. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 20(1)(3) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-
842.01(F) (West Supp. 1957-1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38b
(Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE §2-162 (1973);
FLA. STAT. § 827.07(1)(a) (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-11 l(a) (1953); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 2053 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-3 (Bums Cum. Supp.
1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.2(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-
722(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §'2.015 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14.403 B(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (West Supp. 1975);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 51A (West. Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.622(a)(West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. STAT. § 210.110 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(1) (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §200.5011(1) (1977);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:38 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9 (West 1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3A (Replacement 1976); N.Y. ch. 518, §§ 1-2 (Consol. 1977);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-117(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(1)
(Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(2) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2 (1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1201 (1977); TEx. FAM.
CODE tit. 2, § 11.01(1) (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-16-1.5 (Supp. 1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 173 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-2 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (1957). NEB. REV. STAT. § 38.101 (1974) (provides
that any person under the age of 19 is considered a minor).
130. S.C. CODE § 20-310.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
131. ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, ch. 17.070 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYo. STAT. § 14-
28.7(a)(ii) (Interim Supp. 1977).
132. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 412(l)-(2) (McKinney 1976). The New York legis-
lature recently enacted a law which defines an abused and neglected child as being under
the age of 18. N.Y. ch. 518, §§ 1-2 (Consol. 1977).
1 2:97
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condition of a person, as well as to that person's age, when declaring a
class of persons to be protected by the reporting law. Washington de-
fines such a class as "any person under the age of 18 years," which
"includes mentally retarded persons, regardless of age."', Another
state includes in its statute "any crippled or otherwise physically or
mentally handicapped child under 21 years who has suffered any wound,
injury, disability, or condition of such a nature as to reasonably indicate
abuse or neglect."' 34
The term "abuse" has been given a wide-ranging meaning under
the reporting statutes. There is much variation in the manner in which
states have chosen to define abuse. The trend nationally has been in the
direction of broadening the definition. In many instances it includes
neglect,3 5 acts of emotional abuse,3 ' and the perpetration of sexual
abuse or molestation. 3 ' A number of states qualify their definition of
abuse by inserting the word "serious" prior to the phrase "physical
injury."' 38 The Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming statutes define abuse
in very explicit medical terms.3 9 Other states, however, give a broad
definition of what constitutes child abuse. Alaska defines "abuse" as
"the infliction, by other than accidental means, of physical harm upon
the body of a child."4 0 States such as Nebraska also give a broad
definition of abuse, but enumerate specific acts which include:
"tortured, cruelly confined, or cruelly punished"; or "left unattended in
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(6) (Supp. 1976).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976).
135. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977),
which provides a definition of "neglect," as follows:
a failure to provide, by those responsible for the care and maintenance of the
child, the proper and necessary support, education as required by law or medical
or other remedial care, recognized under State law, other care necessary for the
child's well-being; or abandonment by his parent, guardian or custodian; or sub-
jecting a child to an environment injurious to the child's welfare.
136. The language of a number of statutes broadly construes "emotional abuse"
as the endangering of the child's emotional well-being. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 38-722
(Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403B(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
137. Research in the area of sexual abuse has resulted in an increasing awareness
of this form of physical abuse and the emotional impact it has on young children in
particular. See Sussman, supra note 83, at 254.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50.25.1-02(1) (Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1602(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.7(a)(ii)(B) (Interim Supp. 1977).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.070 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Nova Law Journal 2:1978 1
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a motor vehicle, if such minor child is 6 years of age or younger"; or
"sexually abused."''
The Federal Act focuses attention on "child abuse and neglect" as
a unified term and defines this singular phrase as "the physical or
mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a
child under the age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the
child's welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's
health or welfare is harmed or threatened."'4 Nineteen states have
followed the lead of the Federal Act in viewing abuse and neglect as
conditions falling along a continuum of maltreatment of children.'
This means that abuse, neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional deprivation
are all considered forms of child maltreatment. When these factors of
abuse are placed along a continuum, they tend to flow one into the other
and lose their distinctive characteristics.'44 Such an approach makes it
easier for social service personnel and the courts to interpret what the
offense perpetrated against a child is on a case by case basis. 5 A
neglected child may also be considered abused, depending upon the
severity of injury involved. Sufficient harm may be evident in instances
where the child suffers severe emotional deprivation, starvation, death
by neglect, or even infant addiction to drugs due to the habit of the
mother.'
A number of states include in their reporting statutes a provision
which recognizes that abuse may not be limited only to individual perpe-
trators.47 To protect children from such institutional abuse, thirteen
141. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1501(3) (1975).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (Supp. V 1975).
143. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(1)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 38.722 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3851
(West Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(2)(a)(b) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REv. STAT. §
28-1501(3) (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(1) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9(a)-
(d) (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV.
STAT. § 418.740(1) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); R.I. GEN. LAW § 40-11-2(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1202(16) (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1.5
(Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
26.44.020 (Supp. 1976).
144. Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 199.
145. Id. at 200.
146. Sussman, supra note 83, at 262.
147. See FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6)(a), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
12:1978
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states provide that when a government agency is accused of abusing a
child an investigation must be conducted by a designated agency other
than the one accused of committing the abusive act. " '
(c). The mandatory or permissive reporting of suspected cases
and neglect. The early reporting statutes almost uniformly limited
reporting of suspected instances of child abuse to physicians. Many of
these statutes were not even mandatory. "9 Those states having permis-
sive reporting statutes generally permitted a physician to make a report
if he felt the need to do so. One writer has noted that in "these cases
• . . the aim is more to protect the physician than the child."'' From
this it would appear that a physician could make a medical judgment
his first concern, rather than the underlying social policy of the report-
ing statutes.'5 ' The argument used by opponents of broad-based manda-
tory reporting rested on two points. First, the physician was usually the
only person to see the child. Second, only a physician had the requisite
medical training to distinguish injuries caused by abuse from those
caused by accidental means. 52 Later statutes uniformly made reporting
mandatory for physicians.5
The trend in defining child abuse has expanded the criteria for
reportable situations as well as the list of professionals who are required
to report. Medical practioners remain the most logical and responsible
group to come in contact with children whose injuries require treatment.
In recent years, the list of mandated reporters has grown steadily from
Law Serv., which provides: "Any report which alleges that an employee or agent of the
department [of Social and Rehabilitative Services] acting in an official capacity, has
committed an act of child abuse shall be investigated by the State Attorney in whose
circuit the alleged act of child abuse occurred."
148. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(l)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law.
Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 305-1 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1301(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1501(3) (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(1) (1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.9(a)-(d) (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. I1, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1354 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
149. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 7.
150. Daly, supra note 40, at 305.
151. Id.
152. Shepard, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182,
191 (1965).
153. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child
Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 103, 109 (1974).
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persons in the medical and related fields to almost everyone connected
in some professional capacity with large numbers of children.", It has
been shown that child abuse is often an on-going trauma and that other
persons besides physicians will come into contact with it.155 One survey
has found physicians and hospitals not to be among the most prolific
of reporters.15 When they do come across instances of child abuse, it is
only after the injuries have become serious enough to warrant emer-
gency medical care. 157
Enlarging the class of reporters results in placing into the legislative
mandate the moral obligation of all persons to come to the assistance
of the protective services of the community where the child is located.
Besides physicians, social service personnel,' teachers,'59 hospital in-
terns and residents, 60 psychologists, 6' osteopaths, 6 ' police officers,1ss
154. Id.
155. Grumet, supra note 62, at 305.
156. The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect, Children's Divi-
sion of the American Humane Association, gathered information on abuse and neglect
reports which were made to the mandated authorities by many agencies and individuals
in the communities. Data on this aspect of the study were grouped as follows:
Percentage
Sources of all reports
Public and private social agencies, schools, school
personnel, police, courts, "hotlines." 39.40%
Neighbors, friends, relatives, siblings. 40.60%
Hospitals, physicians, nurses, coroners, medical
examiners. 9.70%
Others (not specified). 8.50%
1977 House Hearings, supra note 73, at 150.
157. Id.
158. Forty-two states presently specifically mandate social service personnel to
report suspected or known cases of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27,
§ 21 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, § 17.020(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(2)(m) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
159. Forty-two states require that teachers report any suspected or known cases
of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-38a (Cum. Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977-1978).
160. Thirty-nine states require that hospital interns and residents report suspected
or known cases of child abuse and neglect. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a
(Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 C (1) (West 1974).
161. Twenty states require that psychiatrists and psychologists report suspected
1 2:97
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medical examiners and coroners, " hospitals, 65 clergymen,'66 and law-
yers '6 are also mandated to report instances of child abuse. Twenty-six
states require reporting by "any other person who has cause to believe"
that abuse has occurred." 8 Some states provide for voluntary reports by
or known cases of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Revised
1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
162. Twenty-two states mandate that osteopaths report suspected or known cases
of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01A (West Supp. 1957-
1977); HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § 350-1 (1976).
163. Only two states required reporting from law enforcement officials in 1967.
The number increased to 14 in 1973. Sussman, supra note 83, at 272. Twenty-eight
states now require law enforcement officials to report known or suspected cases of child
abuse or neglect. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(1) (Supp. 1977).
164. Two states required coroners or medical examiners to report known or
suspected cases of child abuse in 1967. The number increased to nine in 1973. Sussman,
supra note 83, at 272. Twenty-four states presently require the reporting of known or
suspected cases of child abuse or neglect by coroners or medical examiners. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.740(3)(f) (1977).
165. Six states require hospitals to report suspected or known cases of child abuse
or neglect. Other states indirectly require hospitals to report by mandating physicians
on a hospital staff to report to the chief administrator of the hospital in which he is
employed if a case of child abuse is discovered in the hospital. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
166. Clergymen are required to report known or suspected cases of child abuse
or neglect in six states. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(b) (1977).
167. Three states require that attorneys report suspected or known cases of child
abuse or neglect. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(d) (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.740(3)(m) (1977).
168. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01 (West Supp. 1957-1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-38c (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 902 (Revised 1974); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4),
as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Cum.
Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE
ANN. § 12-3-4.1-2 (Burns 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1977); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 35A(e) (Replacement 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1502 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(3) (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:40 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14.1A (Replacement 1976); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(a) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(2) (Supp. 1977);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-
11-3 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203
(Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.01 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-
16-2 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. §
14-28.8(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
1 40
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any person who has reason to suspect abuse or neglect."6 9 One state
provides that certain designated professional institutional reporters may
make oral reports to department or institution heads. 170
(d). Mandatory reporting to a medical examiner or coroner. It
has been only within the past few years that medical examiners or
coroners have been required to receive reports on suspected instances
of child abuse which result in death. In 1967, only two states required
that reports be made to medical examiners or coroners.' 7' This number
increased to nine states by 1973.171 At the present time, eleven states
require that reports be transmitted to the local medical examiner or
coroner in such instances . 7 The paucity of statutes requiring that re-
ports be made to medical examiners prompted one commentator to note
that even though "death ends the possibility of protecting the particular
child, an investigation of the circumstances and the family may bring
assistance to the remaining children." 74 A nearly uniform provision in
these reporting statutes is the requirement that a medical examiner or
coroner, upon receipt of an abuse case resulting in the death of the
infant, forward all information to the police, state attorney, or responsi-
ble social services agency.'75 This procedure is aimed at ensuringthat
169. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978),
which provides that in addition to persons mandated to report, "any other person who
believes that a child has had physical injury inflicted upon him as a result of abuse may
[also] make a report. .. ."
170. VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3 (Cum. Supp. 1977), provides that if information on
child abuse is received by a "teacher, staff member, resident, intern or nurse in the
course of professional services in a hospital, school or similar institution," such person
may "in place of a written report notify the head of the institution or department, who
shall be required to make a report." This statute also provides that any other person
who suspects a case of child abuse has occurred may make a complaint to the appropri-
ate authorities.
171. Sussman, supra note 83, at 272.
172. Id.
173. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-809 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-105 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.; KAN. STAT. § 38-721(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 5 IA (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(5) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 418 (McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2210 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9:1
(Interim Supp. 1977).
174. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 12.
175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv., which provides:
2:1978
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child abuse deaths are promptly reported and recognized as such by the
protective services of each community.
(e). Authorized reporting procedures. Many of the child abuse
reporting statutes treat extensively the procedure to be followed by the
state agency receiving a report. The primary receiving agencies involv-
ing instances of child abuse are the police, social services agencies, the
juvenile courts, and the state attorney. In some states a choice in the
order of contacting these agencies is provided to the reporter" 6 Twenty-
six states provide that reports be made initially to law enforcement
officials or police."' One state requires a report to be made to juvenile
courts,'78 while seven other states provide that reports be made to the
state attorney's office. 79 By far the largest recipients of reports are the
Any person required to report or investigate cases of suspected child abuse
or maltreatment, who has cause to suspect that a child has died as a result of
abuse or maltreatment, shall report that fact to the appropriate medical examiner.
The medical examiner shall accept the report for investigation pursuant to §
406.11 and shall report his finding to the police, the appropriate State Attorney,
and the department. Autopsy reports maintained by the medical examiner shall
not be subject to the confidentiality requirement provided for in this section.
176. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (1977), which provides that a reporter
who suspects that an act of child abuse has occurred "shall report such harm immedi-
ately, by telephone or otherwise, to the judge having juvenile jurisdiction or to the
county office of the sheriff or other law-enforcement official of the municipality where
the child resides."
177. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. §
47.17.020(a)(c) (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 903 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Cum. Supp.
1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 12-3-4.1-2 (Burns 1973); IowA CODE ANN. § 235A.4(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(3) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 D (1) (West 1974);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(d) (Replacement 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1502 (1975); NEv. REV. STAT. §
200.502(1) (1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 418.755 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); TEx. FAM. CODE tit. 2,
§ 34.02 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1977); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.98 1(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); WYo. STAT. § 14-28.9(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
178. KAN. STAT. § 38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
179. IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.4(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. §
38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(d) (Replacement 1976);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 16-1304 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1206(0 (Supp. 1977).
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social services agencies. These agencies are charged by law in forty-eight
states to receive reports on suspected abuse and neglect cases."'0
The designation of the receiving agency is one of the most critical
elements of any reporting statute. The nature and orientation of the
agency first receiving the report will often determine the governmental
response to child abuse. An overwhelming majority of the reporting
statutes emphasize the importance of urgent action in reporting sus-
pected injury.' The next step depends upon what action is taken by the
responsible agency by way of investigating a reported case of child
abuse. The speed with which it acts, how responsibly it provides service,
180. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(a) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(A) (West
Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807(e) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a)
(Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 903 (Revised
1974); D.C. CODE § 2-161 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)-(5), as amended by ch. 77-
429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 350-1 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-2 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.4(2) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-717 (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403 D (1) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(d) (Replacement 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.623(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.115 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1504 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(1) (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:41 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:6-8.11 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-14.1 (Replacement 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(a) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-04 (Supp. 1977);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.755 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2206 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-13.1-3(1) (1977); S.C.
CODE § 20-310.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.02 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1354
(Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 48.981(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9(a) (Interim Supp.
1977).
181. Language typical of these statutes may be found in the Michigan reporting
statute. MICH. COMP. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 722.623(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)
provides that a mandated reporter "who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or
neglect [shall] immediately, by telephone or otherwise . . . make an oral report, or
cause an oral report to be made. . ....
1 2:1978
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and its interpretation of what is expected of it bear directly on the degree
of protection which the reporting statute makes available to abused
children.
The immense importance of these two considerations is acknowl-
edged by one commentator:
This is the most sensitive area of the whole discussion of reporting legisla-
tion. Yet, analysis shows that this is the most confused in terms of legisla-
tive action. A critical determination for the lawmakers is the decision
about which resource to designate for receiving reports of child abuse. On
this important decision rests the effectiveness of the reporting law with
respect to achieving the appropriate goals. The right choice will bring into
play the appropriate resources. A poor, or bad choice may produce re-
sults not contemplated by the law. It is possible, therefore, for the legisla-
tive intent to fail if the tools prescribed to accomplish the goal are inade-
quate or unsuited for the job.'
A consensus among experts in the medical, legal, and social fields
concludes that the existing social services agencies or more specialized
offices of child protective services within these agencies should be re-
sponsible for receiving reports.183 This preference is based upon the
assumption that some type of protective service or treatment will be
provided once the initial report is made.
A typical statute requiring reports to be made to a receiving agency
calls for an oral report first to be made, either in person or by tele-
phone.184 A follow-up written report may be required if the receiving
agency requests it.18s This dual-use reporting procedure allows for speed-
ier attention to the child's problem yet offers a permanent record which
182. DeFrancis, The Status of Child Protective Services, in HELPING THE BAT-
TERED CHILD & HIS FAMILY 127, 140 (Kempe & Heifer eds. 1972): See also Sussman,
supra note 83, at 280.
183. Sussman, supra note 83, at 285.
184. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-812(b) (1977) provides that such reports include
the names and addresses of the child and his parents or other persons responsible
for his care, if known; the child's age, sex, and race; the nature and extent of the
child's injuries, sexual abuse or negect, including any evidence of previous injuries,
sexual abuse or neglect, if known; the composition of the family; the source of
the report; the person making the report, his occupation and where he can be
reached; and the action taken by the reporting source.
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(5), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv.; MICH. COMP. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 722.623(l)-(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978).
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can be relied upon during the investigation. The oral report is usually
restricted to the essential facts necessary for the receiving agency to
gauge whether a condition of child abuse or neglect exists. 8 Being
unencumbered by an overwhelming amount of paperwork, the receiving
agency is able to screen the reports coming in for likely cases of abuse
requiring immediate attention. The amount of time saved in processing
is another key factor which allows for a quick response in emergency
situations. A number of statutes provide 24-hour telephone monitoring
service seven days a week to receive (usually toll free) reports of sus-
pected abuse.' n
(f). Immunity from civil or criminal prosecution for
reporting. An essential element in the success of a reporting statute is
the active co-operation and participation of those mandated by it to
report known or suspected cases of abuse or neglect. Civil and criminal
immunity are offered by the vast majority of reporting statutes.'88 It
would be wholly unrealistic to expect such active co-operation without
some degree of immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. Com-
mentators agree that there is need for some type of immunity to protect
mandated reporters from prosecution.' 9 To encourage those individuals
not mandated to report, it has been urged that immunity should be
extended to them, as well."'
The Federal Act requires that reporting statutes include an immun-
ity provision "for persons reporting instances of child abuse and neglect
from prosecution, under any state or local law, arising out of such
reporting."'' "Good faith clauses" in immunity provisions have been
used by state legislatures to ensure that reports are not made mali-
ciously.'92 This good faith requirement is strengthened in fourteen states
186. Child protective agencies follow a fairly standard procedure in handling
cases. There is an initial intake process that involves limited screening and case assign-
ment within the agency. During the intake process, the social service worker may decide
that no further action can be taken; the report may not present sufficient information
to be investigated-such as a report that does not identify the name and address of the
family of the allegedly abused child.
187. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A(l)-(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
188. Fraser, supra note 153, at Ill.
189. See, e.g., Grumet, supra note 62, at 306.
190. Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 174 (Hel-
fer & Kempe eds., 2d ed. 1974).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b5(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
192. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (West Cum. Supp. 1957-1977). The Ari-
zona statute provides:
2:1978
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by the inclusion of a "presumption of good faith" in their statutes.'
Such a presumption places the burden of proving lack of good faith
upon the instigator of any suit.
The medical profession, a special target group in the law, thinks
itself particularly vulnerable to lawsuits without such protection.194 The
threat or even remote possibility of long and drawn-out legal battles
inhibits necessary reporting. Thus, the inclusion of immunity provides
some freedom to physicians from fear of retaliation by angry parents.
One commentator has noted that such immunity provisions may be
beneficial to the public in general and to physicians in particular
"simply because they exist and can be publicized." '195 Such a provision
may also tend to discourage lawsuits by plaintiffs hoping to gain finan-
cial reward over their own wrongdoing, should insufficient proof be
offered at trial to convict them.
(g). Sanctions for failure to report. Sanctions exacted against a
mandated reporter who fails to report a case of child abuse are included
in the reporting statutes of many states. Thirty-three states at present
impose some form of penal sanctions or fines upon those persons who
are mandated to report instances of child abuse but willfully fail to do
so. ' The criminal penalties imposed upon those who fail to report range
Anyone participating in the making of reports required under the provisions
of this section, or anyone participating in a judicial proceeding resulting from
such reports, shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability by reason of
such action unless such person acted with malice or unless such person has been
charged with or is suspected of abusing or neglecting the child or children in
question.
See also ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, § 17.050 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(h)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (1976).
193. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 23 (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-814
(1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-110 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(10), as
amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2059
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3856 (West Supp.
1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.625 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.2B (Replacement
1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 419 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-09
(Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 2211 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1210 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.11 (Interim Supp. 1977).
194. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 31.
195. Id. at 32.
196. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 25 (Interim Supp. 1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-
842.01(D) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-816(a) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11162 (Deering Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (Cum. Supp.
1978); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 908 (Revised 1974); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(14)(a), as amended
146
Nova Law Journal 2:1978 1
48
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response
1 2:1978
from five days in jail 97 to one year in prison. 9 8 fines may also be exacted
against willful violators. These range from $25111 to $1,000.20 One com-
mentator believes that it is not statutorily prudent to expose one's pro-
fessional judgment to the ravages of criminal prosecution, even though
such sanctions are placed in the context of a civil statute.20 He believes
that such a penalty provision is virtually unenforceable and, as such, is
useless.2 12 This is highlighted by the fact that regardless of the severity
of the penalty, action against the physician does little to aid the abused
child.
The reporting statutes reflect a difference in philosophy regarding
how best to encourage persons required to report to make reports. One
philosophy advocates the inclusion of a penalty clause in the belief that
no action can be mandated by law without also providing a penalty for
failure to comply therewith.203 Proponents of the other philosophy be-
lieve that the main problem is one of education. Their argument is that
when people are made aware of the extent of the problem, and are
informed that they are mandated to report, the problem will solve itself.
A mandated reporter who willfully fails to report an instance of
child abuse may be liable for damages in a civil suit.11 Robinson v.
by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-2(b) (Burns 1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. §235A.9(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-720
(Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 I (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 3856 (West Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978), as amended by 1977 Mass. Legis. Serv. 623 (West); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.165 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1508 (1975); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.507 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:45 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:6-8.14 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.IC (Replacement 1976); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-13 (Supp. 1977);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
II, § 2212 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); S.C. CODE § 20-310.5 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1212 (Supp. 1977);
TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.07 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-
6 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.3
(Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.080 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE §
49-6A-8 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
197. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 38-720 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
198. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.165 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
199. Id.
200. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1(C) (Replacement 1976).
201. Shepard, supra note 152, at 192.
202. Id.
203. See McCoid, supra note 81, at 27.
204. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 36. Paulsen notes that "it seems likely that report-
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Wical °5 concerned a suit brought on behalf of a child against four
doctors and the local police for failure to report and investigate the
report adequately. The child had been taken to the defendant doctors
on a number of occasions for treatment of injuries later shown to have
been the result of abuse."' The doctors acknowledged that they surmised
the injuries to have been caused by such abuse. Nevertheless, they al-
lowed the child to be returned to his mother after each visit for treat-
ment. The suit was based on the theory of negligence per se. It was
argued that the defendants had a statutory duty to report all known or
suspected cases of child abuse or neglect to the proper authorities. The
injured child alleged that the doctors breached their legally mandated
duty to report and that he was a member of the class intended by the
legislature to be protected by the statute. Prior to trial, the defendants
agreed to pay $600,000 as a settlement to the child.
In Landeros v. Flood,"' a guardian ad litem2 8 brought suit on
behalf of a child against a physician and a hospital for negligently failing
to diagnose her abused condition and for negligently failing to report
her injuries to the proper authorities. As a result of such negligence, it
was alleged, she suffered permanent physical injuries and mental dis-
tress. California's reporting statute required physicians to report instan-
ces of physical injuries to children which appear to have been inflicted
by other than accidental means.2"9 In addition to the common law negli-
gence, the plaintiff alleged failure to comply with the mandatory report-
ing laws.
ing statutes which require reporting and which carry criminal penalties create a cause
of action in favor of infants who suffer abuse after a physician has failed to make a
report respecting earlier abuse brought to his attention."
One state even provides for punitive damages. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1978). The Minnesota statute provides for punitive damages being exacted
against a person who either willfully or recklessly makes a false report under the statute,
as well as for actual damages in a civil suit.
205. C.A. No. 37607 (Cal. Sup. Ct.)(San Luis Obispo, filed Sept. 4, 1970).
206. The child had whip marks on his back, puncture wounds in the neck, and
burned finger tips. He was found with strangulation marks and was not breathing. Even
though his breathing was restored, the brain had been without oxygen for so long that
he became mentally retarded due to extensive brain damage. TIME, Nov. 20, 1972, at
74 (col. 2).
207. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
208. For a discussion of the responsibilities of a guardian ad litem, see text
accompanying notes 323-29, infra.
209. CAL. PENAL CODES § 11161.5 (Deering Supp. 1977).
2:1978 1
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The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her complaint to the
California Supreme Court. The first question the count addressed was
whether the physician should be held to a standard of care which in-
cluded knowing how to diagnose and treat the "battered child syn-
drome." 1 Citing People v. Jackson,11 the court stated that testimony
of a physician identifying the battered child syndrome was admissible.2 12
The court recognized that the battered child syndrome had become an
accepted medical diagnosis; 213 however, it did not possess the requisite
medical knowledge to render a decision, as a matter of law, on the
issue.24 The court stated that the question was one of fact and must be
based on expert testimony.25
The defendants contended that the injuries suffered by the child
after her release were not proximately caused by their failure to diag-
'nose and report her condition.21 6 However, the court held that proximate
cause was a question of fact and turned on whether the defendants could
reasonably have foreseen further injury to the child.1 7
The court went on to find that the plaintiff's allegation of statutory
negligence for failure to report was but an alternative theory of recovery
for a single cause of action .2 1 The mandatory reporting statute was
strictly construed by the court: to constitute a violation of the statute it
must actually have appeared to the physician that the child had been
abused. For the plaintiff to prevail on the count of statutory negligence,
she must prove that "defendant Flood actually observed her injuries and
formed the opinion they were intentionally inflicted on her.' 219
Such a subjective standard requiring actual knowledge in order to
show statutory negligence makes a plaintiffs case more difficult to
prove. An argument can be made for the inclusion of an objective
standard in the penalty clause of a reporting statute. 2 1 Simply put, the
subjective standard will vitiate the intent of child abuse legislation by
210. 551 P.2d at 393.
211. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
212. 551 P.2d at 393.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 394.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 395.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 396.
219. Id. at 397-98.
220. Note, Negligence-Malpractice-Physician's Liability for Failure to Diag-
nose and Report Child Abuse, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 1187, 1198 (1977).
! i
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ensuring that any harm suffered by a child in violation of the statute
will give rise to a viable claim for civil damages.
(h). Statutory abrogation of privileged communications. In
many instances of child abuse, the only eyewitnesses are the parents and
the child, and the child may either be too young or too intimidated to
testify. 2' To encourage the disclosure of evidence of abuse, many of the
reporting statutes abrogate a number of privileges pertaining to the
exclusion of confidential communications. A typical statutory exception
provides:
The physician-patient privilege, husband-wife privilege, or any privilege
except the attorney-client privilege . . . provided for or covered by law,
both as they relate to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion
of confidential communications, shall not pertain in any civil or criminal
litigation in which a child's neglect, dependency, abuse or abandonment
is in issue or in any judicial proceedings resulting from a report submitted
pursuant to this section.22
The privileges given to the physician-patient and husband-wife relation-
ships fall by the wayside when a statutory exception abrogates them.
One commentator has noted that the physician-patient privilege did
not exist at common law and never existed in the United Kingdom,
contrary to what was generally believed.12 1 This evidentiary privilege
was not established in the United States until 1828.24 A small minority
of states retain the privileged status of confidential communications in
any professional or personal relationship even when the communication
involves child abuse or neglect.22 At the present time, forty-three states
have enacted legislation waiving this privilege, 26 which is an increase of
221. See text accompanying notes 67-78, supra.
222. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(10), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.
223. Sussman, supra note 83, at 297.
224. Id.
225. These states are Georgia and Maine.
226. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060
(1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
42-815 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.6 (Deering Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 27, §
907 (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE § 2-165 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(1 1), as amended
by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-5 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2060 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-5 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. 235A.8 (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(7) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2:1978 1
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nine states since 1968.117
Even without the existence of such a statutory exception, it is
doubtful whether a parent could invoke the child patient's privilege (on
the theory that the rights of a minor vest in its parents), particularly
when the privilege is used as a shield for the person accused of injuring
the child in the first place.28 Another reason why a court would proba-
bly disallow the privilege is the fact that such a privilege is meant to
ensure that the best interests of the child be maintained. Allowing the
privilege to stand would not work to the child's best interest. 29
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Fagalde, 2 3 ruled
on the applicability of conflicting state statutes as to whether
psychiatrist-patient communications were considered privileged pertain-
ing to evidence entered at trial. The evidence at issue stated that the
defendant had revealed his hostility to the abused child and that he had
physically assaulted the child. The young boy had been taken to a
nearby hospital where an examination revealed that he had suffered a
broken leg. Before this incident took place, the defendant had twice
sought counseling at a mental health center and had spoken of his
hostility with a psychologist. The defendant argued on appeal that there
was a statute which maintained the confidentiality of the psychiatrist-
patient relationship.23' The court rejected the defendant's argument
14:403 F (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3856-A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(h)(2) (Replacement 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.631
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Cum. Supp. 1978);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.140 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-
1307 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1503 (1975); NFv. REV. STAT. § 200.506
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.43 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West
1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-4.2A (Replacement 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-
121 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.775 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2222(2) (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.3 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-15 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1211 (Supp. 1977); TEx. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 34.04 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §
55-16-5 (1974); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.44.060(3) (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. §
14-28.12 (Interim Supp. 1977).
227. Daly, supra note 40, at 330.
228. Sussman, supra note 83, at 298.
229. Krause, supra note 106, at 259.
230. 85 Wash. 2d 730, 539 P.2d 86 (1975).
231. 539 P.2d at 88-89.
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that confidential communications between the perpetrator and a psy-
chologist-a doctor, or a mental health employee-"are protected from
disclosure and privileged in a judicial proceeding according to the terms
of the applicable statutes.""23 The court interpreted the intent of the
legislature as having attached a greater importance to the "reporting of
incidents of child abuse and the prosecution of perpetrators than to
counseling and treatment of persons whose mental or emotional prob-
lems cause them to inflict such abuse. '12a
Such an exception to the privilege may also act to relieve the medi-
cal profession from legal or ethical restrictions against revealing confi-
dential information. One commentator has noted that the physician-
patient waiver "is likely to encourage reporting from a profession which
has a history steeped with protection of confidential communica-
tions. 9234
There exists in many states a privilege similar to that of physician-
patient between a husband and wife. Neither may divulge information
damaging to the other in any criminal procedure without the release of
the spouse against whom the evidence is being given. As this privilege
existed at common law, it must be specifically excluded by statute. 25
The number of states allowing the waiver of this privilege has steadily
increased from only twenty in 1968236 to thirty-two in 1974. 237 Thirty-
nine states now statutorily abrogate the privilege. 8 The reason for this
232. Id. at 90.
233. Id.
234. Daly, supra note 40, at 330.
235. Id. at 331.
236. Sussman, supra note 83, at 299.
237. Id. at 299.
238. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24 (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(D) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
42-815 (1977); DEL. CODE tit. 27, § 907 (Revised 1974); D.C.CoDE § 2-165 (1973); FLA.
STAT. § 827.07(11), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 350-5 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1601 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, § 2060 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.1-5 (Burns 1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.8 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.335(7)
(1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 F (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
3856-A (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.140 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1307 (Cum. Supp.
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1503 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169.43 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West 1976); N.M. STAT.
1 52
Nova Law Journal 2:1978 1
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response
waiver is primarily that often the parents know the cause of the injuries
suffered by the child. To permit the abusive parent to injure the child
and then cause the other parent to remain silent by invoking the privi-
lege is tantamount to encouraging further abuse of the child.- 9 This
would allow the privilege to become a shield for the abusive parent in
much the same manner that the physician-patient privilege could be
used to muzzle the physician and prevent him from reporting what he
had seen.
Waiving the attorney-client privilege presents obvious problems to
a client, should his confidences be betrayed by the very person entrusted
to keep them. If such confidences were to be made known in court
without his consent, it would amount to no less than an abrogation of
his right to a fair hearing. Two states have waiver statutes which con-
ceivably can be construed to abrogate the traditional attorney-client
relationship.20 The Alabama statute provides that "[t]he doctrine of
privileged communications shall not be a ground for excluding any
evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause thereof.' 41 Nevada
makes inapplicable in abuse cases "all privileges against disclosure rec-
ognized by Nevada law. 242 An attempt actually to waive such a privi-
lege in either state would raise serious questions relating to the desirabil-
ity of such clauses and, perhaps, even raise a question as to their consti-
tutionality. That such an exception is permitted by any statute appears
to fly in the face of Canon 27 of the American Bar Association's Code
of Professional Ethics, which provides in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment. . . . A lawyer should not con-
tinue employment when he discovers that his obligation prevents the
performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client ...
ANN. § 13-14-4.2A (Replacement 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-121 (1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 418.775 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2222(2)
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-
310.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-15 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1211 (Supp. 1977); TEX. FAm. CODE tit. 2, § 34.04 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE
§ 63.1-248.11 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.060(4) (Supp. 1976);
W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.12 (Interim Supp.
1977).
239. Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 203.
240. These states are Alabama and Nevada.
241. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24 (Interim Supp. 1975).
242. NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (1977).
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If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclos-
ing the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he
is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosure as may be
necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threat-
ened.24
3
A difficult question to resolve arises if a lawyer receives information
concerning past instances of child abuse which leads him to an inference
of continuing abuse. This leads to the possibility of preventing further
abuse by disclosing such facts to the proper authorities.244 One legal
commentator believes that
it may be less clear that the obligation of confidentiality does not exist
where the attorney or any other counsellor is not being consulted in
relation to the possibility of future abuse and when he is not being asked
to assist in concealment of the abuse of the child.245
Another privilege to be considered is the social worker-client rela-
tionship. Most states do not consider this relationship to be a confiden-
tial one.246 A New York statute does not consider communications be-
tween parent and counselor to be confidential if the communication by
the parent reveals the contemplation of a crime or harmful act.247 An
Illinois appellate court held that an Illinois statute which prohibits so-
cial workers from disclosing information they have gained from persons
consulting with them in their professional capacity does not prevent
social workers from testifying as to information gained from investigat-
ing child abuse cases.248 By disclosing information obtained by investi-
gating cases of child abuse, social workers are attempting to prevent
further abuse. To prohibit such disclosure would effectively frustrate the
social worker's duty of protecting the child. 249
(i). Temporary protective custody. A typical method of dealing
243. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 37.
244. McCoid, supra note 81, at 31.
245. Id.
246. Sussman, supra note 83, at 299.
247. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
248. In re Pitts, 44 Ill. App. 3d 46, 357 N.E.2d 872 (3d Dist. App. Ct. 1976). The
statute being attacked as unconstitutional is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 5320 (Smith-Hurd
1968).
249. 357 N.E.2d at 874.
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with the problem of child abuse is to remove the child from the custody
of the abusing parents either temporarily or permanently. There are two
kinds of temporary protective custody: retention of the child in a medi-
cal facility and removal of the child from its home environment. With
regard to the custody of a child, one statute provides:
Any person in charge of a hospital or similar institution or any physician
treating a child may keep the child in his custody without consent of the
parents or guardian, whether or not additional medical treatment is re-
quired, if the circumstances or conditions of the child are such that con-
tinuing in his place of residence or in the care or custody of the parent,
guardian, custodian or other person responsible for the child's care pres-
ents an imminent danger to the child's life or health. 5'
The right of a physician or the chief administrative officer of a hospital
or similar institution to retain custody of a child in his care is beginning
to gain wide acceptance. In statutes which include the word "health" in
the phrase "in imminent danger to the child's life or health," the stan-
dard to be met is that if the child were released, he might suffer further
injury.251 It is the intent of these statutes to give physicians and medical
institutions some flexibility in dealing with what they feel to be a poten-
tially hazardous home environment for the child. To ensure that this
custodial detention is actually temporary, statutory provisions delineate
the length of detention without an authorized judicial proceeding. Four
states require that a court order be secured prior to any attempt to
remove the child from the custody of parents or guardian.252 Ten states
provide for protective custody until social services or the police can take
over. 2  Nine states provide that social services may assume protective
250. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
251. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 417(1) (McKinney 1976); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
252. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403G(6) (West 1974). The Louisiana statute
provides that the child welfare unit "shall request the juvenile court or other court
exercising juvenile jurisdiction to issue an instanter order for the temporary removal and
placement of the child pending completion of the investigation and disposition of the
case." See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 5 I(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
S.C. CODE § 20-310.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
253. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35A(f)(l) (Replacement 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-1 18(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §
418.760(3) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.056 (Supp. 1976);
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custody of a child when there exists a real danger to the child's well-
being. 54 Four of these states also require that a court order be secured
by the next regularly scheduled day to permit further detention of the
child. 55 Two states allow a child to remain in temporary protective
custody for ninety-six hours or longer.256 Three states permit a maxi-
mum period of forty-eight hours before the retention agency must apply
for a court order to maintain the child in temporary custody. 57 Nineteen
states provide that a treating physician, hospital, or similar institution
may keep a child for a limited amount of time even though the child is
not in need of immediate hospital care.58
These statutes also require that a reasonable effort be made to
notify the parents or guardian that the child has been placed under
temporary protective custody." 9 The placement of a child in a protective
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9:2(a)
(Interim Supp. 1977).
254. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.030(b) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(e)
(Cum. Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(f-1) (Replacement 1976); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.125 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 417(1) (McKinney
1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(2) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-06 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1204 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE
tit. 2, § 17.01 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978).
255. Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Pennsylvania.
256. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 50.25.1-07 (Supp. 1977).
257. IDAHO CODE § 16-1612 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-
1309(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977).
258. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(1) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-811
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(6)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 25, § 2055 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.335(4) (1977);
MICH. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 722.626(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.125(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.16 (West 1976); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 417(1) (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 118(d) (Cum. Supp.
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50.25.1-07 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE § 2151.42.1
(Anderson 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(2) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1204 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE
tit. 2, § 35.04 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.056 (Supp.
1976); WYo. STAT. § 14-28.9:2(b) (Interim Supp. 1977).
259. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(6)(b), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(j)(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The
Maryland reporting statute has attempted to alleviate the constitutional issue of paren-
tal due process rights by statutorily providing rules and regulations protecting the rights
of suspected child abusers. Among these are: notice to the person suspected of being an
abuser prior to his name being entered in the state central registry; a guaranteed right
2:1978 1
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retention situation has been described as a "possibly dangerous but
necessary legal tool." ' One commentator notes that those social serv-
ices agencies which provide child protective services usually carry out
"aggressive social casework techniques." '81 Since these agencies fre-
quently reach out into the lives of those individuals who come within
the scope of their operations without being asked, the statutory tool of
protective custody is extremely susceptible to misuse. 62 Another com-
mentator believes that the temptation to misuse this legal device is too
great to allow its unbridled use.283 He feels that only a social services
agency should be permitted to remove the child, and only if it first
secures a court order allowing the retention of the child. 64
The argument against the protective removal of an abused child is
similar to the one against his temporary retention: "the protection of
children cannot, and need not, be accomplished at the expense of violat-
ing fundamental rights of parents. 2 5 There must be some entity be-
tween the parent and the person having taken custody of the child. This
entity must be the courts or a statutorily appointed authority which will
secure the parent's basic rights.266 A court order provides the necessary
separation of interest between the rights of parents and the possible
intemperate or inexperienced actions by the agencies or individuals who
have the child in protective custody.2 7 The District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas in Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare"6
stated that removal of a child without notice from his home environment
can take place only if there exists an "immediate threat to the safety of
the child.' 2 9 Even so, some standards of due process must still be recog-
nized. The court also held that the state may not "retain custody of a
child for more than ten days Fithout a complete adversary hearing with
of appeal upon request by the suspected abuser pertaining to whether his name shall
remain in the central registry; and limiting names entered in the central registry to
persons adjudicated as abusers.
260. Sussman, supra note 83, at 291.
261. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 46.
262. Id. at 46.
263. McCoid, supra note 81, at 49-50.
264. Id. at 50.
265. Krause, supra note 106, at 243.
266. McCoid, supra note 81, at 55.
267. V. DEFRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's 184 (American
Humane Assoc., Children's Div. 1974).
268. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977) [hereinafter referred to as Sims v. State].
269. Id. at 1192.
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notice to the parents. ' 2 ° The running of this period would begin with
the day of the service, not the day of the initial orders permitting seizure;
the burden is on the state to make a clear showing that further custody
of the child is necessary to protect the child from harm.
27
'
The argument for removal of the child from his home environment
is particularly strong when the child has been physically abused. There
exists a real threat of harm to the child if he is left in a home environ-
ment which has already caused him physical harm. 2 2 One commentator
has noted that there exists from between a 20% to 30% chance of perma-
nent injury or even death should a child be returned to his home environ-
ment. 3 Another commentator places the injury rate at over 50%.274
(j). Evidentiary use of color photographs and x-rays. Even
though the statutory trend in mandatory categories of persons required
to report instances of child abuse is expanding, the physician is probably
best able to discover the evidence of multiple injuries in various stages
of healing which might be identified as constituting the "battered child
syndrome.'275 A physician is able to undertake certain tests to determine
the extent and probable cause of the injuries inflicted upon the child.
The statutes of eighteen states authorize the taking of color photographs
of the areas of noticeable physical abuse. 20 They permit taking of x-rays
to determine the extent of internal injuries which might not be readily
noticeable from an external examination. The purpose for such a provi-
sion is to allow for complete documentation of abuse which can be
270. Id. at 1193.
271. Id. at 1193, 1194.
272. Hefer, The Responsibility and Role of the Physician, in THE BATTERED
CILD 28, 33 (Kempe & Heifer eds., 2d ed. 1974).
273. Id.
274. V. FONTANA, supra note 63, at 23.
275. MeCoid, supra note 81, at 28.
276. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-842.01(d) (West Supp. 1957-1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-810 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-106 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(4)(c), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, § 2056 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §235A.11 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3854.2(G) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
1978); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.626(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.120 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46 (West 1976);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 416 (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson
1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.764 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2207 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978); TEx. FAM. CODE tit. 2, § 35.04 (Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 63.1-
248.13 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (Supp. 1976); W. VA.
CODE § 49-6A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.9(c) (Interim Supp. 1977).
Nova Law Journal 2:1978 1
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
Child Abuse-Federal and State Response2:1978
catalogued in a medical file. Such a medical file may then be entered
as evidence at a trial should the parents or guardian be prosecuted for
causing the injuries observed by the physician while examining the child.
One statute provides:
Any person required to investigate causes of suspected child abuse or
maltreatment may take or cause to be taken photographs of the areas of
trauma on a child who is subject to a report and, if the areas of trauma
visible on the child indicate a need for a radiological examination, may
cause the child to be referred for diagnosis to a licensed physician or an
emergency department in a hospital. Any licensed physician who has
reasonable cause to suspect that an injury was the result of child abuse
may authorize a radiological examination to be performed on the child.
The county in which the child is a resident shall bear the initial cost for
the x-rays of the abused child; however, the parent, guardian, or cus-
todian of the child shall be required to reimburse the county for the costs
of such x-rays, and to reimburse the Department of Rehabilitative Serv-
ices for the cost of photographs taken pursuant to this paragraph. Any
photographs or reports on x-rays taken pursuant to this section shall be
sent to the department at the time the written report is sent or as soon
thereafter as possible. 7
Permitting a physician to have photographs of x-rays taken of a
child he suspects of having been abused means that he need not first
obtain parental permission or release to do so. Other than ensuring that
a proper physical record is made documenting any evidence of child
abuse in the nature of physical trauma, commentators are divided as to
the extent to which physicians should be evidence gatherers or legal-
medico detectives. 78
The physician, as the person examining the child, is the individual
best able to determine whether the child's injuries are disparate from
the explanation given by the parents. 279 If the parent's explanation of the
child's injuries is different from what the physician's examination indi-
cates, the physician's report to the authorized receiving agency should
be given greater weight in the determination of whether physical abuse
277. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(4)(c), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.
278. See Krause, supra note 106, at 257; see also McCoid, supra note 81, at 28.
But see Paulsen, supra note 85, at 10.
279. McCoid, supra note 81, at 28.
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has been inflicted upon the child."' Those opposing the idea that a
physician may also function as a detective believe that it is beyond a
physician's competence "to determine who inflicted injuries on a
child."'2s1 A diagnosis of injury should be limited to no more than a
reasonable guess "that the injuries suffered were not caused by an un-
avoidable accident. ' 282
(k). The central registry. The idea of establishing central regis-
tries did not become popular until the mid-1960s. Since then, the trend
has been toward the establishment of registries either at the local level
or on a statewide basis. Only four states maintained registries in 1966
under legislative mandate.28 This increased to nineteen by 197 0 '28 with
forty states at present maintaining such registries through statutory
enactment.25
280. Krause, supra note 106, at 257. While identification of child abuse should
be tempered by awareness of the fact that children may suffer physical mars, bruises,
and scratches due neither to parental neglect nor intent, the treating physician must be
cognizant of discrepancies between the degree of the trauma and the history given to
explain the injuries. Essential tasks for the physician to consider are skillful interview-
ing, obtaining historical data, and performing physical examinations to rule out causes
of either abuse or neglect.
281. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 28.
282. Id.
283. Sussman, supra note 83, at 300.
284. V. DEFRANCIS, supra note 267, at 178.
285. The following states provide for the establishment of central registries
through statutory enactment: ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(3)(1) (Interim Supp. 1975);
ALASKA STAT. tit. 47, § 17.040 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-818 (1977);
CAL. WELF. & INST. § 18960(g) (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(g) (Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL.
CODE tit. 16, § 904(c) (Revised 1974); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-
429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1623(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.14 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403H (West 1974); Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3859(2) (West Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(i) (Replacement 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51E-51F (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.627(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(11) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978), as amended by ch. 212, 1977 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.; Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-24-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.145(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1506 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.504(l)(c) (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:44 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.11 (West 1976); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 422(1) (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-112 (1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.1-11 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.765
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A large number of state laws establishing central registries make
reference to their use as diagnostic instruments or as research and plan-
ning tools."' As a practical matter, however, few states can show more
than sporadic use of their registries by professionals who have requested
information regarding suspicious cases of abuse or neglect."8 7 Registries
are often hampered by incomplete, inaccurate, and old information
which diminishes their effectiveness as part of a viable statewide child
protection program.
With the expansion in scope of the state child abuse laws, the
purposes and goals of the registries have changed somewhat. 8 The
impetus for their change has come with a reduction of evidentiary stan-
dards presently required by many of the reporting statutes-reasonable
suspicion of maltreatment, rather than the requirement of specific evi-
dence.2HI
One of the primary benefits of well-structured statewide central
registries is the ability of authorized officials to "trace" the abusive
adult so that his ability to avoid detection by continually bringing the
abused child to different doctors and hospitals is lessened.8 ' Some states
require that assistance be given to sister states when there is a reason-
able suspicion that abusive parents are "hospital shopping" across state
lines.28'
As a research tool, the central registries can be a boon to those
attempting to understand better the societal causes and interactions of
those who abuse and maltreat children. With properly motivated and
organized staff personnel, many of the registries presently in existence
could develop demographic and other studies which may increase under-
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-11-7 (1977); S.C. CODE § 20-310.4 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-10-12.2 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1208 (Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE tit. 2,
§ 34.04 (Vernon 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1356 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §
63.1-248.8 (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.070 (Supp. 1976); Wyo.
STAT. § 14.28.13 (Interim Supp. 1977).
286. NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, 3 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS
MANAGEMENT 14 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as 3 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE
PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT].
287. Id.
288. Id. at 17.
289. Id.
290. Krause, supra note 106, at 246.
291. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114(11) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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standing of the nature and extent of abuse. 22 Such studies, when co-
ordinated with other child protective service plans, could evaluate the
effectiveness of a state's abuse prevention efforts.
The use, or, more accurately, the misuse of information placed in
central registries has been of much concern to those who fear infringe-
ment of the right to privacy of both child and parent. The court in Sims
v. State 3 held that although the state may investigate reports of abuse,
there exists no valid reason why the accused family should not have
access to the "fruits of that invasion or the conclusions reached." '94 The
court did recognize that where the confidentiality of the source had been
guaranteed either administratively or through a judicial hearing, such
information should not be released to the family.2 5
Although many of the reporting statutes make provision for the
confidentiality of stored information, there is surprisingly little uniform-
ity in guidelines which govern the dissemination of collected informa-
tion. 96 Some states do not legislatively mandate a specific procedure for
disclosure of information.297 Rather, these states leave the promulgation
of regulations to the agency designated to maintain the central regis-
try.298
292. 3 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT, supra
note 286, at 26.
293. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
294. Id. at 1194, 1195, where the court held that the following provisions of TEx.
FAM. CODE tit. 2, §§ 34.05(c) and 34.08, are unconstitutional on their face.
295. Id.
296. Thirty-six states at present require that records gathered on suspected or
known cases of child abuse and neglect be kept confidential, and to varying degrees,
inaccessible to public scrutiny. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-114(4) (Cum. Supp.
1976); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977).
297. Typical of the statutes which fail to specify the procedure for ensuring the
confidentiality of information gathered by the central registries is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, § 2061 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977) which provides: "[Tlhe Department [of
Children and Family Services], by regulation, [shall] regulate the entry and retention
of child abuse and neglect information and access thereto."
298. The absence of legislative direction in the reporting statutes is dangerous to
the concept of individual privacy. Such statutes fail to define terms such as confidential-
ity, and to specify what agencies and professionals may have access to records. In
discussing these potential dangers, Sussman concludes that "in many states the ironic
situation is created whereby those for whom disclosure was originally intended make
little use of the register while other, unintended individuals, are granted relatively free
access." Sussman, Keeping Records on Suspected Child Abuse, in COUNCIL WOMAN
I1 (Winter 1977).
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There is growing concern among legal and social commentators
that irreparable harm may be caused to the child who may be labeled
an "abused child" for a lifetime.99 Of equal concern is the perpetuation
of inaccurate and unverified information which, if released, may dam-
age the person's reputation and threaten his livelihood. Since abuse and
neglect are now thought to be part of a repetitive cycle whereby one
generation passes to another the characteristics of the abusive parent,
government agencies may become inclined to make undue observation
of a child so labeled as he attains adulthood, marries, and has children
of his own.3°°
To alleviate the concerns of those who believe unbridled use of
central registries may cause more harm than good, an increasing num-
ber of states have very strict guidelines for the classification and expung-
ing of reports."' One agency is usually authorized to receive, investi-
gate, and follow up on suspected cases of abuse or neglect. A single
agency controlling all aspects of the investigation process will minimize
the danger of misuse of the registry.
When a suspected case of child abuse reaches the receiving agency,
the case goes through a number of distinct classifications. These classifi-
cations in the Florida child abuse statute are termed: under investiga-
tion; abuse indicated; and abuse unfounded."' Upon completing an
investigatory report, the receiving agency makes a determination
whether the report is unfounded or indicates abuse."3 Reporting laws
in a number of states provide that information be removed immediately
from the registry if it is unfounded or otherwise inappropriately gath-
ered or stored.0 4 Some states also provide that information gathered
and stored in the registry will be expunged once the child attains a
299. It has been suggested that information received by the central registries may
at some future date be used to raise "the issue of competency of a family or the risk to
a child." 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 710 (statement of Eli Newberger).
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-818(4) to 818(6) (1977); FLA. STAT. §
827.07(7), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
302. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(8), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
has established this classification system for categorizing "all reports of child abuse or
maltreatment maintained within the central registry ..
303. See note 186, supra.
304. FLA. STAt. § 827.07(8), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
states that "[a]ll identifying information contained in reports classified as unfounded
shall be immediately expunged."
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certain age, usually eighteen. 05 In other instances, a statutorily deter-
mined length of time is established which begins when the case of child
abuse is first reported. Seven years is the length of time used in Flor-
ida.30
Access to information stored in central registries is usually re-
stricted to receiving agency personnel. Limited access may be permitted
to information on file for valid research in some states.0 Restrictions
placed on such access includes the anonymity of the abused child, abus-
ing parent, or guardian and reporter.
To maintain the confidentiality of the information stored in the
central registries, twenty-six states include a penalty provision for per-
sons divulging information in an unauthorized manner.38 Fines range
from $10031 to $1,000, with a jail sentence of up to two years.310
(1). Failure to provide medical care because of religious
beliefs. Numerous United States Supreme Court decisions have held
that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental part of our so-
ciety.3 1' The care, custody, and nurture of children has been the primary
305. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(n) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
306. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(8), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.,
places a limit on how long information may remain within the registry, which at this
time is seven years. This section provides, however, that if the individual remains under
the supervision of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, then the
information shall remain within the registry until the Department determines otherwise.
307. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-115(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
308. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(3)(3) (Interim Supp. 1975); ALASKA STAT. §
47.17.040(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-818 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-10-114(10) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(g) (Cum. Supp.
1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 12-3-4.20 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); KAN. STAT. § 38-
723 (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 I (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 3859(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
51E-5IF (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.633(2) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-24-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.150(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1506 (1975); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.5045(2) (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:45 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(10) (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-14 (Supp.
1977); OHIo REV. CODE § 2151.42.1 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2215(g) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-13 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-12.3
(1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1356 (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-614-8
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.14(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
309. W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-8 (Supp. 1977).
310. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51F (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
311. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), where the Supreme
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function of the family. The child's reciprocal right to this parental sup-
port, however, is also a concern of the courts.1 2 Recognition of this
conflict has led a number of states to include a statutory exclusion from
their definitions of abuse or neglect pertaining to "spiritual treatment."
Proper use of this exclusion is of paramount concern when children have
been threatened by parental unwillingness to accede to emergency medi-
cal care which involves surgery or blood transfusions.
Even though many persons place little faith in spiritual healing,
those who do may hold a strong belief which should be interfered with
only under extraordinary circumstances. There exists a constitutional
obligation to permit a liberal exercise of the freedom of religion among
individuals. A dilemma arises where this exercise of religious freedom
endangers the welfare of a minor.31 3 The courts must balance the rights
of the parent to religious freedom with the equally fundamental right
of the child to live.314
The number of states permitting this "spiritual treatment" exemp-
tion has steadily increased. In 1967, seven states had such an exemption
in their reporting statutes, while seventeen states did so by 1974 .315
Twenty-seven states at present include the exemption in their reporting
statutes.3 16 Many of these states seek a compromise which recognizes
Court stated that it had "frequently emphasized the importance of the family." The
Court further noted "that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."
312. Singleman, supra note 9, at 1062. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973).
313. See In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Ist DCA 1975), holding that in a life or
death situation, as confirmed by the treating physician, treatment may be ordered under
the state juvenile judicial treatment statute to treat the dependent child without first
seeking the consent or approval of the parents. The court interpreted FLA. STAT. §
827.07(2) (1975) as not precluding the court from ordering either that medical services
be provided or that treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on
spiritual means of healing be provided to the children. Recognizing the ambiguity of
the statute section, the Florida Legislature recently enacted an amendment to the child
abuse statute which greatly clarifies the authority of a court to order medical care when
the health of children requires it. For the text of pertinent portions of FLA. STAT. §
827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., see note 317, infra.
314. V. DEFRANCIS, supra note 267, at 180.
315. Sussman, supra note 83, at 306.
316. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807
(1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 906 (Revised
1974); D.C. CODE § 2-166 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429,
1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.; HAw. REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §
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a parent's right to seek in "good faith" care for an ill child by means
of Christian Science or by the teachings of a "well-recognized reli-
gion."3,7
Regulations issued by the Social and Rehabilitation Service of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare on January 19, 1977,
implementing the Federal Act addressed the issue of "spiritual treat-
ment. 318 In defining the phrase "harm or threatened harm to a child's
health or welfare," 319 the regulations provide a qualified exemption for
"spiritual treatment." This regulation states "that when a parent or
guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs fails to provide
specified medical treatment for a child, such failure alone shall not be
considered neglect. ' 30 The House Bill proposing the extension of the
Federal Act recognizes the validity of this administrative decision by
expanding the Federal Act's definition of abuse and neglect. The House
Bill provides that a child who does not receive medical treatment by a
parent or guardian "solely as a result of the legitimate practicing of
religious beliefs of the parent or guardian ' 31 will not be considered an
2054 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-722 (Cum. Supp. 1977); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 B (4) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852(l)
(West Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE ANN. §
43-21-5(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5011(2) (1977); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1
(Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.740(1)(b) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §26-10-1.1 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1.5 (Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1352 (Cum. Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.2(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.44.020 (Supp. 1976); WYO. STAT. § 14-28.7(a)(vii) (Interim Supp. 1977).
317. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(2), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. The Florida statute provides in part:
A parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does
not provide specified medical treatment for a child shall not, for that reason alone,
be construed a negligent parent or guardian; however, such an exception shall not
preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child requires it, that:
(a) Medical services from a licensed physician as defined herein, or
(b) Treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies solely on spirit-
ual means for healing in accordance with the tenets and practices of a well
recognized church or religious organization, be provided.
318. [1977 Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 101:0061.
319. Id. at 101:0062.
320. Id.
321. 1977 HOUSE AMENDMENTS, supra note 90, at 10.
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abused or neglected child. The House Bill also states that this exception
will not preclude a court from ordering that medical services be pro-
vided to a child, where the child's health and well-being require it.322
(m). The guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem is a special
guardian appointed by the court for the specific purpose of protecting
the child's interest.3z His position is unique in that his obligations to
the child are transient in nature and limited in scope. He usually has
no contact with the child prior to his appointment, nor does his repre-
sentation of the child continue after the conclusion of the case. A guard-
ian ad litem need not be an attorney, except where it is specifically
required by statute.MA Increasingly it is being recognized that as juve-
nile courts become more complex in their proceedings and cognizant of
protecting all parties' rights of due process, the special skills of an
attorney are best suited to ensure the satisfaction of the child's best
interests.32
It has been shown that a child's interests will be endangered in cases
of willful child abuse.326 The juvenile court is responsible for the well-
being of a child in an abuse proceeding, and one commentator suggests
that an independent representative be appointed by the court.3s Two
reasons have been given for the need of such independent representation.
First, as the child in many cases is abused by his own parents, it would
be unwise to believe that his best interests would be protected by having
an attorney represent him as well as his parents.32 1 Second, in states
where the petitioner is the local social service agency, there is a real
question as to whether its resources of time and personnel are available
to represent the child adequately in an abuse case.32 The guardian ad
litem, being a third party to a court action, is technically an advocate
for the interests of the child rather than an adversary pitted against the
322. Id.
323. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 834 (4th ed. rev. 1968) defines a guardian ad
litem as "a guardian appointed by a court of justice to prosecute or defend for an infant
in any suit to which he may be a party."
324. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a()(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978). The Con-
necticut statute requires that counsel be appointed by the court to represent the best
interests of the child.
325. See Krause, supra note 106, at 263; Fraser, supra note 83, at 21; Sussman,
supra note 83, at 304.
326. See text accompanying notes 67-78, supra.
327. Fraser, supra note 83, at 17.
328. Fraser, supra note 153, at 118.
329. Grumet, supra note 62, at 314.
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parents, social services, or the prosecutor's office.
At the present time, twenty-two states provide for the mandatory
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child
in an abuse proceeding.330 Six other states allow the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for children in cases of abuse resulting in the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings.3 ' The reporting statutes vary as
to the degree of legislative instruction given to those appointed as guar-
dians ad litem. One state simply provides that a guardian ad litem be
appointed in a judicial proceeding involving a child in a child abuse
case.311 Other states, however, specify more exactly the parameters of
a guardian ad litem's authority and responsibilities. These responsibili-
ties include (1) an investigatory role wherein the guardian ad litem may
have access to all pertinent records, may interview witnesses, and may
examine and cross-examine witnesses at hearings; 3 (2) an advocacy
role whereby the guardian ad litem ensures that all necessary facts are
brought to the attention of the court;334 (3) a counselor role wherein
330. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 24(1) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817
(1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 326 (Deering Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-
113(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(f)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1618 (Cum. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 38-815(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3858 (West Supp. 1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
722.630 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11 (Cum. Supp.
1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.160 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); N.C. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-
8.23 (West 1976); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-08
(Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.28.1 (Anderson 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2223(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-14 (1977); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-12.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-248 (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-7 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010-.053
(Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.12:1(a) (Interim Supp. 1977).
Virginia, in a recent legislative session, repealed the guardian ad litem provision
of its child abuse statute. VA. CODE § 63.1-248.12 (repealed 1977).
331. FLA. STAT. § 827.07(12), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 G (7) (West 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
10-1310(12) (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-25(G) (Replacement 1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-1(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
332. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-7 (Supp. 1977).
333. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3858 (Supp. 1975). The Maine statute pro-
vides: "[H]e shall make such further investigation as he deems necessary to ascertain
the facts," which may include "reviewing psychiatric, psychological and physical exami-
nations of the child, parents or other persons having custody, interviewing witnesses,
examining and cross-examining witnesses. .. ."
334. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-817 (1977). The Arkansas statute requires that
the guardian ad litem shall participate in the proceeding, whether that proceeding is
70
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the guardian ad litem recommends various options to the court;3 and
(4) a guardian role whereby the guardian ad litem represents the child
and seeks to ensure the protection of his interests.33 1
The guardian ad litem provisions also hold him to be knowledge-
able about the condition of the child and the facts of the case.3 7 A
guardian ad litem may order the examination by a physician, psychia-
trist, or psychologist of any parent or child or other person having
custody of the child at the time of the alleged abuse3s By statute,
every opportunity should be afforded to the guardian ad litem so that
he can perform properly a complex task whose outcome may have a
crucial effect upon a generation of abused children.
(2). LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN THE STATE REPORTING LAWS
After having examined the current reporting laws, certain future
trends in the area are discernible. The state legislatures, partly due to
the impetus of grants provided by the Federal Act,339 are shaping their
reporting laws toward a more clearly defined "interventionist" role with
respect to the family unit. This intervention by the state into the lives
and welfare of individuals is the result of a general pattern of increased
dispositional or adjudicatory in nature. He shall also participate in the proceeding "to
the degree appropriate for adequately representing the child."
335. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §722.630(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
The Michigan statute requires that the guardian ad litem make recommendations to the
court which are in the best interests of the child.
336. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-10-113 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Colorado
statute provides that "the guardian ad litem shall be charged in general with the repre-
sentation of the child's interests."
337. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978). The Connecti-
cut statute provides that "the child shall be represented by counsel appointed by the
court to speak in behalf of the best interests of the child, which counsel shall be knowl-
edgeable about the needs and protection of children ... "
338. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.053 (Supp. 1977). The Washington
statute calls upon the court, by its own motion, "or the motion of the guardian ad litem,
or other parties, [to] order the examination by a physician, psychologist or psychiatrist,
of any parent or child or other person having custody of the child at the time of the
alleged child abuse or neglect," upon clear evidence that an instance of child abuse or
neglect has occurred.
But see Sims v. State, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1977), where the court
declared that due process must extend to the "investigative stage of state action."
Should psychiatric or physical examinations be objected to by the parents, an
"adversary hearing before a judicial body" must be held.
339. See text accompanying notes 102-13, supra.
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governmental action programs which, until recently, have been almost
exclusively affairs of the community or of the individual.
With respect to the future course of the state reporting laws, this
writer believes that there are three areas which will come under in-
creased legislative scrutiny at the state level. These areas are: (1) the use
of protective services as a means of preventing the recurrence of child
abuse within the family; (2) the continuing expansion of the definition
of child abuse and neglect which will encompass the concept of "mental
injury;" and (3) the establishment of evidentiary standards which will
make it easier for the state to show abusive or neglectful conduct by a
parent or guardian in a legal action. Other trends include the further
expansion of the reporters mandated to report known or suspected in-
stances of child abuse known personally to them; universal immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution for reporting a case of child abuse or
neglect in good faith, or participating in a judicial hearing based upon
a report given pursuant to the provisions of the law; and the increased
use of the state central registries as repositories of data on verified cases
of child abuse. It is anticipated that stringent restrictions will be placed
on access to the files in the registries. To accomplish this, specific mea-
sures must be developed at the legislative level to purge from the files
unfounded, unmeaningful, and inapplicable information which meet the
parameters of an individual's right to privacy.
(a). Protective services. Legislators in many states have come to
the realization that there exists a profound limitation on what legislative
action can accomplish in solving deep-seated social problems. Most
child abuse laws are reporting laws and do not cover other aspects of
the problem, such as therapeutic assistance for the child and his family.
Without the proper institutional framework, the law and the legislative
process cannot create better services or better trained child protection
staffs. Some states have already created the institutional framework for
the reporting and investigation of suspected cases of child abuse and
neglect.4 0 Most of these laws establish a mechanism for the provision
of some type of treatment services.
340. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(6)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("It is the
intent of the general assembly to encourage the creation 9 f one or more child protection
teams in each county or contiguous group of counties."); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 423
(McKinney 1976) ("Every local department of social services shall establish a 'child
protective service' within such department."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2216(a) (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) ("Every county public child welfare agency shall establish a
'child protective service' within each agency.")
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It must be recognized, however, that treatment services are the
least developed part of the child protective system. Counseling, protec-
tive supervision, foster care, and temporary shelter care have been the
predominant treatment services available in most communities for the
past twenty years.
There exist two diverging points of view as to what should be the
ultimate goals of the child protective services at the community level.
One view is that the role of child protective services should be expanded
to include provisions for long-range ameliorative treatment services.
The other view calls for the establishment of services designed to deal
with the short-term effect of abuse and neglect. These diverging views
are related to the primary and secondary prevention of abuse. Primary
prevention refers to the prevention of abuse before it occurs; secondary
intervention fills the short-term needs of preventing abuse, as it is after-
the-fact intervention. Expansion of legislation along these lines will
probably be limited by the extent to which the states are able to provide
necessary funding in the face of the current fiscal difficulties.
(b). Expansion of the definition of child abuse and neglect. The
definition of abuse used in many of the early reporting statutes has
gradually been expanded to include neglect, sexual abuse, lind emotional
deprivation. The dilemma faced by mandated reporters, social service
personnel, and the courts alike is how best to determine whether an
instance of abuse has occurred in any given suspected case. The reason
for this uncertainty rests primarily with the definition of abuse set out
in the reporting laws. In many states, abuse has become synonymous
with any harm to a child that resulted from a parent's or guardian's acts
of commission or omission which cause injury." '
A number of states have expanded their definitions of abuse to
include the concept of mental injury. This particular type of injury has
been described as a state of substantially reduced psychological or intel-
lectual functioning in relation to a number of factors which may vary
from state to state.32 Some of these include failure to thrive, 43 the
341. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
342. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 827.07(l)(i), as amended by ch. 77-429, 1977 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv.
343. "Failure to thrive" refers to the condition of a child (usually under the age
of one year) "who fails to grow in height and weight and to develop in personal-social,
adaptive, language, or fine and gross motor areas, as compared to pre-established
standards over a period of time (generally several weeks)." NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, 2 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 39-40 (1975).
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ability to think and reason, and the control of aggressive or self-
destructive impulses. These injuries must, however, be clearly attributa-
ble to the inability or unwillingness on the part of the parent or guardian
to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child.344
(c). Evidentiary standards in a child abuse case. One commen-
tator has noted that it is extremely difficult to prove a case of child
abuse committed by a parent, owing to the high standard of proof which
must be met by the prosecution in a judicial proceeding. 3 5 There is an
argument that while criminal prosecution of the battering parent 3"1 may
satiate society's desire for retribution, it does not cure the problem of
individual cases of child abuse; nor does it take into consideration the
child's independent interests. 37 Further, it has been argued that there
exists a risk that criminal prosecution of the parents may result in
irreparable harm to the best interests of the child.38
In most family courts, even though the standard of proof to be met
is that of a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, "this standard must be met by legally sufficient evi-
dence. ' '349 The prosecution in many instances is bound to rely on cir-
cumstantial evidence. To alleviate the prosecutor's burden somewhat, a
number of states have enacted legislation designed to allow "evidence
that the child has been abused or has sustained a nonaccidental injury
[to] . . . constitute prima facie evidence . . sufficient to support an
adjudication that such [a] child is uncared for or neglected. ' 350
344. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-103(l)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
345. Fraser, supra note 153, at 117.
346. The Court of Appeals for Maryland in a 1975 decision held in State v.
Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975) that the state's child abuse statute applied
to a mother's failure to obtain medical help for her badly injured daughter. "The
mother, embarrassed by the condition of her daughter's body" after she had left the
child in the custody of another man and woman, refused to take her child to the hospital
even after noting that her daughter was in a semicomatose state. Recent statutory
changes have made the parent liable for the "unattended worsening of obviously serious
medical conditions." The court viewed such conduct as being the equivalent of inflicting
physical injury. The court further stated that this was "especially true since the statute
makes the parent responsible for providing the necessities of life including medical
care." Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that criminal child abuse was properly
found by the trial court.
347. See Friedrich & Borniskin, supra note 40, at 216; Fraser, supra note 153, at
119; Grumet, supra note 62, at 307.
348. Fraser, supra note 153, at 119.
349. Paulsen, supra note 190, at 155.
350. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(f)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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A number of jurisdictons have recognized the battered child syn-
drome in criminal cases when the syndrome is enunciated by an expert
witness.3 51 Such an expert witness is usually the treating physician but
may as well be a pathologist or other medically-trained person. The
Supreme Court of California in Landeros v. Flood-2 recognized that
there exists widespread knowledge of what constitutes the battered child
syndrome within the medical community. It is likely that other states
will judicially recognize the battered child syndrome as being capable
of diagnosis in the ordinary course of a physician's practice, and the
testimony based upon the symptoms of the syndrome will be admissible
into evidence in court.
3. CONCLUSION
Social problems and some of their more disturbing trends across
the country are amenable neither to easy solutions nor to legislative
actions at the state or federal level. Realistically, it must be recognized
that the term "child abuse" is as much a political concept, defined to
draw attention to the existing social problem, as it is a scientific concept
which can be used to measure a specific phenomenon. The use of child
abuse as a tool to make the public conscious of the problem has allowed
state reporting laws to define the term as broadly or loosely as desired
in order to magnify concern on this issue.
Mere reporting laws are not enough satisfactorily to combat abuse
and neglect in this country. Positive programs at the state and local level
must implement protective services for the child and therapeutic services
to both child and parent. Without such programs it is clear that no "law
can be better than its implementation, and its implementation can be
no better than its resources permit." 3
Effective measures to find a feasible solution to the problem must
be based on long-term prevention. Recognizing child abuse as an infec-
tious disease in which the victim becomes the carrier, with each genera-
tion passing on the illness to its children, underlines the need to detect,
intervene in, and prevent the disease. The reporting laws, when they
351. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1971) and State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973), where
expert testimony given by physicians concerning the battered child syndrome was admit-
ted into evidence.
352. See text accompanying notes 207-20, supra.
353. Paulsen, supra note 85, at 49.
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include provisions for protective services, can be utilized only if the full
resources of the state can be brought to bear to meet the needs of the
abused child and family on a case-by-case basis. Such a concerted effort
can be accomplished only in light of certain fundamental rights of the
abusive parents, the parents patriae interests of the state in protecting
the health and well-being of children, and, lastly, the unspoken interest
of the child. Protection of the child's interest must include adequate and
timely representation by a guardian ad litem at any hearing which may
result in removing the child from the family.
William C. Redden
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An Attorney's Liability to Third Parties:
The Expanding Field of Malpractice
Malpractice suits against attorneys have increased dramatically in the
last decade. In Florida, they have more than tripled in the last three
years alone (Chart 1). As a consequence of the overwhelming amount
of litigation resulting from such suits and the substantial judgments
awarded to winning plaintiffs, professional liability insurance premiums
for Florida attorneys have almost quadrupled since 1973 (Chart 2). This
expanding field of liability has become of justifiable concern to members
of the legal profession.
S6OO
$400_
1974 1975 1976 1977
Chart 1. Number of malpractice suits
brought against attorneys. (Courtesy
of Poe Insurance Company, Tallahassee
Florida.)
1973-74 1975 1976 1977
Chart 2. Average yearly premiums for
professional liability insurance. (Courtesy
of Poe Insurance Company, Tallahassee,
Florida.)
[The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Jack Driscoll, Poe Insurance
Company, Tallahassee, Florida, for his generous assistance in providing the statistical
data for the charts.]
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In this country, the overabundance of lawsuits against attorneys
has not emanated from clients alone, but also from third parties who
lack privity or any contractual relationship with the attorney. Although
the question of an attorney's duty to one other than his client has
already been settled in two leading jurisdictions, New York and Califor-
nia,' Florida only recently decided the issue as one of first impression. 2
Consequently, the question of an attorney's liability to third parties
remains a controversial and speculative issue.
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of past and
current professional malpractice litigation by third parties as it has
occurred in other states, and to offer insight into the recent develop-
ments in Florida, including a discussion of related Florida statutes.
1. HISTORY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Historically, there has been widespread agreement in the legal com-
munity that an attorney will not be held liable to third persons for acts
committed in good faith.3 Consequently, an attorney's negligence in the
performance of an obligation to a client will not provide a third party
with a cause of action against the attorney.4
Early in this century, the United States Supreme Court struggled
with the question of where an attorney's liability should end. In
National Savings Bank of the District of Columbia v. Ward,5 an attor-
ney negligently certified that his client held good title to a certain piece
of property when, in fact, the client had conveyed it to another individ-
ual. The bank, relying on the certificate, made a loan to the client. When
the client later defaulted on the loan payments and the bank discovered
it was unable to foreclose on the property, it brought suit against the
attorney, claiming he owed it a duty to make a careful title search.
After considering whether the bank was a beneficiary of the attor-
ney's actions, the Court ruled that the suit failed to state a cause of
action, since "[wihere there is neither fraud, falsehood nor collusion, the
obligation of the attorney to exercise reasonable care and skill in the
performance of a designated service is to the client and not to a third
I. See text accompanying notes 8-32 infra.
2. McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
3. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 52 (1948).
4. Id.
5. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
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party.' 6 This lack of privity proved to be a barrier to any actions the
bank sought to bring against the attorney. The case exemplified the
general principle that a person who is not a client can still be substan-
tially affected by an attorney's actions or advice. Therefore, it became
necessary to establish a realistic limit to the attorney's liability. Without
privity, the Court reasoned, no duty existed and, with no duty, no cause
of action could arise.7
In the years following Ward, privity again became a focal point in
determining the liability of individuals to third persons. Mr. Justice
Cardozo authored two often-quoted opinions which set the standards for
many courts.8 In the first, when faced with a plaintiff claiming to be a
third-party beneficiary to a contract, Cardozo stated that the require-
ment of privity in order to bring suit was a necessity, for to allow
otherwise would mean that "[e]veryone making a promise having the
quality of a contract will be under a duty to the promisee. . . but under
another duty apart from the contract, to an indefinite number of poten-
"2tial beneficiaries ... .
Two years later, the New York Court of Appeals heard the second
case involving an action brought against an accounting firm that had
negligently prepared a financial statement for an individual who had
applied to the plaintiff for a loan.1" In his complaint the plaintiff de-
manded damages, alleging that the firm should be liable because it knew
that creditors like the plaintiff would rely on the financial statement.
However, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to sue because he
lacked privity with the accountants. The court feared that allowing such
a suit would "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."" The
court felt the "assault upon the citadel of privity" was growing at such
a rate that it had to be contained before the consequences of such suits
outweighed the remedy they sought to provide. 2 The danger Cardozo
foresaw-that of unlimited liability-has remained in the minds of
many courts to this day. The New York courts have remained steadfast
6. Id. at 198.
7. Id. at 199.
8. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928);
Ultrameres Corp. v. Touche, Niven and Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
9. 159 N.E. at 899.
10. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441.
11. Id. at 444.
12. Id. at 445.
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in their belief that attorneys should not be subjected to suits by third
parties lacking privity.
In Victor v. Goldman, 3 an attorney was sued by a relative of a
deceased client who claimed that the attorney negligently failed to
change provisions in the decedent's will, as the latter had instructed,
naming the plaintiff as the beneficiary of the right of first refusal to
purchase the decedent's estate. The court, in dismissing the case, stated
that "an attorney owes no duty to third parties for acts committed bona
fides in the performance of an obligation to his client . . . and this
remains the rule even where negligence results in damage to the third
party.""
Recently, a New York court reiterated its stand on attorney liabil-
ity in Drago v. Buonagurio,15 where a doctor who had been unsuccess-
fully sued for malpractice filed a countersuit against the attorney alleg-
ing that the action had been frivolous and that, due to the attorney's
negligence in failing to check out the facts, the doctor had been finan-
cially damaged. The issue at bar was whether an attorney who instituted
a frivolous malpractice suit on behalf of a client could be held liable for
damages to the doctor against whom he instituted the lawsuit. Deciding
that he could not, the court said:
The Courts of this state have consistently held that an attorney is not
liable for the negligent performance of his obligations to a client, even
where such negligence results in damage to a third party . . . and there
is no indication that such a rule would be adopted in this state.,6
To do so, the court feared, would unquestionably discourage the use of
the courts as a means of resolving conflicts, and thus be "contrary to
public policy."'17 Clearly, the New York courts believe that an extension
of an attorney's liability to third parties would be a fatal blow to the
attorney's role as advocate, since the fear of personal liability could
overshadow the attorney's duty to practice law in the best interests of
his client.
While New York clings to its long-standing policy of privity as a
requirement for attorney liability, California appears to have gone from
13. 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
14. 344 N.Y.S. 2d at 673.
15. 89 Misc. 2d 171, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
16. 391 N.Y.S. 2d at 63.
17. Id.
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one extreme to the other. In 1895, the California Supreme Court"8 held
that an attorney who negligently drafted a will would not be liable to
an injured beneficiary solely because he lacked privity of contract. The
court stated that the plaintiff was also precluded from bringing suit
under the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary, since the purpose
of the will was expressly for the client's benefit.19
However, the requirement of strict privity began to erode with the
case of Biakanja v. Irving.2" Here, a notary public, in preparing a will,
had failed to have it properly witnessed, rendering it invalid. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed a lower court's dismissal of the case,
reasoning that the time had come to liberalize the privity requirements
by permitting a third-party beneficiary of a will to recover his losses."
As a means of controlling suits and the conditions under which they are
brought, the court stated that the allowance of such suits was "a matter
of policy and involves the balancing of various factors. . ."2 among
which are the extent of the intended benefit to the third party, the risk
of harm to him, the certainty of his injury, the proximity of the negligent
party's conduct to the injury, the moral blame involved, and the need
to prevent future harm.23
Although the Biakanja decision did not deal directly with attorneys
and third parties, it took the court only a short time to include attorneys
in the category of those who could be sued by third parties lacking
privity. In Lucas v. Hamm,24 the court determined that a beneficiary to
a negligently drafted will could make the negligent attorney answer in
damages for his mistakes. After listing the "balancing factors"25 it set
forth in Biakanja, the court held that such a cause of action could be
founded in either contract or tort.28 In addition, the court dealt with the
18. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
19. 42 P. at 901.
20. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
21. 320 P.2d at 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962).
25. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
26. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The court held, however, that plaintiff's claim for relief
was not such as to allow recovery:
The complaint . . . alleges that defendant drafted the will in such a manner that
the trust was invalid because it violated the rules relating to perpetuities and
restraints on alienation * * * In view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities
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question of whether extending privity could impose an undue burden on
the legal profession. Upon comparing the possibility of an undue burden
on attorneys with the probability of harm to an innocent beneficiary,
the court resolved the conflict by stating that "[s]ince, in a situation like
those presented here . . . the main purpose of the testator . . . is to
benefit the persons named in his will . . . this intent can [only] be
effectuated, in the event of a breach by the attorney . . . by giving the
beneficiaries a right of action. 27
In 1971, a California Court of Appeals~l extended the right to sue
to all third-party beneficiaries, in addition to those whose claims arose
from negligently drafted wills. In this case, the plaintiff had employed
a collection agency to recover a debt owed to him. However, the plaintiff
lost his chance to recover the debt when, due to the negligence of the
agency's attorney, the action was dismissed for lack of diligent prosecu-
tion. Although a lower court dismissed the case, the appellate court
ruled that the plaintiff had a cause of action on the theory that the
agency's attorney fully realized that his services were for the benefit of
a third party.2 1 In its opinion, the court stated that "an attorney may
be liable for damage caused by his negligence to a person intended to
be benefited by his performance irrespective of any lack of privity of
contract between the attorney and the party to be benefited.""0 The
decision paved the way for a multiplicity of lawsuits against attorneys
in that state and, at some point, limitations were required to reduce the
ever-rising number of malpractice actions.
In one case that reached the California Supreme Court, 3 an attor-
ney had negligently advised both his clients and the plaintiffs' attorney
that the sale of certain stock by his clients to the plaintiffs would not
be subject to a particular securities registration and tax regulation. The
plaintiffs purchased the stock, subsequently learned it was not exempt,
and restraints on alienation and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made
by defendant in preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that
defendant failed to use such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly exercise.
364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826. The third count was also held not actionable in
negligence. 364 P.2d at 692, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
27. Id. at 825.
28. Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971).
29. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
30. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
31. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976).
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and, as a result, suffered heavy financial losses. In their case against the
attorney, the plaintiffs alleged that they were third-party beneficiaries
of the advice given by the attorney to his clients and, as such, it was
foreseeable that the negligently rendered advice would cause them in-
jury.
In a lengthy opinion, the court held that the plaintiffs were not
third-party beneficiaries and, more important, that the liability of an
attorney to third parties had discernible bounds.
The attorney's preoccupation or concern with the possibility of claims
based on mere negligence. . . by any with whom his client might deal
"would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's inter-
ests." The result would be both "an undue burden on the profession" and
a diminution in the quality of the legal services received by the client.3"
2. FLORIDA DECISIONS
In 1976, Florida dealt with the issue of third-party liability in the
case of McAbee v. Edwards.33 Here, a trial court had dismissed a
malpractice suit against an Orange County attorney who, in response
to a request from his client, had failed to inform her that subsequent to
her remarriage certain provisions in her will would have to be altered
to ensure that her daughter would inherit her estate as sole beneficiary.
When the woman died and her second husband successfully claimed a
portion of the estate, the daughter brought suit against the attorney
alleging that his negligence prevented her from succeeding to the entire
estate. The attorney's main defense to the action was that even though
the plaintiff was a beneficiary, she lacked privity of contract with the
attorney and thus did not have standing to sue. Furthermore, he
claimed, a Florida attorney owes a duty only to his client.
In an opinion which indicated that this was a case of first impres-
sion, the appellate court squarely addressed the question of whether a
person without privity of contract may bring a malpractice action
against an attorney. The court's research led it through three California
cases34 which had decided this issue some years ago. Citing the Califor-
32. 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
33. 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
34. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223,449 P.2d 161,74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Lucas
v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16; see also text accompa-
nying notes 20-27 supra.
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nia opinions extensively, the court held that a third-party beneficiary to
a will can sue the attorney who drafted it, if his negligence resulted in a
loss to the intended beneficiary.35
The Florida court fully agreed with the California courts' conten-
tions that an attorney who is employed to draft a will takes on a rela-
tionship with the beneficiaries as well as his client, since it is readily
foreseeable that the purpose of the will lies more in benefiting the benefi-
ciary than it does in benefiting the client. Equally important, the court
felt, was the fact that an attorney holds himself out as one having
training and knowledge superior to that of the layman and, therefore,
assumes a duty to avoid the foreseeable consequences of his own negli-
gence.36 Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court was unable to rule
upon what could have been the test case for setting the state standard,
since the parties reached a settlement after the appellate court remanded
it for a hearing on the merits. But for now, the case stands out as an
indication of the direction which Florida courts may take in terms of
expanding the liability of attorneys. The bulk of the court's opinion in
this case was quoted from prior California cases, and it is puzzling why
the court failed to establish its position using existing Florida case law.
As will be evident below, had the court wished to do so, it could have
reached the same conclusion by other means.
3. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES
The courts of this state follow the well-accepted rule that, when a
contract has been created solely for the benefit of the contracting par-
ties, a third party-even though he receives some incidental bene-
fit-cannot sue for the negligence of the parties in the performance of
their contractual duties." However, Florida has long recognized that
third-party beneficiaries have standing to sue on a contractual duty. As
early as 1887, the Florida Supreme Court stated that third parties could
bring suit where there was a "clear intent" for the third party to be
benefited.3" The mere fact that he might be benefited, held the court,
35. 340 So. 2d at 1170.
36. Id., citing Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225.
37. Muravchick v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA
1970).
38. Wright v. Terry, 23 Fla. 160, 2 So. 6 (1887), where Terry contracted with
Wright to have logs "driven" down a river to a designated place and, upon their arrival,
Wright was to pay Terry's employees for their work. Terry's employees were deemed
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is not enough.39
In order for a plaintiff to bring a suit as a third-party beneficiary,
stated the court in Weimar v. Yacht Club Point Estates," his pleading
must allege that the contract was one created "expressly for his benefit
and one under which it clearly appears that he was a beneficiary."'"
Here, although the court pointed out that it was ii no way relaxing the
requirement of privity in order for a plaintiff to sue on a contract, it
found that the status of a third-party beneficiary was sufficient to create
the privity necessary for such an action.42 But the Florida courts have
placed definite limits on the types of people they consider to be third-
party beneficiaries. For instance, in the case of a plaintiff who was not
in privity with an abstract company,4 3 but relied on its title search, the
court held that "the liability of a title abstractor extended only to the
person employing him or one who is a party or privy to the contract of
employment"4 and not to a party who might subsequently rely on the
abstract.
In a more recent case,45 an action was brought against an account-
ant who had prepared a financial statement for lenders that was subse-
quently relied on by the plaintiff in making a loan. The plaintiff suffered
a loss and sued, alleging that the accountant was negligent in preparing
the statement. But the court of appeals held that in order for the plain-
tiff, a third party who had not employed the accountant, to recover from
the accountant, he had to show either that the accountant was guilty of
gross negligence or that he knew the plaintiff intended to rely on the
statement.
4 6
To date, the most far-reaching decision on third-party liability in
Florida was made in a case involving a contract between plaintiffs
employer and the defendant,4 7 whereby the defendant was to make
by the court to be third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Terry and Wright.
39. Id. at 8.
40. 223 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), where a plaintiff homebuyer would have
been allowed to bring suit against a subcontractor who was involved in building the
home, even though the plaintiff's only privity lay with the general contractor, if the
plaintiff's pleadings had been drafted correctly.
41. Id. at 102.
42. Id. at 103.
43. Sickler v. Indian River Abstract and Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195
(1940).
44. Id. at 198.
45. Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
46. Id.
47. Gallichio v. Corporate Group Serv., Inc., 227 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
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safety inspections of a drydock. He conducted his inspections negli-
gently and, as a result, the plaintiff was injured. The court found the
plaintiff to be a third-party beneficiary of the contract and held that
"one who may foreseeably be injured by the negligent performance of
a contractual duty has the right to maintain an action against the negli-
gent performer, even though he is not in privity with the performer. '48
In matters involving beneficiaries under wills, it is apparent that
such persons fall into the category of third-party beneficiaries within the
meaning given to the term by the courts of this state.49 Unquestionably,
the intent of the contracting parties, the attorney and his client, is to
create an instrument capable of passing a portion of an estate into the
hands of the beneficiary upon the death of the testator. Moreover, it will
be clear on the face of the instrument that the concern of the contracting
parties is for the protection of those rights which they vested in the
beneficiary. In accepting employment to draft a will, the attorney also
undertakes a duty to ensure that the document is carefully researched
and skillfully prepared, so that the party's interests as a third-party
beneficiary will be protected. Thus, under existing case law, the plaintiff
in McAbee had the right to sue for the alleged negligent advice the
attorney had given his client.5"
4. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE'S ATTEMPT
TO CONTROL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
In 1975, the Florida legislature took notice of the unprecedented
rise in malpractice litigation against physicians." Lawsuits had become
so numerous, and malpractice insurance rates so high, that an outcry
from both physicians and the public brought together a committee
charged with creating legislation to help relieve some of the economic
hardships physicians were facing. 5 The public's concern about doctors'
rising malpractice insurance premiums was the inevitable result of high
48. Id. at 521.
49. See Auto Mutual Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852, 856 (1938);
McCann Plumbing Co. v. Plumbing Industry Program Inc., 105 So. 2d 26, 27 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1958); Di Camillo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 122 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA
1960); Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Guitierrez, 325 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA
1976).
50. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
51. Medical Malpractice Reform Act, Ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 13.
52. Id. at 14.
2:1978 1
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
Attorney Malpractice-Third Party Liability
insurance rates, since, as rates went up, physicians passed the increased
costs on to their patients in the form of higher charges for services. But
insurance rates alone were not the cause of increased costs for medical
care. A large part of the problem was that doctors, in order to protect
themselves from the possibility of lawsuits, began practicing
"defensive" medicine-ordering extra x-rays and tests, or hospitalizing
parties who may have fared just as well if allowed to stay home."
The legislative committee, whose recommendations eventually re-
sulted in a far-reaching bill titled the "Medical Malpractice Reform
Act ' 5 (MMRA), included representatives of the Florida Bar, Florida
Medical Association, and Trial Lawyers Guild. Their goal was to organ-
ize a system of checks and balances that would reward legitimate suits
by patients, while limiting non-meritorious actions brought against
Florida physicians.-" The bill set up a study commission, a self-insurance
program for doctors, medical liability mediation panels, and a two-year
limitation on malpractice actions against physicians. An important fea-
ture of the section dealing with the statute of limitations was the state-
ment that such malpractice actions were limited to "the health care
provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care. 56
Buried deep within the bill was an amendment to an already exist-
ing Florida statute of limitations.5 7 The amendment created a new and
distinct category of parties whose liability would be regulated by the new
section and, more important, the amendment limited itself solely to
physicians and other professionals. Although the word "professional"
was left undefined in the statute itself, presumably the bill's sponsors
intended it to cover any person licensed by the state, including attor-
neys."'
The new statute is divided into two sections, the first dealing with
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 20, 21.
57. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1975).
58. A "professional" act or service within malpractice policy is one arising out
of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge,
labor, or skill, and the labor or skill is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than
physical or manual. Marx v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 157 N.W.2d
870, 872 (1961).
A "professional" is one engaged in one of the learned professions or in an occupa-
tion requiring a high level of training and proficiency. Reich v. City of Reading, 3 P.
Comm. Ct. 511, 284 A.2d 315, 319 (1961).
I
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actions "for professional malpractice other than medical malpractice,"' 9
and the second for medical malpractice." It is the first of these sections
which is relevant to the present discussion, and it reads as follows:
95.11 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.-
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malprac-
tice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of
limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or
should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; provided,
however, that the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice
shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.6
A problem as to the proper interpretation of the statute exists, because
it is not clear if it was intended to limit the liability of an attorney to
only those persons with whom he is in privity of contract.
In attempting to answer this question, the opinions of various attor-
neys in South Florida, 2 including those who had participated in the
drafting of the MMRA, were solicited. There was one common thought
linking the various interpretations of the statute: at some point during
the drafting of the privity requirement for physicians, it was felt that it
would be proper and justifiable to limit the liability of all professionals
by making privity a prerequisite to bringing a malpractice action. In
other words, under the statute, the intent of the draftsmen was to limit
an attorney's liability to third parties. The point of disagreement is
whether the wording of this section successfully carries out this intent.
Attorneys on one side of the issue feel that the phrase "the limita-
tions of actions herein for professional malpractice"6 means that the
privity requirement is applicable only when a negligent attorney is sued
under this particular two-year statute of limitations, but that a party
lacking privity could still bring an action under the more general four-
year "negligence" provisions of the statutes. That is to say, those who
59. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (1975).
60. Id. at (4)(b).
61. Id. at (4)(a).
62. For the purposes of this section relating to the statute of limitations, the
attorneys interviewed requested that they not be named in the article.
63. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(a) (1975) (emphasis added).
64. "§ 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.
(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.-
(a) An action founded on negligence."
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hold this view feel that the legislature's intent to limit actions against
attorneys to this section alone failed by the wording of the statute.
The opposing viewpoint is that the word "herein" is insignificant,
since this is the only place throughout the entire statute of limitations
where a section has been exclusively tailored to professionals. Therefore,
one who has a professional malpractice case is forced to bring suit only
under the professional malpractice section of the statutes and not under
the general "negligence" section. Those who support this interpretation
also point out that it seems illogical that a person in privity would have
only two years in which to bring an action, while one not in privity
would have four years. Why should a person without a contractual
relationship be allowed a longer period of time in which to bring a suit?
Some argue that the longer period is necessary, since a party not in
privity might not have the opportunity to discover the injury done to him
and, therefore, should be entitled to a longer time in which to sue.
However, the argument is moot in view of the general rule that statutes
of limitations begin to run when the injury is discovered or should have
been discovered. 5 Therefore, a party without privity is in no way disad-
vantaged and should not be given a longer period in which to bring an
action.
5. PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW
Throughout this article, an attempt has been made to present a
broad overview of the historical development of a third party's ability
to sue an attorney for his negligent performance of a contractual duty.
Today this issue remains unresolved, as no uniform rule exists through-
out the country. Two leading jurisdictions, New York and California,
represent totally opposing viewpoints on the matter. New York courts
continue to take the position that under no condition will an attorney
be held liable to third parties; California insists that any legitimate
third-party beneficiary should have a cause of action against a negligent
attorney. Florida, in its first dealings with the subject, has followed the
lead of the California courts in permitting a third party to bring an
action. While these cases are representative of what has occurred in the
past, they do not necessarily reflect what future decisions the courts will
make. Will the courts strengthen the privity requirement so as to limit
an attorney's liability? Or will they abolish the privity restrictions in
65. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 144 (1971).
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order to ensure that anyone injured as a result of an attorney's profes-
sional negligence can bring a malpractice action?
6. FUTURE TRENDS
As one might expect, there is a definite split of opinion regarding
where the law is or should be headed, each view supported by socio-
economic as well as legal reasons. On the one hand, as Chief Justice
John Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison," there is a strong consti-
tutional argument that every person who has been wronged is entitled
to a viable remedy through the courts. Marshall wrote: "The very ess-
ence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the
[equal] protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection."6 Keeping
in line with the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison, the drafters of the
Florida Constitution have provided the citizens of this state with a
constitutional right "for redress of any injury, and justice . . . without
sale, denial or delay. 68
The innocent third-party beneficiary who is injured by the negligent
performance of an attorney acting on behalf of a client deserves the
opportunity to gain redress through the courts. If the law fails to provide
the injured third party with access to the legal system, he will then be
left abandoned and without a remedy. The California decisions and
McAbee show that the courts recognize the potential injustice that can
arise from such a situation and have begun to remove the age-old privity
requirement as to third parties in the same way that they have abolished
the privity requirement in other areas of the law. 9
Consider that, in cases involving the growing field of products
liability, the courts have recognized that a plaintiff who has been physi-
cally injured by a defective product may bring an action against either
the retailer or manufacturer of the product, regardless of whether privity
exists. 0 The law, in effect, now makes both retailer and manufacturer
strictly liable for defective products they sell, or produce, that result in
66. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
67. Id. at 163.
68. FLA. CONST., art. 1, § 21.
69. For instance, the concept of strict products liability no longer requires
plaintiff-consumers to be in privity with the manufacturer; see notes 70-72 infra.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A, B, Strict Liability.
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physical injury.71 However, at this point, the lifting of the privity re-
quirement has been extended to only those cases dealing with physical
injury, not with purely financial loss. 72 Logically, it seems that abolish-
ing the privity requirement where physical injury has occurred is only
the first step in abolishing the need for privity under other circumstan-
ces. Commercial loss can be just as devastating to an individual as a
physical disability, and the right to bring an action should be made just
as available. It is probably this attitude that has produced the California
and McAbee decisions.
The most serious concern of the courts, and perhaps the most valid
reason for limiting an attorney's liability to third parties, is protection
of the client. Should the scope of attorney liability expand, followed by
an inevitable rise in malpractice actions, the increased cost of these
lawsuits and judgments will be passed on to clients-much as physicians
have passed costs on to patients. Thus, the cost of malpractice insurance
for attorneys will ultimately be borne by the client. Of even greater
potential concern is the fact that the attorney who is placed in the
unenviable position of fearing personal lawsuits by third parties may
tend to become overconservative, because his apprehension over the
impact of his actions on third persons will have overshadowed his con-
cern for taking the course of action most likely to benefit his client. If
an attorney must focus upon interests other than those of his client, a
devastating blow is dealt to the adequate representation of a client's best
interests that an attorney is expected-and is under a duty-to pro-
vide.71
Ethically, the attorney who allows his representation of a client to
be constrained or altered by third parties is violating the very Code of
Professional Responsibility he has sworn to uphold. Canon 5, EC-5-I
states that "[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised,
within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free
from compromising influences and loyalties." In addition, the Canons
71. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (manufacturer
held liable to injured bystander); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956)
(manufacturer liable to third party for negligent design); Marrilla v. Lyn Craft Boat
Co., 271 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (privity not required to maintain action against
retailer).
72. 336 So. 2d at 89.
73. "The attorney is under a duty at all times to represent his client and handle
his client's affairs with the utmost degree of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty and fidel-
ity." Smyrna Dev. Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
74. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY, EC 5-1.
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point out that "[t]he obligation of a lawyer to exercise professional
judgment solely on behalf of the client requires that he disregard the
desires of others that might impair his free judgment."7 5 Should an
attorney suddenly be confronted with the threat of personal liability for
a decision he has made with the best interests of his client in mind, he
will surely, when faced with alternatives, choose the one least likely to
expose himself to a lawsuit by third parties. No longer may he act as
an undaunted advocate for his client's cause, or represent his client as
zealously as possible within the bounds of the law.
Last year, a Florida District Court of Appeal placed limitations on
an attorney's liability to third parties, using both pragmatic and ethical
reasoning. In the case of Adams v. Chenowith,6 the court concerned
itself with the issue of whether an attorney representing the seller in the
sale of a home owed a duty to the buyer. Here, the seller's attorney had
completed a closing statement using incorrect figures given to him by
the seller. The buyer was supplied with a copy of the statement prior to
the closing, but failed to confirm the figures himself and, as a result,
overpaid the seller. Upon learning of the overpayment, the buyer
brought an action against the seller's attorney, alleging that the attor-
ney's negligence in preparing the closing statement caused him subse-
quent financial injury.
The appellate court affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the case,
holding that the attorney owed a duty to no one other than his client.
In addition to the fact that this was an arm's-length business transac-
tion, the buyer had the opportunity to verify the closing figures on his
own. Moreover, the court pointed out that it was never intended for the
seller's attorney to represent both parties to the transaction, since to do
so would violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Citing from
Canon 5, EC-5-14, the higher court agreed that an attorney may not
represent multiple clients with differing interests if such employment
would adversely affect the attorney's judgment on behalf of, or loyalty
to, a client.7" In holding that the interests of a seller and buyer in the
sale of a home are opposing interests that cannot properly be repre-
sented by the same attorney, the court said: "Here there are two sides,
two interests to be protected and we cannot hold a lawyer responsible
to all parties in a transaction .... ,,18
75. Id. at EC 5-21.
76. 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
77. Id. at 231.
78. Id.
2:1978 1
92
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
Attorney Malpractice- Third Party Liability
For members of the legal community, it is not hard to imagine the
burdensome impact an unqualified extension of third-party liability
could have upon attorneys and the courts. Besides the endless amount
of litigation that would result, such an expansion of liability could, con-
ceivably, severely cripple the basic foundation of the legal system by
preventing an attorney from trying to the best of his ability to represent
the view of the client.
No one can seriously contend that attorneys should be provided
with complete immunity for their actions. Attorneys must be made to
answer to the same system of justice they represent. Yet, at the same
time, logical and equitable restraints on a lawyer's personal liability,
particularly to third persons, must be established and enforced. Now
may be the time for the states to take an interest, as they have with
physicians, in controlling, directing, and limiting the actions that can be
brought against attorneys. Short of that, the courts must rely upon their
own precedent-setting authority to ensure that the legal system, and
those working within it, are given the opportunity to advocate the best
interests of clients-now, and in the future.
Marshall J. Emas
Harvey A. Nussbaum
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Pesticide Regulation:
Why Not Preventive Legislation?
Technological advancements are, by and large, inspired by economic
considerations. They are spurred by motives to reduce labor and pro-
duction costs, and to increase profits. In the twentieth century, man has
implemented many such technological improvements, which have
usually brought about their expected benefits. In his haste to advance
and improve technology, however, man has created new problems, more
complex and dangerous than those he originally sought to solve. It
seems that pollution, ominous and difficult to control, lies invariably in
the wake of technological innovation.
This discussion deals with one type of pollution-that of our food
supply by the chemical residue of pesticides. It will show that the tradi-
tional means of regulation used to eliminate the hazards posed by pesti-
cide residue are inappropriate and ineffective. If protection of human
health is the rationale for environmental control and regulation, then
adequate means of achieving this worthy goal should be adopted. It is
suggested that the traditional political process of regulation should yield
to a more scientific process of regulation. Regulation, preventive in
nature and based on scientific data, would achieve more efficiently the
purpose of environmental control by giving greater consideration to
preventing potential harm, rather than merely attempting to rectify past
harm, as the political process has done.
1. THE DILEMMA
The question boils down to whether to proceed with regulation given an
imperfect and ambiguous scientific base or wait until further data has
been collected . . . waiting for a body count before regulating is an
approach which is hardly the mark of a civilized society.'
This critique on the federal regulation of environmental contami-
nants expresses the growing concern-over human exposure to hazardous
I. Karstadt, Protecting Public Health from Hazardous Substances: Federal Reg-
ulation of Environmental Contaminants, 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 50176 (1975).
94
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
Nova Law Journal
substances. However, the solution to this problem can be achieved only
within specified guidelines and boundaries, which also mark a civilized
society.
Laws which embody these guidelines reflect a balancing of adverse
interests. Specifically in pesticide regulation, legislatures and courts are
confronted with the task of balancing the chemical producers' demands
for a free and unfettered market, with the environmentalists' pleas for
strict constraints to avert the frightening proposition of an indiscrimi-
nately polluted environment. The difficulty of this balancing process
increases when a present benefit is counterbalanced by a potential
future harm. Within the legal framework of assessing the propensity and
gravity of a future uncertainty, the ability of present circumstances to
indicate reliably the occurrence of a future event is determinative. The
understanding of present circumstances, however, is limited by existing
technological knowledge and scientific expertise. Predicting future
events from them is extremely difficult, especially in the field of environ-
mental health, where dealing with the unknown and unpredictable is not
uncommon.2 Invariably, under the legal process, such a balancing stan-
dard has resulted in the scales of regulation being favorably tilted to the
chemical producer's demands.
The legal approach to resolving problems has failed to protect the
American people and their environment from exposure to pesticide pol-
lution. Its major flaw is that it does not adequately compensate for the
lack of conclusive scientific evidence of potential harm. Those entrusted
to make environmental decisions, particularly legislators, should adopt
a standard that would emphasize the potential health hazards posed by
the heavy use of pesticide chemicals. Such an approach which allots
greater concern to future consequences would better protect the environ-
ment for future generations.
The scientific approach to decision-making, by comparison, is ori-
ented much more toward the future. The scientific method discourages
2. Questions involving the environment are particularly prone to uncertainty.
Technological man has altered his world in ways never before experienced or antici-
pated. The health effects of such alterations are often unknown. This language was used
by the Court in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 11976] 8 EN vIR. REP.
(BNA) 1785, 1801. (Not officially reported. For further discussion of case, see note 120
infra.)
For discussion on the amount of scientific knowledge available for regulatory
decisions, see E. Burger, Regulation and Health: How Solid Is Our Foundation, 5
ENvIR. L. REP. 50, 179 (1975).
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hasty action, especially if the consequences of that action cannot be
predicted. Rather, if uncertainty exists, the major concern of the scien-
tific method is to refrain from action until such time as scientific knowl-
edge allows a reasonable prediction of future events.
The differences between the legal and the scientific approaches may
be best distinguished in their different interpretations of such terms as
"cause" and "proof." For example, to prove a hypothesis successfully,
a scientist must use certified evidence, in which the probability of error
by standard statistical measurements must generally be less than 5%.3
Likewise, to show cause, a scientist must prove his hypothesis by rigid
laboratory experiments. In the judicial or administrative process,
however, testimony by a scientist, given in his professional capacity, can
be deemed competent proof and can establish that the likelihood of
occurrence of a certain event is simply more probable than not.4
The legal requirements of cause and proof have burdened the ef-
forts of those attempting to regulate suspected harmful substances. Reg-
ulation through the legal framework has been proven inadequate in
other areas of society, with the resulting problems being resolved only
by stricter legislation.5 The regulation of environmental contaminants,
e.g., pesticide chemicals, has apparently run that same frustrating
gamut. Legalities have hampered not only the regulators' enforcement
procedures, but their administrative and perfunctory duties as well.
Implementation of stricter legislation, employing scientific concepts,
would remove the burden of having to show that a harm is more likely
than not to occur. Conversely, pesticide manufacturers would clearly
have to establish that their products are safe. This type of legislation
would include standards mandating the complete testing of all sub-
stances before they could be mass-produced. If their full effects were not
ascertainable, their production would not be permitted. Such legislation
would foster the application of a scientific approach, because it would
force the support of research which hopefully would remove the limita-
tions of existing scientific predictive knowledge. At present, those to
3. Comment, 21 S. D. L. REv. 425, 427 n.9 (1976), citing Judge Wright for the
majority decision in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 176 U.S. App.
D.C. 373, 541 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2263 (1976).
4. Id. In most civil proceedings, a preponderance of the evidence test is used,
which demands only a certainty of 51%.
5. "Workmen's compensation legislation grew out of the frustration of trying to
recover damages within the framework of negligence law. . . ." YANNACONE V. &
COHEN B., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS & REMEDIES at 6 (1971).
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whom is allotted the task of regulating pesticide residues found in foods
are confronted by the dilemma of which approach to use, scientific or
legal. Agricultural codes and federal regulations, entangled among legal
and technical considerations, essentially ignore the serious ecological
shortcomings inherent in the use of modern pesticides.' It has become
clear that legislation which merely regulates the labeling and application
of pesticides7 is not sufficient to protect the American people and their
environment. A regulatory pattern must be implemented that also limits
the extent of pesticide residue to which man is exposed. Up to the
present, the effectiveness of residue limitations has been greatly cur-
tailed, due to the "legally insufficient" certainty of detrimental results.,
Hopefully, hindsight will no longer continue to be our guide, and
reparation of the damage afterward our burden. The thought underlying
future legislation should be that we must stop treating the population
as guinea pigs and the environment as a laboratory. Regulation of
environmental contaminants offers a tangible and achievable opportun-
ity to practice preventive medicine9 through preventive legislation.
2. EXTENT OF PESTICIDE USE
In the mid-1940's, as one war had come to an end, another was
being initiated. 10 The new war was not against man, at least not inten-
tionally so. It was against insects, pathogens, and weed pests. Its princi-
pal weapons were not artillery or armies, but chemicals. Since then, this
chemical warfare has intensified. Today in the United States alone, over
1.2 billion pounds of synthetic pesticides are used annually" for the
6. Van Den Bosch, Insecticides and the Law, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 615 (1970).
7. "Labeling was the credo of control of the 1947 Federal Insecticide Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act and remains so today." ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 847
(1977).
8. Under traditional principles, the party bringing the suit against the producer
of a particular substance must produce factual evidence to show that the substance is
responsible for bringing about a specific harmful condition. See, e.g., Casenote, 25
CATH. U. L. REV. 178, 180 (1975) (emphasis added); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41 (4th ed. 1971); Comment, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 581, 584 (comment on Scientific
Uncertainty and Environmental Threats to Human Health).
9. For an excellent essay assessing the role science plays in the regulation of
environmental contaminants, see E. Burger, supra note 2.
10. After World War II, the world experienced the widespread growth of the use
of pesticide chemicals. For a general discussion, see ROGERS, supra note 7, at 835.
11. For information concerning the extent of pesticide use, its successes and
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prevention of crop loss and the eradication of pestiferous organisms.
That amounts to six pounds of pesticides applied annually for every
man, woman, and child in this country."2 In an address to Congress in
1971, it was calculated that there would be a 13% annual increase in the
use of pesticides, and that by 1985 there would be a sixfold increase . 3
Recent estimates show there are over 1,400 active chemical ingredients
present in pesticides. Combined in various amounts and arrangements,
there are over 40,000 different pesticide products," each of which must
supposedly be individually tested for safety in order to be registered. 5
Alarmingly, once applied, the chemicals do not simply achieve their
purpose and then degrade or decompose. The pesticides retain their
chemical identity and continue to function for an extended period of
time." This trait of pesticides has given rise to the use of the common
failures, alternative methods of pest control, and the infeasibility of pesticide use in light
of the food and energy crisis, see Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, 22
BULLETIN OF THE ENTOMOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, 20-26 (1976), and Pimentel,
Bioenvironmental Control of Pests: A Research Assessment (July 9, 1974) (unpublished
work prepared for Dept. of Entomology and Section of Ecology and Systematics,
Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.).
12. Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra note 11, at 21 n.17.
13. These estimates were based on the amount of pesticides then employed in pest
control, 833 million pounds. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to Federal Insecticide
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), before the House Committee on Agriculture,
92d Cong., 1st SEss. (1971).
14. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 117.
15. Before a pesticide can be registered, the manufacturer must submit with the
application the results of various safety studies. However, the EPA can, at its discretion,
register a pesticide with chemicals similar to those of a pesticide already registered,
without requiring additional safety tests. Conditional registrations can also be granted,
pending the outcome of safety tests. These two procedures, by which a manufacturer
can legitimately avoid showing a particular pesticide's safety, seem to have reduced
greatly the effectiveness of the registration process.
A senate subcommittee staff recommended that safety-testing data on pesticides
should be done for each compound prior to registration. Theoretically, this is an ideal
proposition. The task may, however, under existing registration procedures, prove insur-
mountable. The estimates of the General Accounting Office in 1975 predicted that over
46,000 pesticides were to be registered. For a further breakdown of the workload, see
note 71 infra. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Federal Pesticide Registra-
tion Program: Is It Protecting the Public and the Environment Adequately from Pesti-
cide Hazards? (Dec. 4, 1975) [hereinafter cited as GAO Report]; [19771 8 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 350 on subcommittee recommendations. See generally ROGERS, supra note 7,
at 850, 856, 872; W. BUTLER, Federal Pesticide Law, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
1240 (ELI 1974), discussing conditional permits and experimental use.
16. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT
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descriptive term "persistent pesticide."" Two other common descriptive
terms used for pesticides are "subacute" and "general." Subacute
means that the toxicity of the pesticide causes adverse effects in an
organism only upon repeated exposure.'8 The pesticide is considered
general when its composition is such that it does not specifically attack
one pest.'"
The persistent attribute provides an economic advantage to the
farmer or other applicator because the pesticide retains its toxic effect
for a long time. Thus, once a sufficiently lethal dosage is applied to
eradicate the intended pest, continual application is unnecessary. The
subacute characteristic of a pesticide is beneficial because it is safer for
those who handle the pesticides in transportation or application. The
chemicals, not being as acute,"0 are not as potentially lethal to one who
accidentally comes in contact with the substance. Most pesticides also
have a general characteristic because it is financially favorable to the
manufacturer. A general pesticide can attack various pests, thus making
the development of innumerable different pesticides unnecessary. This
can be a substantial saving, considering that the cost of development
may be anywhere from $2.1 million to $4 million."
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVI-
RONMENTAL HEALTH (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mrak Commission Report].
17. Comment, 6 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 122 (1970) (discussion on the
persistence of pesticides).
18. GAO Report, supra note 15, at glossary.
19. Comment, supra note 17.
20. "Acute" is that property of a substance or a mixture of substances which
causes adverse effects in an organism through a single exposure. GAO Report, supra
note 15, at glossary.
There is no reliable system capable of reporting, collecting, collating, and dissemi-
nating accurate information on the status of pesticide poisonings today in the United
States. A recent EPA study, however, was conducted nationwide. From 1971 to 1973,
the study estimated, there were 8,248 hospital-admitted pesticide poisonings. Of that
figure only 28% (2,295) were occupationally related poisonings. Farmers and agricul-
tural workers accounted only for 36% (817) of that group. UNITED STATES ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL STUDY OF HOSPITAL ADMITTED PESTICIDE
POISONINGS at 4, 168, 169 (April 1976).
21. Rumker, Guest & Upholt, The Search for Safer More Selective and Less
Persistent Pesticides, 20 Bio Sci 1004 (1970); see also Duvall, Pesticides: The Problem
and the Solution, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 79 (1975).
Today the cost of producing a pesticide can run as high as $12 million and is heading
upward. One contributing factor is that the time between discovery of a new pesticide
and the time it gets to market can be more than eight years. BUSINESS WEEK, September
27, 1976, at 56.
_. o
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3. EFFECT OF RESIDUES
The beneficial aspects22 of pesticides are subverted to the extent
that they remain active and potentially poisonous to man. This danger-
ous situation arises, as previously indicated, because the chemicals uti-
lized in pesticides do not rapidly decompose. For instance, DDT, one
of the first and most commonly applied, takes two to five years to break
down.?
Man unwittingly ingests these pesticide residues. He consumes
them daily with his food, which has been sprayed in the field or in
storage.u Man can also absorb residues from the meats and dairy prod-
ucts that he eats.? Processed foods may be another source of residue
intake, since they are generally packed or stored in containers which are
treated to prevent loss to rodents and contamination.
Man is subjected to an arguably low amount of pesticide residue
per food product. 2 Nevertheless, United States Department of Agricul-
22. Just how beneficial pesticides have been is debatable. Some say that many of
the diseases seemingly eradicated by the synthetic chemicals would have been eliminated
by natural causes, e.g., better nutrition, improved health care, and good hygiene. See
R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1970). Also, the overall percentage of crop losses to pests
has been increasing. Post-harvest losses (13k) plus pre-harvest losses ( 5%) indicate
that pest populations are consuming and/or destroying nearly half the world's food
supply. Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra note 11.
For an opposite view praising DDT and other pesticides, see War on Pesticides,
DDT was Number One on the Casualty List, BARRON'S, November 10, 1975, at 3.
23. Bennett, Residues Permitted in Foods, 49 TEx. L. REV. 356, n.27 (1975).
24. Crops are in contact with pesticides or their residues all along their route from
seedlings in the field to products in a store. The soil that grows them and the water that
nurtures them contain chemical residues. The foodstuffs are sprayed in the fields, after
harvest in storage, and in the boxcars on their way to market, to prevent loss to rodents,
micro-organisms, and insects. Pimentel, World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra
note 11.
25. For example, the two pesticides Heptachlor and Chlordane are found in 73%
of all dairy products and 77% of all meats, fish, and poultry samples. 5 ENvIR. L. REP.
10,163 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Natick Paperboard Corp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir.
1975), holding that paper packaging material containing polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB) in excess of tolerance levels will in many instances be an "unsafe food additive"
within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; see also Pimentel,
World Food Crisis: Energy and Pests, supra note 11.
27. EPA determines the acceptable daily intake for residues of each pesticide
which may be present in or on agricultural commodities. Acceptable daily intake for
man is usually one per cent of the pesticide concentration which was found to have no
toxic effect in the most sensitive animal species tested. Total possible exposure to
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ture (USDA) figures show that the average American consumes 1,435
pounds of food annually. 8 Although the food is readily broken down,
the pesticide chemicals contained therein are not. Virtually every person
in the United States has residues of pesticides in his body tissue. 9 The
potential harm posed to man from such continued exposure to low levels
of pesticides is presently being debated .3  Exposure at these levels,
however, has been proven to be toxic to other species.3t In laboratory
tests it has been shown that 0.1 parts per billion in seawater of the
pesticide Mirex, which is used to control the fire ant in the southeastern
United States, had a lethal effect on crabs, and killed 11% of the shrimp
population in ten days and 50% after three weeks of exposure.2 The
potentially poisonous effect may be more startling and ominous in
human consumption of pesticide residues.
pesticide residue is computed in the average diet of a 132-pound man. However, as will
be shown below, the safety tests upon which the tolerances are set are of dubious validity
and the FDA, whose duty it is to monitor the foodstuffs for pesticide residue, only test
for the presence of about 90 of the 230 residues in food for which tolerances have been
set. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 38-44.
28. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL STATISTIcs at 562 (1974).
29. Mrak Commission Report, supra note 16.
30. "Scientists are concerned that so little is known about the ecological effects
of pesticides on the plants and animals (200,000 species) making up man's life system.
Information on the effect of pesticides is available for less than 1% of these species, and
at best most of this information is incomplete." Pimentel, Bioenvironmental Control
of Pests: A Research Assessment, supra note 11, at 14.
Since so little is known, most debates center on" the question of whether "the facts
must come first, and social judgments later," or whether to allow the marketing of a
pesticide, whose effects are unknown, based upon the possibility and seriousness of the
threatened harm. The latter argument seems to have support because of the underlying
premise that man can resolve (eventually) any problem he has created.
Such illusions are antiquated. Recently, we have realized that our resources are
finite and that they must be conserved and utilized rationally. As David Pimentel
indicated, large quantities of fossil fuel energy is used in controlling pests. Most pesti-
cides are formulated with a petroleum base and their development and application
expend great quantities of fuel. Also, many other activities necessary to our system of
food production consume enormous amounts of fuel. If the present world population
ate a diet derived from a food production system equivalent to that of the United States,
petroleum reserves would be exhausted in thirteen years.
See also Comment, 21 S.D. L. REv. 425, 427-28 (1976). (Debate between Prof.
Green and Dr. Handler on which approach is better: to restrict production until facts
are known, or to allow production so that facts can be gathered which will form the
basis of subsequent social judgments.)
3 1. Duvall, supra note 21, at 82.
32. H. WELLFORD, SOWING THE WIND 297 (1972).
I
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Man is at the top of the food chain,3 at each step of which the
pesticide residue is stored and the chemical concentration increasesY
This process, known as biomagnification, continues until it reaches man
at the top. In addition, the effects of pesticides are sometimes magnified
by interaction with other chemicals or drugs, resulting at times in syner-
gistic effects.'- This occurs when the co-operative action of separate
substances produces a total effect much greater than the sum of the
effects of the two compounds acting independently. The opportunity for
synergistic interaction is apparently greater today, with the ever-
increasing amount of chemicals that the American public consumes,
either in the form of food additives or by means of "medical drug
intoxication.""6
4. HISTORY OF REGULATION
The Food and Drug Act of 1906 3 was the forerunner of statutory
33. That is to say, he is at the top of the sequence in which each organism in the
chain feeds on the member below it. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ECOL-
OGICAL EFFECrS OF PESTICIDES ON NON-TARGET SPECIES (1971). For example, pesti-
cide residues can enter the waterway from industrial waste, agricultural runoff, direct
application to control mosquitoes, and the like. Once in the aquatic environment, the
residues will settle to the bottom. There they will be picked up by algae, plankton, and
water bottom plants. In time, these organisms will be eaten by shrimp, shell fish, and
small fish. At this point (or after the smaller water life have been consumed by a species
higher in the chain, e.g., larger fish" man, at the top of the chain, will consume the
pesticide residue contained in the % ater organism which he ate. Only by now, the
chemical concentration will have been increased by every organism through which it
passed. C. EDWARDS, PERSISTENT PESTICIDES IN THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1973).
34. Duvall, supra note 21 at 79, 80.
35. Williams, DRUGS-PESTICIDE INTERACTION, FDA PAPERS 14 (1969).
36. This comment on the American infatuation with the "Almighty Curative
Chemical" reflects a critical analysis by many observers. The American public today
consumes more drugs than ever before, most of which are taken unnecessarily and
merely as a result of profit-seeking advertisement. For example: Headache?-take the
little white aspirin; Hangover?-the bubbly pill will make it vanish! Fat?-some diet food
or pills (amphetamines) will get you back in shape. Skinny?-steroids will beef you up.
No wonder the American people are hesitant and unsupportive in the fight against
the existence of chemical residues in their food. This is a drug-oriented society with a
fervent faith in the politically powerful chemical and drug companies. Miami Herald,
Sept. 15, 1977, Br. Sec. at 2.
37. Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 repealed by Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act c. 675 § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1059, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-392 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). See also Birmingham & Kyl, Legal & Practical Aspects of Pesticide Spray
Cases, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 585, 592 (1970).
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authority for control of pesticide residues in food. Stronger statutes
ensued: the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938,1s
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 9
in 1947. Many amendments accompanied FIFRA, most importantly
the Miller Pesticide Chemical Amendment in 1954, the 1959 amend-
ment, and the 1964 amendment. 0
Originally, FIFRA was designed to provide for safety and product
quality through labeling and registration. It called for the registration
of all pesticides with the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA). The FDCA, administered by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW), complemented FIFRA in protecting the
public from food contamination by pesticides.41 Its civil and criminal
sanctions, however, were operative only if an "adulterated" food was
introduced into interstate commerce bearing a level of pesticide residue
exceeding HEW's established tolerance.42
In the 1960's, as national concern grew about the effects of pollu-
tion and the extent of "uninvited additives" present in food, environ-
mental groups attempted to use FIFRA to prevent the indiscriminate
application of pesticides. Their efforts in a series of court cases were
38. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321-392 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
39. C. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-305, 78 Stat. 190
(1964), 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970) (prior to 1972 Amendments) [hereinafter cited as FIFRAI.
This Act repealed and replaced the Insecticide Act of 1910, which essentially was a
labeling measure covering all insecticides and fungicides. C. 125,61 Stat. 163 (1947)
(repealing Insecticide Act of 1910, c. 191, 36 Stat. 331).
40. The 1954 Amendment gave the administrator of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration the power to establish tolerance limits for pesticide residues on raw agricultural
commodities and processed foods. H. A. TOULMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
FOODS, DRUGS AND COSMETICS § 19.6 at 396 (1963). The 1959 amendment brought
defoliants and other newly developed pesticides under the regimes of FIFRA. Id. § 19.7
at 397. The 1964 amendment laid the foundation for today's registration process, by
trying to restrict marketability prior to registration. 100 CONG. REC. 2948 (1964). See
generally Comment, supra note 17.
41. See Bennett, supra note 23, for an explanation of how the administrator of
the FDA set the tolerances while the registration of the pesticide was under the control
of the USDA. Both departments split the monitoring of foods for excess residues duties.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1970 & Supp. 1975. The term "adulterated" applies to a
food or pesticide containing chemicals or substances inconsistent with the tolerance
levels prescribed by law. The definition can be found under the FEPCA, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(C) (1976).
43. For a description of pesticide residues existing in our food supply, see Rogers,
The Persistent Problem of Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 567, 595 (1970).
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futile.41 The inadequacy of FIFRA's narrow scope was exemplified by
those decisions. The Act was impotent because (1) it failed to meet its
original product safety purposes, i.e., the setting of tolerances; (2) it
could not enforce its provisions; and (3) it did not provide for monitor-
ing of food residues. 4
Overlap of agency control also caused the Act's failure to meet its
original product safety purposes. HEW was to base its decision, whether
to grant a tolerance of a pesticide, upon safety. 6 However, USDA had
the initial determination of whether to register a pesticide, and based
its decision on other considerations. Thus, if HEW found the residue
of a certain pesticide to be unsafe, it could not effectively prohibit its
use if the USDA continued to allow its registration. Such an occurrence
44. Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 461 F.2d 293
(7th Cir. 1972). The court rejected the Environmental Protection Agency's attempt to
cancel the manufacturer's registration of a rodenticide. The court held that the agency
had overstepped its authority in attempting to apply the "intricate balancing test" in
this instance. FIFRA is basically a labeling act, the court continued, and a registration
can be cancelled only if the product is misbranded. It is inappropriate, however, to
determine that a product is misbranded when it is being used in accordance with com-
monly recognized practices.
Continental Chemist Corp. v. Ruckleshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972). The court
said the basic purpose of FIFRA is to regulate the labeling of poisons. The fact that
the use of the poison in compliance with the directiqns on its label would cause certain
food to become "adulterated" within the meaning of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
does not mean that the poison was necessarily misbranded, within the meaning of
FIFRA. Thus, the manufacturer's registration, the court held, could not properly be
cancelled. See also Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (administra-
tive process must be concluded to properly suspend registration of a herbicide).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The EDF petitioned for review of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture which failed
to suspend federal registration of a pesticide or to commence formal administrative
procedures that could terminate that registration. The court favorably remanded the
case for further proceedings. The court held that it would require the administrators to
articulate the factors on which they based their decisions, but noted that on matters of
substance the courts regularly would uphold agency decisions.
45. See W. BUTLER, supra note 15, where the author discusses the problems
created by agency overlap and designates these areas as critical.
46. Safety was based upon the consideration of three factors: "the nation's need
for food; effects of the pesticide on the consumer; and the USDA's opinion concerning
the pesticide's usefulness." Bennett, supra note 23, at 359.
47. The determination was to be based upon agricultural usefulness and probable
residue levels involved in the establishment of tolerances. SEN. REP. No. 1635, 83d
CONG., 2d SEss. (June 25, 1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2626, 2629.
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was not uncommon. 8
Also, the USDA failed to enforce adequately the provisions of
FIFRA. Such inadequacy was noted in a report to Congress in 1971.
"[Tihe Department not only failed to initiate a single criminal prosecu-
tion for 13 years despite evidence of repeated violations, but . . . it did
not even have any procedure for determining the basis for action."49
Finally, its powers to monitor were also virtually ineffective. The
Department of Agriculture relied heavily on inadequate and incomplete
data to determine if the pesticide should initially be registered."0 Also,
a great deal of information regarding the toxicity or other characteris-
tics of a pesticide was supplied by manufacturers, who had a substantial
investment in the pesticide51 and a vested interest in securing a speedy
registration 2.5 A monitoring plan utilizing only such biased information
would assuredly not lead to the cancellation or suspension of a pesticide.
If the USDA administrator determined that the weight of evidence
supported the cancellation or seizure of a hazardous pesticide, his action
would be reviewable by the courts. However, this system of court review
before a pesticide could be taken off the market was a sham, because
the procedural process could delay any affirmative action up to 390
days." Apparently, the agencies were still at the mercy of the manufac-
turers and had to rely largely on voluntary recalls. 4
To patch these gaping holes in FIFRA, Congress responded in 1970
by approving the President's Reorganization Plan, which expanded the
government's environmental concerns and consolidated fifteen federal
organizations under the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).5 5 This consolidation of power would have been fruitless had it
48. Rogers, supra note 43, at 570. See also 117 CONG. REc. 2009-10 (introduction
of the National Pesticide Control and Protection Act).
49. Id. at 2010.
50. Id.
51. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1277.
52. Comment, The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972: A
Compromise Approach, 3 ECOL. L. QUARTERLY 277 (1973).
53. 117 CONG. REC., supra note 48.
54. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1237.
55. The primary transfer of power shifted to the administrator of the EPA the
functions vested in the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for establishing
tolerances for pesticide chemicals, REORG. PLAN No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-
1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
See Comment, supra note 52 and Rogers, supra note 43, discussing effects and implica-
tions of the reorganization plan on the regulation of pesticides.
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not been accompanied by significant improvement of the law. The con-
gressional response to criticism of FIFRA by courts, legal commenta-
tors, and environmental groups was the Federal Environmental Pesti-
cide Control Act (FEPCA),56 which completely overhauled the federal
environmental authority.57 An in-depth study of the Act is not within
the scope of this report. Some of its more important aspects, however,
deserve mentioning.
Under the FEPCA, regulation of pesticides will no longer be re-
stricted to those involved in interstate shipment, but will include all
aspects of transfer, solicitation, and sales even if totally intrastate." The
FEPCA also expands the previous registration procedure. By employing
a system of use control, it cures one of the major deficiencies of FIFRA.
The use, either "general" or "restricted," is determined by demonstrat-
ing whether the pesticide, when applied according to its labeling instruc-
tions, will cause an unreasonable effect on man or the environment.59 If
affirmatively determined that the pesticide will cause substantial ad-
verse effects on the environment, it will be classified for restrictive use.
As of October 1977, 23 pesticides had been classified for restrictive use
and 38 more were being considered. Such categorization of a pesticide
requires that it be applied only by those competent to handle such
materials and restricted by other limitations as determined by the ad-
ministrator of the EPA."0
The major advancement in the pesticide registration process
brought about by FEPCA is the provision stating that any pesticide
56. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516,
86 Stat. 973 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as FEPCA].
57. 40 Fed. Reg. 28, 242 (1975).
58. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1976), states in pertinent part: "[N]o person in any State
may distribute, sell, offer for sale, hold for sale, ship, deliver for shipment, or receive
and (having so received) deliver or offer to deliver, to any person any pesticide which is
not registered with the Administrator."
59. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(B) (1976) states:
If the Administrator determines that the pesticide, when applied in accordance
with its directions for use, warnings and cautions and for the uses for which it is
registered, or for one or more of such uses, or in accordance with a widespread
and commonly recognized practice, will not generally cause unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment, he will classify the pesticide, or the particular use or
uses of the pesticide to which the determination applies, for general use.
The FEPCA defines unreasonable adverse effects as "any unreasonable risk to man or
the environment, taking into account the economic, social and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide." 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1976).
60. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1976); 3 EPA JOURNAL 3 (1977).
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which fails to meet certain criteria will be subject to a "rebuttable
presumption" against registration."' This provision also applies to pesti-
cides that are already on the market, since the Act requires that all
pesticides registered with the EPA before the 1972 amendment be rere-
gistered before October 21, 1976.62 After that date, all pesticides must
be reregistered every five years.
The reregistration procedure may tactically be used as an alterna-
tive to cancellation or suspension, as a means of removing a pesticide
from the market. Instead of becoming entangled with the expensive and
unchanged lengthy cancellation process, the EPA will allow the pesti-
cide to be used up until the time reregistration is required. Then the
application for reregistration will be denied, based upon the rebuttable
presumption that the pesticide will cause adverse effects on the environ-
ment. This "phase out" of a pesticide is currently being used against
Mirex.13 It succeeds not only in saving money and time, but also shifts
61. 6 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,087 (1976). A notice of intent to deny registration or
cancel an existing registration will be issued by the EPA if the applicant fails to prove
the safety of his product. The presumption of unacceptability is based upon risk. How-
ever, even if the chemical's use gives rise to a presumption of risk, this presumption can
be rebutted by showing the pesticide's economic, social, and environmental benefits. 40
CFR § 162.11 (1977).
Note that, although this is a patently strong provision, it is doubtful if its applica-
tion can be effective in eliminating from the market a pesticide with hazardous effects.
Manufacturers can avoid the ramifications of this provision and refute contentions of a
pesticide's possible safety risks by producing evidence of attainable economic costs and
benefits.
This provision still does not rectify the problem that has plagued EPA's analysis
of information submitted in support of registration of a pesticide. Adequate review of
safety tests data continues to be difficult because (I) EPA lacks its own scientific
research and evaluating knowledge and (2) private environmentally interested groups
are of no assistance, since the data supporting the registration are not published in the
Federal Register until 30 days after the product is registered. Compounding this flaw is
the fact that a good portion of the data is not published. Trade secret protection is
allotted to that test data which the originator of the product claims. Under this provi-
sion, health and safety data are often excluded from the published information. See
ROGERS, supra note 7, at 861, 862; [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 280; E. Burger, supra
note 2.
62. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1976). All FEPCA provisions were to be effective by
October 21, 1976. This meant that all pesticides were to be registered according to its
provisions, including presently active pesticides. As will be shown later, this task proved
to be impossible. 41 FED. REG. 7218 (1976).
63. See [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 849.
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the burden on the pesticide manufacturer to prove the safety of his
product.64
5. CONTINUING PROBLEMS
Theoretically, under the FEPCA, the residues from pesticides in
our foods will be restricted to limited and safe levels. The registration
process requires the manufacturer to provide the EPA with safety stud-
ies on the active ingredients in each type of pesticide. The EPA then
reviews the studies to ensure the pesticide's safety and effectiveness.
Based upon the studies submitted, the EPA establishes tolerances for
the maximum pesticide residue concentration allowed in a food product.
The monitoring of the residues in food for violations of the tolerances
is done via the food inspection functions of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), and by the meat and poultry inspection and chemical
monitoring services of the USDA. 5 If a violation of a tolerance level is
detected, then appropriate regulatory" action will be initiated. If the
administrator of the EPA determines it necessary, he may notify the
registrant of his intentions to cancel or suspend the registration of the
pesticide or change its classification. 7
The above system, however, does not operate as successfully, rou-
tinely, or effectively in practice as it hypothetically was proposed. The
FEPCA has apparently filled the gaping holes of previous legislation.
Unfortunately, crevices still exist which permit persistent pesticides to
continue to seep into our environment and food supply. The EPA real-
ized its deficiencies in the review of tolerance regulations and procedures
in 1975, but said that it would devote its attention to reassessing the
existing tolerances and making a comprehensive evaluation of the whole
scientific basis for tolerance setting. 6 Good intentions, however, do not
make good regulations. A Senate subcommittee staff report released
64. Id. For a discussion of the effects of Mirex, see H. WELLFORD, supra note
32, at 296, 297.
65. Id. at 354.
66. The EPA can initiate cancellation or suspension hearings of the pesticide or,
if necessary to prevent further contamination, it can issue a "stop sale, use or removal
order" to any person who owns, controls, or has custody of such pesticide. 7 U.S.C. §
136k (1976). The Food and Drug Administration can remove the adulterated foodstuff
from the market under the authority of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C.
§ 331 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
67. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136d(b) & (c) (1970) [before 1972 amendments].
68. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 49.
107 112:1978
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two years later in 1977 came to the "unfortunate conclusion that pesti-
cide regulation in the U.S. is still fundamentally deficient." 9
The foundation of such criticism lies in the basis of pesticide regula-
tion-the registration process. The FEPCA, enacted in 1972, required
the EPA to register all pesticides during the two-year period ending
October 1976.10 That called for, in addition to the normal workload,7'
the registering of 46,000 pesticides. To magnify the enormity of the
project, EPA failed to have the proposed guidelines for registering and
classifying pesticides ready for public viewing until June 25, 1975.72
Since registrants needed such information to know what was necessary
to support their registration, and the FEPCA registration program
could not start without such regulations, "the EPA lost about nine
months of the 2-year period provided by the Act.' 73 The problem still
exists. An EPA official told a Senate subcommittee in March 1977 that
"the registration of pesticides could take as long as 15 years. 74
This excessive workload has given rise to other problems. The
comprehensive evaluation of the scientific basis for tolerance-setting
may once again be shoved to the rear of the workload. Time and re-
sources are limited, so the EPA must make a policy decision of whether
to proceed with the registration process as quickly as possible, and
accordingly sacrifice the integrity of the data submitted by a manufac-
69. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
prepared a report on the EPA, a summary of which can be found in [77] 7 ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 1284-86.
70. See text accompanying note 62, supra.
71. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 67. The report also stated: "In addition to
the 46,000 FEPCA registrations, EPA's projected workload during the 2 year period
include[d] 13,000 . . .new pesticide registration applications and 14,000 [applications
for amended registrations as to product formulation, uses labeling, etc.]. Id. The 46,000
figure represented 29,000 currently registered pesticides that [had to be] reregistered and
17,000 intrastate pesticides . . . not previously required to be registered. . . ." Id.
72. Id. at 68 (40 FED. REG. 26,801-928. The final proposals were not published
until July 3, 1975 (40 FED. REG. 28,241-86 and did not become effective until August
4, 1975.
73. Id. at 69. The two-year period specified by the FEPCA was from October 22,
1974 to October 21, 1976. The lapse between the passage of the Act in 1972 and the
time the registration period was to begin allowed ample time for the EPA to devise some
standards of safety and risk benefit, to which the registrants could conform. They did
not, however, do so.
74. Assistant Administrator for Water and Hazardous Materials Andrew W.
Brienenback noted: "In no case could the process take less than five years." [77] 7
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1742.
I
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turer in support of registration.75 Such sacrifice is questionable in light
of past experiences by the EPA with the safety data submitted by regis-
trants. A General Accounting Office study in 1975 showed that many
manufacturers failed even to submit safety studies on active pesticide
ingredients." The reliability of many of those submitted was question-
able. EPA Deputy Administrator John R. Quarles noted "that in vir-
tually every instance, independent pathologists77 diagnosed many more
cancerous and pre-cancerous tumors in test animals than did the origi-
nal laboratory pathologists. ' 7 Reliance by the EPA on the safety data
for registration qualification and tolerance-setting by those who have a
"vested interest" in having the pesticide registered is without substantial
foundation. Concealment of certain hazardous attributes have been
made without prosecution for violation of the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act.79
75. [1977] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1286. Note that the former EPA Administrator
cancelled the reregistration program in August of 1976 pending resolution of the data
validity issue.
A year later, the problem of laboratory test deficiencies still exists. However, the
agency recently has requested 31 pesticide manufacturers and two federal agencies
(FDA and USDA) to review and certify the accuracy of tests conducted by a suspect
independent laboratory. If review uncovers "serious human health or environmental
hazards," then evidence of faulty testing will be handed over to the Department of
Justice for appropriate action. This could lead to the first civil or criminal penalties
assessed against a testing laboratory under FIFRA. [77] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 585. See
also [771 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 644.
76. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 7-11. The requirements of safety data have
been becoming more and more stringent on the active ingredients. The GAO report,
however, shows that compliance has not been on a reciprocal increase. The two most
recent testing requirements for teratogenicity, 1970 (to determine if exposure to the
chemical will cause birth defects), and mutagenicity, 1972 (to determine if exposure will
cause permanent genetic change), have been generally ignored. Safety data were missing
for the 36 active chemicals present in the 100 sample pesticides chosen for the GAO
study, in 14 instances (39%)" for teratogenicity and 23 instances (64%) for mutagenicity.
77. A pathologist is someone in the branch of medicine who studies the nature of
the structural and functional changes caused by disease, and the conditions and pro-
cesses that result in disease. See J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
at 38 (1975).
78. A comment made when seeking a criminal investigation of the Veliscol Chem-
ical Corporation of Chicago. The firm was suspected of withholding data of possible
cancer-causing properties of the pesticides, Heptachlor and Chlordane. PREVENTION-
THE MAGAZINE FOR BETTER HEALTH, May 1976, at 202 [hereinafter referred to as
PREVENTION).
79. W. BUTLER, supra note 45, at 1267-68.
Experience has shown that because of the paucity of EPA enforcement personnel
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In light of the Act, the motive for such an incomplete presentation
by the manufacturer is obvious. Under the FEPCA, the biggest burden
on the pesticide manufacturer is getting his product registered. Once
that is accomplished, the pesticide is permitted to be used. It then is
relatively safe from being removed from the market. The cancellation
procedure is still a seemingly endless and almost non-existent process.80
The possibility of suspension is also slight, since the EPA must resort
to "courtroom" proof that the pesticide presents a risk to man or the
environment.81 Moreover, even if a cancellation or suspension enforce-
and the low priority which the Justice Department gives to even criminal viola-
tions of the pesticide laws, violations, when uncovered, provoke nothing more
than a slap on the wrist, a warning to go and sin no more, and a minor fine.
Id. There are also legal ways to conceal. The agency requires animal tests in the safety
studies for registration. The registrant is given the choice of which two species to use in
the experiments. The law's requirement for animal testing may be fulfilled if the manu-
facturer, as is frequently done, chooses the species which has been found to be the most
resistant to the substance at issue. The validity of the chemical's "safe" characteristic
is only a partial truth. Id. at 1277. EPA's reporting requirements are less stringent for
inert ingredients than they are for active ingredients, and non-existent for synergistic
effects, i.e., toxic effects caused by chemicals in combination which are greater than
the effects of the individual chemicals acting independently. GAO Report, supra note
15, at 6, 12. In addition, the present system allows the granting of conditional registra-
tions, which "permit exposure of the public to occur and user reliance to develop before
the safety of the product has been established." Extension of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Re-
search and General Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1977) (statement of Maureen Hinkle, pesticides
monitor, Environmental Defense Fund), reprinted in [1977] 8 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 281.
80. In the CBS broadcast, "The Politics of Cancer," reporter Lesley Stahl inter-
viewed three senior EPA lawyers who resigned in February 1976. Their resignation was
to protest the EPA's inaction under its existing authority to control toxic chemicals. For
quite some time, the EPA had a list of over 100 suspected carcinogenic pesticides and
no action was taken. Even if action were taken, the process is "very long."
Frank Sizemore, one of the three attorneys who resigned, said: "The conservative
estimate is that if a chemical goes into that procedure [referring not to the process to
take the pesticide off the market, but merely the procedure before the administrator is
allowed to decide whether he wants to do something] it won't come out until 12 or 18
months later, and then we start a big hearing." CBS REPORTS, "The Politics of Can-
cer," as broadcast over the CBS Television Network, pp. 2, 13 of transcript (June 22,
1976).
81. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d
1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973), stating: "[Tlhe order of the Administrator cancelling
registrations must be based on substantial evidence of record developed at a hearing if
a public hearing is held, and the order must set forth detailed findings of fact." See
[1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. 586, where an EPA Office of General Counsel attorney noted that
1 10
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ment procedure is undertaken, some comfort is still provided for the
powerful pesticide manufacturer. A conciliatory and undermining
"indemnity provision""2 was included in the final version of the FEPCA
to facilitate its acceptance.3 It provides that if a pesticide is not found
to be unsafe upon registration, but is subsequently discovered to have
hazardous effects, then the manufacturer is to be reimbursed. Ironically,
the reimbursement is to come from the public, whom the manufacturer
has endangered.
There are other flaws in the FEPCA regulatory scheme. For exam-
ple, no provision exists for environmentalists or consumers to bring suit
to challenge the refusal, granting, or cancellation of a pesticide's regis-
tration, although provisions were present in earlier drafts of the Act.Y
In the recent past, citizen participation has been encouraged by the
EPA." Such a vital element as an interested party86 should not be in-
cluded or excluded from a registration hearing at the whim of the ad-
ministrator.
Administrative agency overlap, which impedes the implementation
of action, still exists. When the EPA was formed in 1970, only a partial
transfer of the pesticide regulation function was effectuated." The entire
registration process was assumed from the USDA, but portions of the
"EPA would have to meet a stringent imminent hazard standard to suspend registra-
tion."
82. 7 U.S.C. § 136 m (1976). The provision allows not only the manufacturer, but
anyone who owns a portion of the pesticide at the time it is suspended or cancelled to
be reimbursed for its costs by the EPA. One author notes that the indemnity provision
does not apply where it can be shown that those claimants caught with quantities of
the pesticide had prior knowledge of its hazards or had some reasonable way of attaining
such knowledge. Even then, the exclusion depends upon whether the EPA bears its
burden of proving the manufacturer's knowledge. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1260,
1261.
83. Comment, supra note 52, at 308-9.
84. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1287.
85. Id. "EPA has encouraged citizen participation in the implementation of
FEPCA, as provided by § 21(b) of the Act, especially by inviting comment upon imple-
menting regulation." Id.
86. Surely citizens concerned with leading a healthy and safe existence have an
interest in proceedings (administrative as well as judicial) whose outcome will determine
if a pesticide, with potential detrimental environmental effects, will be permitted to be
produced and applied. See Casenote, 52 J. URB. L. 609 (1974) (discussing Pinkney v.
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (no funda-
mental right to a healthful environment)).
87. W. BUTLER, supra note 15, at 1274.
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responsibility for setting tolerances of residues in food were left with the
FDA." Also, the entire program for the monitoring of residues of pesti-
cides was scattered among several different agencies, 9 with the FDA
and USDA primarily handling the monitoring function for foods.
This division of authority created co-ordination problems. The
FDA and EPA have attempted to alleviate some of them by reaching
an inter-agency agreement to exchange all information and investigative
reports.10 Similar co-operation with the USDA has not blossomed. To
the contrary, the USDA has been at times more a hindrance than a
help.9 Perhaps such lack of co-operation emanates from the loss of
pesticide regulation to the EPA, or, as many have commented, from the
fact that USDA's principal obligation is the protection of agricultural
business.g9
6. A NEW APPROACH
A current crisis exists in pesticide regulation. The inadequate evalu-
ation of safety testing data for registration results practically in the
invalidation of the tolerance-setting program. The consequence of
falsely-based tolerances is the inundation of the market with pesticides
that are dangerous to health and the environment. Congress blames the
EPA for poor planning and management.9 3 The EPA seeks exoneration
by citing the lack of resources, time constraints, and the enormity of the
task.94 Regardless of how this political problem of regulation is resolved,
88. The Environmental Protection Agency sets tolerances for (1) pesticide resi-
dues on raw agricultural commodities; (2) residues carried over into processed foods
from raw agricultural commodities; (3) residues resulting from direct treatment of
processed foods and from exposure during treatment and preparation in food-handling
establishments; and (4) residues attributable to certain types of packaging. The Food
and Drug Administration continues to set pesticide food tolerance for residues resulting
from the use of sanitizers on food-contact surfaces, from the use of pesticides as preser-
vatives in processed food, and from certain types of food packaging not regulated by
EPA. Id. citing 36 FED. REG. 24, 234 (1971); 38 FED. REG. 21,685 (1973); 38 FED. REG.
24,233 (1973).
89. Id. at 1275, 1276.
90. 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,136 (1975).
91. One example has been a concerted effort unsuccessfully spearheaded by the
USDA to regain pesticide control from EPA jurisdiction, after that agency had banned
Chlordane and Heptachlor. PREVENTION, May 1976, at 202.
92. Comment, supra note 17, at 136.
93. [77] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1284, 1285.
94. Id. at 1286.
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the burden of inadequate protection from pesticide hazards ultimately
falls on the public and the environment.
It is apparent that regulation is not keeping pace with scientific
development and thus is not achieving the goals intended for environ-
mental legislation.15 The greatest impediment to successful regulation
appears to be the regulations themselves! The EPA is strangling in its
own red tape. It needs help in the form of stronger legislation which
abandons the traditional legalistic approach. Regulations based upon
legal concepts of cause and proof in the context of environmental pro-
tection are inappropriate and inefficient. A "substantial adverse effect
on man or the environment""6 must be shown "likely to occur"97 before
strict enforcement practices can be implemented to prevent further con-
tamination by the hazardous substance. Pressure has already been ap-
plied to modify the standards of proof and methods of review applied
by the courts in public health hazard litigation." It seems anomalous,
95. The purpose of environmental legislation is:
(1) [to] fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
(2) [to] assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) [to] attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences ...
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(l)-(3) (1970).
96. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (bb) (1976). See supra note 59 (definition of unreasonable
adverse effects).
97. In the case of Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514
F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir. 1975), an action was brought seeking a permanent injunction.
This action was brought against Reserve to abate the industrial discharge of asbestos
fibers into the waters of Lake Superior and the emission of the fibers into the ambient
air.
At issue were the long-term effects of low level exposure to asbestos fibers. The
effects of such exposure, like the harm of pesticide residue consumption, have not been
conclusively established by scientific proof. The court concluded that it could not be said
that "the probability of harm is more likely than not." Reserve was granted a
"reasonable time" for abatement despite claims by the EPA that any delay could
endanger the surrounding community. Thus, as other commentators have noted, the
burden on the environmental litigant remains a proof that the risk of harm is "more
likely than not" to occur. See generally Comment, supra note 30; Comment, UTAH L.
REV. 58 (1975); Casenote, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 178 (1975).
98. For discussion of proposed legislation after the Reserve Mining decision, see
Note, 59 MINN. L. REV. 893, 923 n. 138 (1975) discussing S. 841, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 3 (1975), a bill to make the risk-benefit approach applicable to all environmental suits.
Especially instigating the legislative response was the court's decision to resolve "all
uncertainties . . . in favor of health safety." This was a "legislative policy judgment
12:1978 113 1
114
Nova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol2/iss1/1
114 Nova Law Journal 2:1978
though, to wait until the litigation stage to enjoin the use of a pesticide.
Legislation requiring the manufacturer to prove that his substance will
not have a detrimental effect on man and the environment could prevent
a dangerous pesticide from ever being used. At the present time, preven-
tion of the use of hazardous pesticides cannot be successful, owing to
(1) the limited tests now required of a pesticide's safety and (2) the rigid
standard of proof required by courts in reviewing agency decisions on
the safety of a product.
These problems can be resolved by drafting legislation which (1)
includes requirements of extensive testing, as recommended by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office99 and (2) concomitantly provides for the adop-
tion of the scientific concept of proof to determine the pesticide's safety.
The former provision would require tests on every individual pesticide
product, not merely on the product's active ingredients. Also, informa-
tion would have to be supplied on the product's inert ingredients and
mutagenic effects.100 The latter provision calling for the use of a scien-
tific approach in restricting environmental contaminants would allow
the EPA, in reviewing a pesticide application for registration, to require
nearly "scientific proof" that the manufacturer's product is safe.'0 This
approach, which would limit the exposure of the environment to sub-
stances the effects of which were unascertainable by present technology,
could be characterized as an "absolutist stance against uncertainty."
This stance would prevent a pesticide from being produced or applied
if its safety test results did not meet "the conditions for valid scientific
predictive inferences"'0 2 that the product's use would be safe.
not a judicial one." Hearing on S. 1104 Amend. 1814 Before the Subcomm. on the
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1974). See
Comment, 60 IowA L. REV. 299, 312 (1974). The author dicusses S. 3723, The Resource
Conservation & Energy Recovery Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), which was
proposed to clarify congressional intent in the area of health safety. The proposal
apparently favored an ex parte proceeding in decisions to eliminate a hazard. The
administrator would only have to make a prima facie showing of a hazardous condition
to obtain an injunction, which could not be rebutted until trial.
99. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 6.
100. An active ingredient in a pesticide is one which will:
(I) prevent, destroy, repel, attract or mitigate any pest,
(2) regulate the growth of a plant,
(3) cause foliage to fall from the plant (defoliant),
(4) artificially accelerate the drying of plant tissue (dessicant).
Id. at glossary.
101. See Comment, supra note 3.
102. Such terminology is used to describe the level of criteria that would substan-
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The use of such a stringent standard as scientific certainty would
also be beneficial when the agency's decision to cancel, suspend, or deny
registration of a pesticide is subjected to court review. Fewer decisions
would undergo unresolvable scientific debate in the courtroom because
the agency's decisions would be based on more definite data. With
judicial review limited to a determination of whether the manufacturer
proved the safety of his product by more than a mere preponderance of
the evidence, it seems likely that fewer agency decisions would be over-
turned.
In banning a pesticide, strong scientifically-based legislative action
will prove more effective than the risk-benefit analysis presently used
by the courts' in reviewing whether a chemical substance poses an
adverse effect to man and his environment. Professor Owen Olpin
summed up the reasons why the risk-benefit test is less than acceptable:
First, available knowledge is often inadequate to permit a meaning-
ful balancing of benefits and costs, since the costs are often unknown and
incapable of measurement. Second, the balancing often requires the com-
parison of incomparables, and raises serious ethical questions, such as
those arising from weighing the value of production of certain items for
human convenience and monetary gain against serious risks of human
death and injury."4
Indeed, the choices available with a balancing test are not rational
ones. First, although the expenses of research, development, and lost
profits can be evaluated, what value should be assignable to a healthy
human existence? In a recent hijacking of a Japanese airplane, the
Japanese government paid $6 million for release of the hostages." 5 Life
should not be of any less value to Americans. Chemicals on the market
should not be cloaked in the same presumption of innocence as people;
they should not be presumed innocent until proven guilty.'
Second, a court that uses the risk-benefit test while weighing the
value of a suspect chemical is not as qualified as an administrative
tiate a scientist's prognostication of an event from the given evidence. See Gelpe &
Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decision Making, 48 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 371, 374 (1974).
103. For discussion of the development and use of the risk-benefit analysis, see
Comment, 1975 UTAH L. REV., supra note 97; see also Casenote, supra note 97.
104. Olpin, Policing Toxic Chemicals, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 85, 89.
105. Miami Herald, October 4, 1977 § A at 2.
106. CBS, supra note 80, at 3. See also Casenote, supra note 97, at 180.
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agency to consider the risks posed or the available alternatives that are
equally, if not more, effective." 7 In this area, a Washington newspaper
report indicated that human death and injury are present risks, which
the now utilized legalistic methodology of enforcement has failed to
curb.
Ominous recent reports of a sharp increase in the cancer rate in 1975
tend to support those who say that we are now seeing the start of a cancer
epidemic caused in part by massive use of synthetic chemical pesticides
since World War 11.108
Dr. Samuel S. Epstein, an environmental toxicologist, has criti-
cized the introduction of potent chemical agents which are largely un-
tested for adverse public health effects. He remarked: "[Clancer rates
have gone up one percent a year since 1933 . . .and by 3.8 percent in
1975. There is no question that cancer is a major epidemic, and the
environment and what man has done to it is indeed a major source for
this great killer."'' 0
The Council of Environmental Quality concurred with this view in
its sixth annual report.10 It noted that of approximately two million
known chemicals, only 6,000 have been tested in the laboratory for
carcinogenic properties. Furthermore, the report continued, a thousand
people every day are killed by cancer; one out of four is likely to con-
107. Pesticides are not the only means of preventing loss to pests. There are
bioenvironmental controls such as: (1) breeding pest resistance into crop plants; (2)
improving crop management practices, e.g., crop rotation; (3) utilizing parasites and
predators, e.g., augmentation and conservation of natural enemies; and (4) genetic
manipulation and sexual sterility of the pests. Bioenvironmental controls have the poten-
tial to reduce pest losses and environmental pollution by pesticides, while more effec-
tively utilizing energy for pest control. Interestingly, all this can be accomplished at a
lower cost. See Pimentel, Bioenvironmental Control of Pests: A Research Assessment,
supra note 11, at 9-12. The EPA administrator has encouraged the use of these methods
for pest control, but adoption of bioenvironmental controls has not gathered wide
support. [19771 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1991.
Why pesticides have remained the principal method of pest control is a question
that lends itself to resolution in an economic-sociological aura. Surely, human conveni-
ence is one of the prime factors. There are numerous pesticides on the market, readily
available, easily applicable, and supposedly inexpensive.
108. 6 ENvIR. L. REP. 10,031 (1976).
109. What Causes Cancer, NEWSWEEK, January 26, 1976, at 62.
110. Council on Environmental Quality Annual Report (1975), reprinted in
PREVENTION, May 1976, at 204.
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tract it, and sixty to ninety per cent of all cancer is attributed to environ-
mental causes."'
7. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Congress is cognizant of the controversy surrounding the regula-
tion of chemical pollution. Its awareness was evidenced by the passage
of the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976 (TSCA)."2 The relative
strength of this legislation reflects the intent of Congress to provide for
the regulation of toxic substances, a health priority.
The Act requires that a manufacturer submit to the EPA adminis-
trator a "notice of intent" to market a new chemical, or one having a
significant new Use. 13 The notice should contain, among other informa-
tion, "all known data on health and environmental effects.""' This
significant provision places an affirmative duty on the manufacturer to
submit all information and test results, even if they are damaging to the
chances for marketability of the chemical. Hopefully, such explicit and
encompassing requirements will eliminate the concealment of safety
data that has plagued pesticide regulation and control. The manufac-
turer also has a continuing duty to inform the administrator of
"information which reasonably supports the conclusion that "[the] sub-
stance. . . presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment."" 5 The incentive for filing the required information is considera-
ble, with a maximum $25,000 fine for each violation,"' and treatment
of each day of continued violation as a separate offense." 7
The Toxic Substance Control Act takes a significant step in achiev-
ing the aspired goals of pesticide regulation, by giving broad authority
to the administrator to act during the notification period. The adminis-
trator may limit, delay, or prohibit the manufacturing of a suspect
111. Id.
112. Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976). For a full
discussion of the Act, see ROGERS, supra note 7.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (a) (1976).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(a), (b), (d), 2607(b) (1976).
115. This provision, like the registration process in pesticide regulation, may
prove to have all the impact of a Hollywood set-all great facade and no substance. As
ROGERS, supra note 7, at 906-907 points out, "this reporting obligation can succumb
to the rationalizations that the risk isn't all that 'substantial' or the threat of it not
'reasonably' justified."
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) 1 (1976).
117. Id.
1 2:97
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chemical, and his basis for doing so will not be scrutinized by stringent
requirements of proof. If the administrator, having evaluated the data
supplied (1) deems it insufficient or (2) considers that the substance's
use presents an unreasonable risk, then he may limit or prohibit the
manufacturer's marketing of the chemical." 8 The administrator may be
compelled to go to court to justify (1) the injunction pending further
information or (2) the prohibition against manufacturing because antici-
pated uses present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the envi-
ronment." 9
Under the TSCA, the courts will not be able to place an excessive
burden of proof on the administrator to show that the chemical will
adversely affect the environment. In taking steps toward a new ap-
proach to pollutant regulation, Congress lessened the burden of justifi-
cation imposed on the administrator for his actions. He will be able to
justify his limiting or prohibiting decisions on the same basis that has
been evolving in the courts,20 that is, whether an adverse result is "more
likely than not" to result from an action. The administrator will not be
required to offer impossible proofs. He can make his decision in the
balancing of risks and benefits, which disregards the traditional con-
cepts of causal connection,' 2' and resolve "the uncertainties in favor of
concern for possible harm to the environment and public health, and not
for immediate economic advantage."' 22
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (e)(1)(A) (1976).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (e)(2)(A)(B) (1976).
120. Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 510 F.2d
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court ignored the traditional concepts of proof in this action
to suspend the registration of the pesticides Aldrin and Dieldrin. The EPA administra-
tor, as the party alleging the harm, was not required to bear the burden of demonstrating
a direct link between the particular substance and the specific damage. He would not,
as determined by the court, be required to prove facts that scientists have been unable
to prove. Id. at 1298. Where the risk involved is so great as to create a strong possibility
that the substance causes a harm, the registrant has a duty of proving the safety of his
product. See also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 176 U.S. App.
D.C. 373, 541 F.2d I, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2263 (1976).
The Eighth Circuit pondered whether an injunction should be granted when the risk
of future environmental harm is not readily ascertainable. The court resolved in favor
of the EPA administrator's decision to phase out the use of lead as a gasoline additive.
The administrator could base his conclusion upon suspected, but not completely sub-
stantiated, relationships between facts, and could make determinations upon theoretical
projections based upon imperfect data.
121. Comm. of Conference, Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976, S. REP. No.
1302, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976). See also Casenote, supra note 97, at 89.
122. This language, first used in Reserve Mining, does reflect a "legislative policy
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Congress also extended broad authority to the administrator and
established the grounds necessary to substantiate his decisions. Such
measures were necessary to assure fulfillment of the Act's purpose,
namely, that all suspect chemicals be tested adequately before the
commencement of the manufacturing process. 23 In order to prevent
exposure to suspect chemicals, action must be taken "before commer-
cial production begins."'2 4 If an injunction were not possible at that
stage, not only would the purpose of the Act.be frustrated,12' but the cost
of removing the chemical from the market would be substantially
greater.'26 The standards which restrict a manufacturer's production of
a chemical reflect an intent by Congress to supplant, at least in the
instance of chemical regulation, the traditional elements of proof re-
quired to be shown before a court will exercise its equitable jurisdiction
to grant an injunction. 27
The impetus for the Toxic Substance Control Act was, as Professor
William H. Rogers had observed, "the technological revolution in the
chemical industry that [had] outflanked thoroughly the traditional legal
judgment not a judicial one." Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency,
514 F.2d at 500. However, even in the immediate aftermath of Reserve Mining, the
legislature still seemed hesitant to make just such a determination. The courts, in
interpreting the environmental statutes (see Ethyl Corporation (Clean Air Act), Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency (FIFRA)), continued
to prod for a legislative policy decision by noting their restrictions. "We are a court of
law, governed by rules of proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof of
demonstrable hazard to the public health." Reserve Mining v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 498 F.2d at 1084 (from a preliminary injunction hearing which was denied
because the activity of Reserve was not found to be an imminent hazard to health).
Congress, with the Toxic Substance Control Act, took the initiative and set forth
the basis upon which the administrator can render his decisions. Pub. L. No. 94-469,
94th Cong. 2d Sess., 90 STAT. 2003, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4491, at
4554.
123. Id.
124. The Act expresses an intent to avoid a "body count" approach to determine
the health and safety hazards posed by a substance whose effects are dubious, Id. at
4550.
125. The purpose of the Act is to "assure that such innovation and commerce in
such chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1976).
126. Not only is human and environmental harm avoided or alleviated, but the
cost of any regulatory action in terms of loss of jobs and capital investment is mini-
mized. [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 122, at 4550.
127. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 122.
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regimes such as the pesticide laws."u Congress, with this legislation,
clearly intended to put the burden on the manufacturer to develop toxic
substance information, to emphasize the manufacturer's responsibility
for the chemical's possible detrimental effects, and to assess them and
to take corrective measures to alleviate their hazards.' For the first
time, the government is able to gather extensive information 3 ' neces-
sary to make a valid determination of a substance's potentially hazard-
ous tendencies. The Act also contains a citizen-suit provision 3' that will
have substantial impact, since the participating party may be provided
with compensation for attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other
costs. 132 Thus, concerned environmental groups will be able to compete
economically with the rich agribusiness and chemical corporations.
Ostensibly, the "political science of regulation" is losing ground to
a much needed "science of regulation."1 3  The Toxic Substance Con-
trol Act, by requiring the administrator to collect and record all infor-
mation on the attributes of the toxic chemicals, 34 indicates a growing
support by Congress for government acquisition of scientific knowledge.
Although the information is still for the most part supplied by concerned
128. ROGERS, supra note 7, at 899.
129. [19771 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1915.
130. The administrator under section 8 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976)) has
broad power to gather information, keep records, and report health and safety studies.
This power under the TSCA is all encompassing. Unlike § 10 of FIFRA, health and
safety test data will not escape scrutiny and recording because the manufacturer makes
the claim that it is a "trade secret." Douglas Costle, the administrator of the EPA, is
presently pushing to have the pesticide regulations amended to be consistent with the
Toxic Substance Control Act. Again the deficiency of FIFRA is noted. In this instance,
the law is too general and does not expressly state what data may qualify as trade
secrets. Also exhibited is the court's comforting but not curative assistance. The
"narrower view" of what are trade secrets, Costle predicted, would be upheld by courts,
but only after a lengthy legal process. [1977] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 280.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(d) (1976).
133. Burger, supra note 2. The political science of regulation is the term used to
categorize the conflict among various interest groups to have legislation and regulations
passed which are favorable to their respective causes. They are more concerned with
regulation for regulation's sake than in the quality and quantity of information available
upon which to render a regulatory decision. Burger contends that "he who controls the
information controls the regulatory activity." The government which has few indepen-
dent sources of its own must make speculative and inconclusive decisions based upon
information supplied by those to be regulated. This has resulted in a prominent lack of
scientific information for regulatory decisions.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976).
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interests (manufacturers), the administrator now has the authority to
conduct research, development, and monitoring in pursuit of the objec-
tives of the Act.' Realizing that "he who controls the information for
regulation controls the regulatory activity,"' 3 Congress acted to re-
trieve control from the industry by authorizing the EPA to develop its
own sources of gathering data.
The political clout of the chemical manufacturers and their constit-
uents has not disappeared from the spectra of regulations. The scope of
TSCA is incredibly limited. The act specifically excludes the regulation
of a number of substances, particularly pesticides, which is covered by
another law whose ineffectiveness has been manifested. 3 President
Carter may have erred in his environmental address when he noted that,
with the TSCA, no further comprehensive federal legislation should be
necessary.' Only time will reveal if the Act can be efficaciously en-
135. 15 U.S.C. § 2609 (1976).
136. Burger, supra note 2, at 50,184.
Since information control is so important, it is advantageous for the parties con-
cerned with the character of the regulation to supply the information. Id. Both environ-
mentalists and businesses have an interest in health and environmental regulation. The
environmentalists favor strict legislation fostering economic complacency, while the
businesses encourage a laissez-faire approach, which would promulgate unrestricted
progress, and profit. Therefore, to serve best their own interests, they would neither
encourage the government to collect nor develop its own resources for scientific data.
137. 15 U.S.C. 2602(B) (1976). The term chemical substance does not include:
(I) any mixture.
(II) any pesticide [as defined by 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1976)].
(III) tobacco or tobacco product.
(IV) nuclear material or by-product.
(V) article subject to tax under § 4184 of IRC of 1954 (as amended through
December 31, 1976).
(VI) any food, food additive, drug, cosmetic or device [as defined by FFDCA,
21 U.S.C. § 321 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
138. [19771 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 132 at 133. In his environmental address to
Congress, President Carter noted the necessity of a co-ordinated federal effort to ex-
clude these chemicals from our environment. Idealistically, interagency co-ordination
would offer a better guarantee that hazardous materials would not be allowed to be
mass-produced into our environment. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
Douglas Costle even proposed a transfer of that agency's administration of pesticide
programs to the Office of Toxic Substances.
The integration, however, may only prove to be beneficial for clerical convenience.
In the area of enforcement, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act will
continue to provide the guidelines for registration, record keeping, and cancellation or
suspension of pesticide registration. See note 137 supra. Any attempt by the Administra-
tion to apply wider discretion allowed under the TSCA, or use of any of its other strong
121]112:1978
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forced to achieve successfully the purposes sought by Congress. Also the
Act's authoritative parameters are subject to speculation. If merely
applicable to the straggler substances that have eluded other regulatory
controls, the gap-filling legislation is an enormous gesture with no im-
pact.
While the operative capabilities of the Toxic Substance Control
Act are being determined, the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and
Fungicide Act remains the governing legislation over pesticides. Its in-
adequacies will continue to allow many pesticides to be registered with-
out knowledge of their full effects,"3 9 and tolerances for human con-
sumption to be based on limited questionable information. 40
8. CONCLUSION
Pesticide regulation has undergone heated debate and radical re-
construction in recent years. Whether the result has achieved a success-
ful goal of protecting the health and environment of the American
people is dubious at best. Conflicting interests between environmen-
talists and chemical industrialists have produced only conciliatory legis-
lation.
The pattern is classic. The concerned public relieves its fears by
pressuring for a dramatic gesture from the government, while representa-
tives of the affected industry quietly prepare devices to absorb the pres-
sures. Typically they take the form of enforcement procedures, where
exasperating technicalities and labyrinthine delay mask Federal inaction
in a camouflage of tedium-until the public tumult subsides.''
Such a pattern undermines the regulation of pesticide residue al-
lowed in foodstuffs. The "indemnity provision" was not the only at-
provisions (e.g., citizen suit), will inevitably result in litigation. This is a time-consum-
ing and expensive venture which the EPA would rather avoid. See note 141 infra. Ap-
parently § 2602 of the TSCA, limiting its application, may prove to be the Achilles heel
of the Act, by which a chemical classified as a mixture, pesticide, drug, food additive,
and the like can escape TSCA jurisdiction.
139. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 7, 15, 21. See also note 76, supra.
140. See note 75, supra. Note that the Environmental Chemistry Review Section
identified 120 of approximately 250 pesticide chemicals, for which tolerances have been
established for their residue content in food and animal feeds, that have never undergone
environmental chemistry data review. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 18.
141. H. WELLFORD, supra note 32, at 330.
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tempt to undermine insidiously the power of the EPA. Other instances
include: the establishment of a Pesticide Policy Advisory Committeey
which has pesticide industrialists as members; an attempt to give the
secretary of the USDA veto power over any pesticide classification
decision;' the creation of a Scientific Advisory Commission;' the
requirement of a sixty-day notification before any action can be taken
by the EPA;' and, most recently, the inclusion of a provision on the
FIFRA Extension Bill"' which would provide for congressional review
and possible disapproval of EPA regulations. The "legislative wisdom"
purporting to establish an efficacious regulatory scheme has created a
severe conflict of interest by allowing the proponents of chemicals to test
their own product for defects that may keep them off the market.'
Hopefully, these compromising practices will not continue until the
pesticide industry exclusively controls the entire spectra of regulation.
The courts offer little redress. In the area of environmental contam-
inants, prevention-not subsequent reparation of the damage-is the
logical method of control and enforcement. Most law suits, however,
focus exclusively on past events.' Courts, sympathetic to environmen-
142. PREVENTION, December 1975 at 202-3.
143. Pub. L. No. 94-140; 89 Stat. 751, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1359.
See 6 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,003-33 (1976) for a discussion of proposals and effect of
final provisions. The original version H.R. 8841 proposed to the House was critized by
Russell Train, then the administrator of the EPA. In particular, he cited to the Pooge-
Wampler amendment which would require the EPA to share with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture authority to change the classification of a pesticide, suspend or cancel a
registration, and write regulations. See [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1359,
1374.
144. Id. at 1371; 7 U.S.C. § 136 (d) (1976).
145. Id. All of these provisions deal with administrative review. The details of the
intricacies involved in notification of the Secretary of the U.S.D.A., publication of
notice of intent to cancel registration, and consultation with the Scientific Advisory
Committee are prime examples of "the exasperating technicalities and labyrinthine
delay" that hinder prompt action to remove a pesticide from the market.
146. H. R. 12944 vetoed, H. Doc. No. 585, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976) to extend
FIFRA was vetoed by President Ford, because it contained the provision requiring an
executive agency to submit its regulations to Congress for review and possible veto. See
[1976] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 627.
147. It is doubtful whether the chemical industry, one of the largest and most
powerful in the United States, will, in its economic self-interest, foster restrictions on
productivity, while they expend substantial capital to market a product. See 6 ENVIR.
L. REP. 10,138, 10,042 (1976).
148. Id. Courts in suits for injunction have had difficulty in assessing a risk-
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tal concerns, palliate the deficiencies of pesticide regulation, but cannot
cure the flaws that allow people to be exposed to the pesticides and their
residues.
Even when successful in removing a pesticide currently on the mar-
ket, the court battles are a time-consuming and expensive method of
regulation for the EPA. The cancellation process of a pesticide registra-
tion is lengthy and the suspension process difficult, since courts are
restricted in their decision-making to the burden of proof required to
establish the likelihood of an event's occurrence.
Pesticide proponents understandably prefer to use the courts as the
means to enforce regulations. They know that the court's assessment of
the potential gravity of a situation is entangled in legalities. Conse-
quently, when the judicial process is circumvented, as was done in the
Mirex "phase-out" used by the EPA, pesticide proponents vociferously
condemn the termination of cancellation hearings. In the Mirex situa-
tion, they criticized the EPA's use of the registration process as a means
to phase out Mirex from the market. The Mirex manufacturers, how-
ever, did not confront the propensity of the harmful effects caused by
the pesticide. They complained, instead, that the EPA's approach was
a wholly inadequate substitute for adjudicatory findings-not legally
justifiable and not based on facts.149
Facts are history-an established actuality; the state of things as
they are. A stringent standard requiring an absolute factual determina-
tion should not be the basis of proof required before restricting the use
of a potent killer. To remove a pesticide from use, it should not be
necessary to establish, merely to satisfy a legal technicality, that the
residue in food consumed by man is a carcinogenic, mutagenic, or tera-
togenic substance.
At present, the responsibility of enforcement of FEPCA is lodged
with the administrator of the EPA. In justifying his decisions, he is not
benefit analysis, as pointed out in Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Environmental law marks a domain where knowledge is hard to obtain and ap-
praise, even in the administrative context; in the courtrooms, difficulties of understand-
ing are multiplied. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Note, Imminent Irreparable Injury:
A Need for Reform, 45 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1025, 1026-28 (1972).
For courts limiting review to procedural basis, see Latham v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d.
677 (9th Cir. 1974), National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973).
149. [19761 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 849.
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confined to legal standards of proof. Scientific expertise, familiarity
with specific issues, and insight into the development of an environmen-
tally sensitive situation assist him in the risk assessment, which focuses
toward future consequences. 5 However, his decisions are subject to
review by the courts, which lack his insight. Also, whether to take action
against a pesticide is almost exclusively at the discretion of the adminis-
trator.' This "tremendous discretion" has resulted in selective enforce-
ment, which has been greatly criticized by some. Clearly, what is needed
is stricter and more concrete legislation. Regulations that include a
provision for citizens' suits would add another dimension to the enforce-
ment of FIFRA.5 1 Environmentalists and other interested persons could
then compel the administrator to take action against a suspect pesticide.
If strictly legal concepts continue to be employed in pesticide regu-
lation, then the outlook for the acceptance of legislation that will pre-
vent future ill health is bleak. If, in the future, scientific discovery
exhibits with certainty that an extensive and continuous exposure to a
low level of pesticide residues is carcinogenic, the banning of their use
150. Id. See also 6 ENvIR. L. REP. 10,138, 10,042, and Ethyl Corp. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 176 U.S. App. D.C. 373, 541 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
2263 (1976). In discussing the administrator's ability and authority to assess risks, the
court stated that he is not confined by reliance on facts. Those entrusted with enforce-
ment of the laws protecting against "gross environmental modification" are not en-
dowed with "a prescience," which removes speculation from the decision-making. Yet,
there must be regulations and decisions. Consequently, it must be based upon theoretical
and even conflicting data. Such a delicate balancing, the court held, should be left to
the administrator, whose familiarity better qualifies him to make the risk assessment.
Although his decisions may not be based on intuition, most courts will limit their review
to procedural questions, or to whether his decision was arbitrary or capricious. Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
For examples of courts favoring substantive review of agency action, see Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Conservation Council of
North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
151. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976). Agency regulation has its advantages over judicial
implementation of pesticides statutes. However, the administrator has great discretion
whether to take action and has resisted attempts to undermine that power. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d at 289; Environmental Defense
Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d at 346.
152. A citizen suit would allow individual citizens to bring suits against persons,
companies, and governmental agencies, for violations of the Act or for failure to enforce
its provisions. See Comment, supra note 52, at 303. See also note 13 supra, at 2010,
remarks by Senator Nelson; Comment, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1254, 1259-62 (1970).
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will be a futile exercise, as the harm will already have occurred. The
effects of exposure to such carcinogens are insidious, irreversible, and
cumulative.5 3
It may be possible to avoid this disastrous effect if a scientific
approach to legislation is adopted whereby the future health, safety, and
general welfare of the population are considered. An approach such as
this, if adopted, would ban a chemical whose repercussions were not
presently ascertainable. Furthermore, the quest of overcoming the tech-
nological limitations of prognostication of pesticide and chemical ab-
sorption would be propelled. Regulation prior to production and mar-
keting would logically compel manufacturers to discover and rectify
defects or develop alternatives in order to remain economically competi-
tive.
Immediate consideration should be given to the incorporation of a
novel scientific concept in the regulation of environmental contamina-
tion by pesticides and their residues. Then and only then would EPA
enforcement no longer be evaluated critically as "too little, too late and
unpredictable." 154
John P. Wilkes
153. For a discussion of different mortality studies of cancer, see A. LILIENFIELD,
M. LEVIN & I. KESSLER, CANCER IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); for an easy non-
scientific reading on cancer, see R. GLASSER, THE GREATEST BATTLE (1976). See also
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE NATIONAL PANEL OF CONSULTANTS ON THE
CONQUEST OF CANCER, NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANCER (1971).
154. [1976] 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 42.
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Constitutional Law: Freedom to Observe Religion
Must Yield to Collective-bargaining Contract's
Seniority System: Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison
In June 1967, Larry Hardison was hired by Trans World Airlines to
work at its vital, round-the-clock Stores Department at the Kansas City
International Airport. The job was covered by a seniority system in a
collective-bargaining agreement maintained by TWA and a labor
union.' In the spring of 1968, Hardison began to study a religion known
as the Worldwide Church of God, which requires its members to refrain
from working on certain designated holidays as well as on its Sabbath,
sundown Fridays through sundown Saturdays. In December 1968, pur-
suant to his request to be assigned to a day shift, Hardison was trans-
ferred from Building I of the Stores Department (where he had senior-
ity) to Building 2 (where he was number two from the bottom). Shortly
thereafter, he was called to substitute for a vacationing fellow employee
1. Hardison's job was subject to a collective-bargaining contract maintained by
TWA with three different unions: the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, District 142, and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, Local 1650, all of which were sued along with TWA. When the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case, it noted that, in view of its holding, the unions
could be referred to simply as "the union." Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527
F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1975). Under the seniority system, a union steward, representing all
the unions, accepted bids from employees for particular shift assignments as they be-
came available. First choice for job and shift assignments was offered to the most senior
employees, and the most junior employees were required to fill those positions and shifts
that the union steward was unable to fill through the voluntary bidding method. The
TWA-IAM agreement provided in part:
The principle of seniority shall apply in the application of this Agreement in all
reductions or increases of force, preference of shift assignment, vacation period
selection, in bidding for vacancies or new jobs, and in all promotions, demotions,
or transfers involving classifications covered by this Agreement.
0 0 0 0 0
Except as hereafter provided in this paragraph, seniority shall apply in selection
of shifts and days off within a classification within a department. . ..
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 67 & n.1 (1977).
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whose working hours included Friday evenings and Saturdays, Le.,
Hardison's Sabbath.2
Because of his recent transfer to Building 2, Hardison lacked suffi-
cient seniority to bid himself out of the substitution assignment. Subse-
quently, his superior at TWA informed the union steward that the com-
pany would be amenable to any trading of employee work schedules that
the latter could work out within the framework of the seniority system,3
provided that the accommodations did not call for payment of overtime
wages or the undermanning of any TWA operations.' Eventually,
Hardison was transferred to the twilight shift, but on his first Friday
under that schedule he left work at sundown, thereby precipitating his
discharge by TWA.5
After exhausting the administrative remedy provided by Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Hardison sued for injunctive relief, claim-
ing that his discharge constituted religious discrimination in violation
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e-2(a) (1)' and 2000e(j) 7 and of the
2. Id. at 68.
3. Although it would seem that a viable alternative would have been merely to
reassign Hardison to Building 1 where he might have regained his seniority, such a
solution was not available. The union, pointing to the seniority system, would not
approve his early return because it would violate a rule in the agreement prohibiting
transfers twice within six months. Id. at 95 n. I1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 68-69. Justice Marshall, in his lengthy dissent, considered an important
factor that goes to the heart of this solution-searching by TWA and the union:
"[Hardison] lost the non-Sabbath shift when an employee junior to him went on vaca-
tion. The vacation was to last only two weeks, however, and the record does not explain
why respondent did not regain his shift at the end of that time." Id. at 94 n.9 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 69. Justice White, writing for the majority, questioned Hardison's failure
to'seek assistance of the Union Relief Committee which had dealt successfully in the
past with scheduling problems. Id. at 68 n.3. Finally, Justice Marshall, in his dissent,
also noted that TWA, the union, and Hardison had apparently not approached the
Union Relief Committee to approve an exemption. See text accompanying notes 103-
4, infra.
The Union Relief Committee should be distinguished from the union's grievance
committee, which did become involved in the dispute. 375 F. Supp. 877, 884 (1974).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970), pro-
vides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1970), adopted by
1128
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Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
1967 Equal Employment Opportunity guidelines.' The United States
District Court ruled in favor of both the union and TWA.? The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the union
as Hardison had not attacked it on appeal, but reversed the judgment
for TWA.' On certiorari," the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment against TWA and HELD that the company had satisfied
the Act's reasonable accommodation duties; that further efforts to ac-
commodate Hardison's beliefs would have resulted in "undue hardship"
to TWA; and that an agreed-upon seniority system is not required to
yield to accommodate religious practices.' 2 By reaching this particular
decision, the Court found that it had obviated the necessity of address-
ing TWA's constitutional challenge of Title VII based on the establish-
ment of religion clause 3 and of pursuing further the union's status."
Thus, the only issue addressed by the Court was "the extent of the
Congress in its 1972 amendment to Title VII, provides:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
8. The 1967 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline on religious
discrimination provides:
The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds,
required by Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obliga-
tion on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommoda-
tions can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's
needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer. 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (July 13, 1967).
9. 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
10. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
11. The Court granted both TWA's and the union's separate petitions for certio-
rari. Although the union prevailed in both of the lower federal courts, it nevertheless
filed its own petition for certiorari, contending that if the court of appeals' ruling as to
TWA were upheld, it might eventually be obligated to waive provisions in its collective-
bargaining agreement. 432 U.S. at 70-71 n.5.
12. Id. at 77-79.
13. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"Congress shall make no law respectirg" an establishment of religion. . . ." Both the
district court and the court of appeals ruled against TWA's argument that Title VII's
prescribed duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs is a violation of the
establishment clause. 375 F. Supp. at 887; 527 F.2d at 44.
14. 432 U.S. at 70-71 & n.5.
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employer's obligation under Title VII to accommodate an employee
whose religious beliefs prohibit him from working on Saturdays. ' ' 5
In deciding the issue, the Court turned its attention to an examina-
tion of the statutory and administrative language of the Act and the
guidelines which served as the basis of Hardison's claim. With regard
to Section 703(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discharge an employee because of his reli-
gion, the Court noted, in its opinion," McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 7 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,18
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2"
15. Id. at 66.
16. Id. at 71 n.6.
17. 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976). In McDonald, two white employees charged
with misappropriating their employer's property were dismissed from their jobs while a
black employee, charged with the same offense, was retained. The whites brought suit
against both the employer and the union alleging that their discharge constituted dis-
crimination on the basis of race. The Court held that Title VII and § 1981 prohibited
racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as against non-
whites.
18. 424 U.S. 747,763 (1976). The Court undoubtedly relied heavily on the Franks
dissenting opinions to support its decision in Hardison. Significantly, the dissenters in
Franks help to comprise the majority in Hardison, and, conversely, Justice Brennan,
who wrote for the majority in Franks, joins Justice Marshall in his dissent in the present
case. In Franks, the lower federal court had held that several blacks had been discrimi-
nated against by an employer's hiring practices. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the sole issue was whether an award of retroactive seniority (as well as back pay)
was an appropriate remedy to correct that past discrimination. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, granted that relief, even though he recognized that to do so would
implicate the seniority expectations of Bowman's other employees. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in their dissenting opinions protested
the inequity of permitting the retroactive seniority relief, charging that such a remedy
placed an unfair burden on "innocent employees," and afforded "preferential" treat-
ment to a minority of employees at the expense of the majority. Chief Justice Burger
accused the majority of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." Id. at 781 (Burger, J., dissenting).
19. 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). The Court in McDonnell ruled that, while Title VII
prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a qualified applicant because of his race, it
does not prohibit rejection of that same applicant if he has previously engaged in
deliberate, unlawful activity against the employer, and the employer's refusal to hire him
is based upon his participation in that activity.
20. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII prohibits
an employer from requiring a high'school education or the passing of a standardized
intelligence test as a condition of employment when neither standard relates signifi-
cantly to job capability. Although the Duke Power Company's tests appeared neutral
in terms of intent, they operated to disquafy black job applicants at a significantly higher
rate than white applicants, and implemented the employer's longstanding practice of
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as well as an excerpt from the Congressional Record." These cases
established that the main purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimi-
nation in employment and that "similarly situated employees are not
to be treated differently solely because they differ with respect to race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.""2 The Court underscored this
declaration by stating: "This is true regardless of whether the discrimi-
nation is directed against majorities or minorities. 2 3 Central to the
Court's concerns was that Title VII be applied equitably, taking into
account the impact it could have on all parties that would be affected.
In considering the 1967 EEOC guideline that requires employers
to "make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employ-
ees . . . where such accommodation can be made without undue hard-
ship on the conduct of the employer's business,"24 the Court first estab-
lished the propriety of using the guideline in its determination of the
issue. While administrative guidelines are not ordinarily entitled to great
weight, the Court singled out this one noting that Congress, wishing to
give the guideline force, ratified it by passing "positive legislation,"' '
i.e., Section 701(j),21 which adopted the specific language of the 1967
EEOC guideline. The Court pointed to the legislative history of the Act
as evidence that Congress wanted to clear away doubts left by inconclu-
sive case law? Precisely because it had found sufficient legislative in-
tent, the Court held that it would consider the guideline and Section
7010) without considering "whether Section 7010) [had to] be applied
giving preference to whites. The Court condemned the tests, calling them "fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
21. "'[Tlhe purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal
and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color,
religion, or national origin."' 432 U.S. at 71 n.6.
22. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added). In making this statement, the Court relied on
the McDonald and the Griggs cases. Given the holding in Hardison, it would seem that
the Court chose to overlook its Griggs ruling that Title VII "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). However, the discriminatory
device in Griggs was an intelligence examination which job applicants were required to
pass and not the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (1967). See text accompanying
note 8, supra.
25. 432 U.S. at 76 n.l.
26. Id. at 73-74.
27. Id. 73.
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retroactively to the facts of this litigation.
' 28
As the Court traced the applicable statutory and administrative
language, and examined the supporting case law, it arrived with seeming
consternation at what it saw as an inescapable conclusion: "the em-
ployer's statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for
the religious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue
hardship, is clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been spelled
out by Congress or by EEOC guidelines. ' 29 The Court noted that the
Commission, in proposing its 1967 guideline, "did not suggest what sort
of accommodations [were] 'reasonable' or when hardship to an em-
ployer becomes 'undue."'
3
When the Supreme Court affirmed, by an equally divided court, the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,3' the ques-
tion as to how far this accommodation should extend was left unan-
swered. The Court in Dewey affirmed the lower court's judgment be-
cause there had been a finding that the manner in which the employer
allocated his Sunday work assignments was not discriminatory either in
its purpose or in its effect. 32 Furthermore, consistent with the 1967
guidelines, the employer had fulfilled his duty to make reasonable
28. Id. at 76 n.1l.
29. Id. at 75.
30. Id. at 72.
31. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
402 U.S. 689 (1971). In this case, the employee, Dewey, was subject to the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement between his union and his employer. Under the agree-
ment, employees were required to work overtime when scheduled, or, in the alternative,
to secure a replacement for themselves. When he was assigned Sunday overtime, Dewey
refused to work or to find a replacement, contending that either act would violate his
religious convictions. Following his subsequent discharge, he brought an action against
his employer, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the employee had wrongfully violated the non-discriminatory terms
of the collective-bargaining agreement so that his subsequent discharge was permissible
under Title VII.
32. 432 U.S. at 73. In a footnote to this observation, the Court in Hardison
pointed out that regardless of what the Dewey decision stated, it must be disregarded
because "[j]udgment entered by an equally divided court is not 'entitled to precedential
weight,' Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972)." 432 U.S. at 73 n.8. The impact of
Dewey is inconclusive also because (1) the case "was decided prior to the addition by
Congress to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of§ 7010) (42 USCA § 2000e(j); and (2) the
Court held the 1966 EEOC version of 29 CFR § 1605.1 applicable, and that version of
the regulation did not require an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the
religious needs of its employees. . . ." Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 580, at 606 (1975).
A 4 n I
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accommodations when he provided that the employee was permitted to
secure his own replacement.3
In its discussion of the 1972 amendments to Title VII embodied in
Section 701(j), the Court lamented that, in neither the statute nor the
ample legislative history 4 backing it, was any guidance given for deter-
mining the degree of accommodation required of an employer. 5
Finally, case law appeared on both sides of the issue, providing no
clear-cut theories of decision:
In circumstances where an employer has declined to take steps that would
burden some employees in order to permit another employee or prospec-
tive employee to observe his Sabbath, the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
have found no violation for failure to accommodate. . . .But the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits have also reached the opposite conclusion on similar
facts.3"
33. 432 U.S. at 73.
34. Id. at 74-75 n.9, which states:
The Congressional Record ...contains reprints of Dewey and Riley v.
Bendix Corp ... as well as a brief synopsis of the new provision [Section
7010)], which makes reference to Dewey, 118 Cong. Rec. 7167 (1972). The signifi-
cance of the legislative references to prior case law is unclear. In Riley the District
Court ruled that an employer who discharged an employee for refusing to work
on his Sabbath had not committed an unfair labor practice even though the
employer had not made any effort whatsoever to accommodate the employee's
religious needs. It is clear from the language of § 7010) that Congress intended
to change this result by requiring some form of accommodation; but this tells us
nothing about how much an employer must do to satisfy its statutory obligation.
The reference to Dewey is even more opaque:
"The purpose of this subsection is to provide the statutory basis for EEOC
to formulate guidelines on discrimination because of religion such as those chal-
lenged in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company, 429 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1970),
Affirmed by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)." 118 Cong. Rec. 7167
(1972). Clearly, any suggestion in Dewey that an employer may not be required
to make reasonable accommodation for the religious needs of its employees was
disapproved by § 7016); but Congress did not indicate that "reasonable accommo-
dation" requires an employer to do more than was done in Dewey, apparently
preferring to leave that question open for future resolution by the EEOC.
This interpretation of the legislative history is in sharp contrast to that of Justice
Marshall in his dissent. See note 72, infra.
35. 432 U.S. at 74-75 & n.9.
36. Id. at 75 n.10. The cases in which no violation was found were: Williams v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959
(1976) (employee's dismissal did not constitute religious discrimination by employer if
he did not regularly ask employee to work on Saturday (employee's Sabbath) but only
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After looking in vain for helpful rules of law, the Court focused on
the facts of the case. It observed that the court of appeals felt that TWA
had failed to seek reasonable accommodations short of undue hardship,
because the company rejected three alternatives. Its refusal to permit
Hardison to work only four days a week, utilizing an employee on duty
elsewhere; its refusal to bring into work an employee not normally
assigned to that shift as a Saturday substitute; and finally, its refusal to
arrange a swap between another employee and Hardison, made TWA's
conduct violative of the Act. The court of appeals further found that
TWA had not sought, and the union had not entertained, the idea of a
possible variance of the collective-bargaining agreement, and that both
TWA and the union were relying on one another to find a solution, with
the result that neither did anything.
The Supreme Court chose to "disagree with the Court of Appeals
in all relevant respects."3 In giving its reasons, it defined the limits to
which an employer, bound by a collective-bargaining agreement con-
taining a seniority system, must go to reasonably accommodate reli-
gious observances. The three above-mentioned alternatives were re-
jected: the first two would have worked an undue hardship on the com-
pany in the form of undermanning its operations or forcing the em-
asked employee to work a particular Saturday in order to complete a critically impor-
tant project); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), petition for rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct. 2989 (1977) (em-
ployer's failure to hire not discriminatory where prospective employee, a newspaper
copyreader, refused to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath, and where employer, a news-
paper publisher, required a limited number of copyreaders, who are specialists, to be
available for a six-day workweek); Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th
Cir. 1974) (small postal facility of limited manpower which had hired employee to
work as "part-time flexible clerk" was justified in discharging employee who failed to
show up for work on several Saturdays after making attempts to accommodate em-
ployee's religious practices by allowing him as many Saturdays off as possible and rec-
ommending his transfer to a larger postal facility). The opposite conclusion was reached
in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affd by an equally
divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), judgment vacated and case remanded to the court
of appeals for further consideration in light of TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),
97 S. Ct. 2965 (1977) (employer held liable for religious discrimination under Title VII
where he discharged employee in response to "mild and infrequent complaints" from
fellow employees forced to substitute on employee's Sabbath); and Riley v. Bendix
Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972) (employee's discharge constituted religious dis-
crimination 'Under Title VII where employer admitted that he had made no effort to
transfer employee to different shift, or to obtain a substitute and, furthermore, that no
actual need for a substitute appeared during employee's Sabbath absences).
37. 432 U.S. at 77.
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ployer to pay overtime to some employee;8 the last, in which TWA
would have unilaterally arranged a "swap," would have involved an
impermissible breach of the seniority provisions of the contract.3 TWA
had sought to comply with the statutory requirements by holding several
meetings, by accommodating Hardison's observance of his special reli-
gious holidays, by authorizing the union steward to search for someone
who would be willing to swap shifts, and, finally, by attempting (without
success) to find Hardison another job.40 Furthermore, Hardison's supe-
rior at TWA, in meeting with the union's steward, had expressed his
willingness in approving any possible job swaps, but the union official
had stood firmly by the collective-bargaining contract and had been
unwilling to work out a shift or job trade." Thus, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, TWA had gone as far as it could. Regarding the
collective-bargaining agreement that tied the employer's hands, the
Court remarked: "[It] appears to us that the system itself represented
a significant accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular,
of all TWA employees." 4 According to the Court's finding, TWA, by
working within the framework of the seniority system, had found a
neutral way to minimize the occasions during an employee's working
life when he would be required to work on a day that he wanted to take
off. Furthermore, TWA had reduced its weekend force to a bare mini-
mum in order to complement that goal of the seniority system.43
Having concluded that the seniority system was itself a manifesta-
tion of reasonable accommodation, the Court rationalized its holding
by listing strong public policy and equity arguments. It began by re-
sponding to a Hardison-EEOC contention that compliance with the
statute took precedence over the collective-bargaining contract and the
seniority rights of TWA's other employees. The Court agreed that case
law indicated that neither a collective-bargaining agreement nor a
seniority system could be used to violate the statute." However, the
Court felt that the case supporting that rule, Franks v. Bowman,"
needed to be distinguished from the Hardison issue. In Franks, actual
38. Id. at 76.
39. Id. at 76-77.
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. at 78.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 79.
45. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See also note 18, supra.
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past discrimination by the employer had already been found, and the
Court had agreed to an abrogation of the seniority system only because
it was necessary to "make whole" the victim of that past discrimination.
The Hardison case was not subject to similar treatment because no dis-
crimination had been found that needed to be corrected. Moreover, the
Court had no intention of finding any discrimination in Hardison's
case:46 "[W]e do not believe that the duty to accommodate requires
TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement."4
Thus, the Court, by simply refusing to find discrimination, successfully
evaded the constraints of prior judicial rulings and, consequently, saved
the TWA-IAM collective-bargaining agreement from alteration. Di-
recting its attention to the strong public policy interest to be achieved
by this interpretation, the Court stated:
Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agree-
ments between management and labor, lies at the core of our national
labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally included in these
contracts. Without a clear and express indication from Congress, we
cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon seniority
system must give way when necessary to accommodate religious obser-
vances 48
In further support of seniority systems, the Court pointed out that an
employer like TWA allocated work schedules either through involun-
tary assignments or through an equitable seniority system. In the opin-
ion of the Court, to circumvent such a system would be to deny an
innocent employee his contractual rights under the agreement. To favor
Hardison's religious preferences would be to do so only "at the expense
of others who had strong, but perhaps nonreligious reasons for not
working on weekends"; another employee would have been deprived of
his shift preference "at least in part because he did not adhere to a
religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath." 49 The Court summed it
up by finding that
Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment. The repeated,
unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the legislative history of
Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such dis-
46. 432 U.S. at 79 n.12.
47. Id. at 79.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 81.
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crimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well as
minorities.5"
Finally, the Court supported its conclusion by observing that Sec-
tion 703(h)51 of the Act afforded special treatment for seniority systems.
Citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S." and United
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,53 the Court indicated that the statute signified
50. Id.
51. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970),
provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ...
52. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In this case, it was shown that an employer had violated
Title VII by engaging in discriminatory hiring and promoting practices against black
and Spanish-surnamed persons. Those who could show themselves to be victims of the
company's discrimination after the passage of the Civil Rights Act were rewarded
retroactive seniority relief, but victims of pre-Act discrimination were denied that rem-
edy. In response to that denial, the pre-Act discriminatees alleged that the seniority
system was unlawfully serving to perpetrate the effects of pre-Act discrimination and
that the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining a seniority system violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Court responded by referring to § 703(h) which, it held,
reflected Congress' intent to immunize seniority systems from charges of that nature.
Congress passed 703(h)
to make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would
not be unlawful under Title VII. . . . [T]he congressional judgment was that
Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy
or water down the vested seniority rights of employees simply because their
employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.. . . [A]n
otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under
Title VII simply because it may perpetrate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did
not intend to make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to continue
to exercise those rights even at the expense of pre-Act discriminatees.
431 U.S. at 352-54. The opinion further noted that under these circumstances the
seniority system would be seen as discriminatory under Title VII if it could be shown
that (1) its provisions did not apply equally to all races and ethnic groups or (2) it was
formed and operated to perpetrate some illegal purpose. Id. at 355-56.
53. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Evans was a female flight attendant who was discharged
from United Air Lines in 1968 because she had married. She was rehired in 1972
subsequent to a judicial determination that such practice on the part of airlines was
violative of Title VII. After the rehiring, she filed suit against United when she was
treated for seniority purposes as though she had had no prior service with the company.
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that routine application of a seniority system would not be regarded as
unlawful.54 After referring once again to Franks,5" which held that Sec-
tion 703(h) was a definitional provision and could therefore be relied
upon to demonstrate which employment practices were discriminatory
and which were not,5" the Court declared: "[A]bsent a discriminatory
purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful
employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory conse-
quences." 57 Adopting this line of reasoning and finding that there had
been "no suggestion of discriminatory intent"5" on the part of either
TWA or the union, the Court ruled that the employer had not discrimi-
nated against Hardison because of his religion. 5 The Court concluded
by stating that, in the absence of what it considered to be clear statutory
language and legislative history to the contrary, it would not construe
Title VII to require an employer "to discriminate against some employ-
ees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath. '60
Believing that the majority's interpretation of the statute had ac-
tually nullified it, Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan,
filed a lengthy dissent, in which he wrote:
Today's decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to
accommodate work requirements to religious practices. The Court holds,
in essence, that although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an
employer must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take
account of religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really
In rejecting her Title VII claim, the Court pointed to its untimely filing and, signifi-
cantly, to the fact that her attack on the seniority system as discriminatory was insuffi-
ciently drawn. Citing § 703(h), the Court stated:
That section expressly provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice to apply different terms of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system, provided that any disparity is not the result of intentional discrimination.
Since respondent does not attack the bona fides of United's seniority system, and
since she makes no charge that the system is intentionally designed to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, § 703(h) provides an
additional ground for rejecting her claim.
431 U.S. at 559-60.
54. 432 U.S. at 82.
55. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
56. 432 U.S. at 82.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id. at 85.
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mean what they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant
even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable
them to follow their faith. As a question of social policy, this result is
deeply troubling, for a society that truly values religious pluralism cannot
compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel choice of surren-
dering their religion or their job."1
First, Marshall urged a common-sense reading of the statutory
language by pointing out that an accommodation issue by its very defi-
nition arises only when some special interest must be allowed special
consideration." The typical pattern appearing in case law is one in which
an employer's neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with a par-
ticular employee's religious practices. The issue is always whether the
employee is to be exempted from the rule's demands.13 To allow such
an exemption, Marshall contended, is to allow its natural consequences,
i.e., "unequal" or "preferential" treatment for the individual involved
and a privilege being "allocated according to religious beliefs." 4 Ac-
cordingly, Marshall found that the statute, by calling for
"accommodations," demanded that Hardison be granted preferential
treatment unless TWA could show that "'undue hardship' would re-
sult." 5
Second, Marshall asserted that the Court seemed "almost oblivious
to the legislative history of the 1972 amendment of Title VII." '6 He
recounted that two employer-favoring decisions, Dewey v. Reynolds
Metal Co. 7 and Riley v. Bendix Corp.,8 rendered shortly after the
promulgation of the 1967 EEOC guidelines,69 questioned whether the
guideline was consistent with Title VII7 Congress, in response to those
questions and wishing to resolve the issue firmly in favor of an em-
ployee's viewpoint, tracked the language of the guideline and unani-
mously passed the 1972 amendment, i.e., Section 2000e(j). Finding the
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. at 87-88.
64. Id. at 88.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
68. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
69. See text accompanying note 8, supra.
70. 432 U.S. at 88.
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language of the Court in Hardison to be "strikingly similar" to that in
Dewey7 (which Congress had specifically rejected in its 1972 amend-
ment),72 Marshall concluded that the Court had "follow[ed] the Dewey
decision in direct contravention of congressional intent."73
Third, Marshall criticized the Court's treatment of TWA's conten-
tion that to require it to accommodate Hardison's religious needs would
constitute an establishment of religion contrary to the first amendment
of the Constitution. He noted that the Court, instead of responding to
the Constitutional challenge, simply bypassed it by deciding the case in
such a way as to nullify effectively the problem statute itself. 74 Marshall
then proceeded to defend the constitutionality of Section 701j) as
applied to employment situations fitting the profile of Hardison's. First,
he recognized that valid constitutional questions would be raised if the
statute were interpreted to compel employers to incur substantial expen-
ses to oblige religious observers;75 conversely, if the expenditures were
"de minimis" (as he found the $150 cost of accommodating Hardison's
beliefs to be),7 no constitutional argument could be valid.77 Second, by
71. Id. at 89.
72. Id. Referring to both Dewey (see text accompanying notes 34-35, supra)
and Riley (see text accompanying notes 34-35, supra), Marshall reviewed the legislative
history supporting Section 2000e(j):
These courts reasoned, in language strikingly similar to today's decision, that to
excuse religious observers from neutral work rules would "discriminate against
• . . other employees" and "constitute unequal administration of the collective-
bargaining agreement." Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. [at 3301. They therefore
refused to equate "religious discrimination with failure to accommodate." Id. at
335. When Congress was reviewing Title VII in 1972, Senator Jennings Randolph
informed the Congress of these decisions which, he said, had "clouded" the
meaning of religious discrimination. 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). He introduced
an amendment, tracking the language of the EEOC regulation, to make clear that
Title VII requires religious accommodation, even though unequal treatment
would result. The primary purpose of the amendment, he explained, was to pro-
tect Saturday Sabbatarians like himself from employers who refuse "to hire or
to continue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly require
them to abstain from work in the nature of hire on particular days." Id. at 705.
His amendment was unanimously approved by the Senate on a roll call vote, Id.,
at 731. ...
This interpretation of the legislative history is in sharp contrast to that of Justice White,
writing for the majority. See note 34, supra.
73. 432 U.S. at 89.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 90.
76. Id. at 92-93 n.6.
77. Id. at 90.
I t IA
141
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder,"8 Sherbert v. Verner,79 Zorach v.
Clauson,0  Gillette v. United States,81 Welsh v. United States,82
Braunfeld v. Brown,83 and McGowan v. Maryland," Marshall demon-
strated that the Court, on previous occasions, had failed to find estab-
lishment clause problems in exempting religious observers from state-
imposed duties, 5 and contended, finally, that logic dictated a similar
holding with regard to duties owed a private employer."
Finally, Marshall narrowed his analysis to an examination of the
facts and a determination of whether TWA had met its burden of ex-
hausting all reasonable accommodations short of "undue hardship" to
its business. He concluded that it had not. 7 He rejected the Court's
conclusion that compelling the company to assume the costs of overtime
pay or replacing Hardison during his Sabbath would have resulted in
"undue hardship.""8 The record indicated that an accommodation
78. 406 U.S. 205, 234-35, n.22 (1972) (two Amish children, aged 14 and 15, who
had completed eighth grade, were exempted from state compulsory school attendance
law requiring all children to attend school until the age of 16).
79. 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventist whose religion prohibited
Saturday employment and who had rejected job offers for Saturday work was allowed
to collect state unemployment compensation benefits even though state law, regarding
benefits explicitly rendered ineligible any person who failed to accept work offered to
him).
80. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (city program permitting public schools to release and
excuse from class attendance certain students so that they could go to religious centers
for religious instruction was found to be constitutional with regard to the establishment
clause).
81. 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (section of Military Selective Service Act of 1967 which
provided exemption from military service to conscientious objectors to all war was not
violative of the establishment clause).
82. 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (draft registrant who held "with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions" strong beliefs opposing the taking of human life
was exempted from military service).
83. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing law proscribing Sunday retail sale of
certain enumerated commodities upheld after Court rejected contention that the statute
was law respecting establishment of religion and therefore violative of the first amend-
ment).
84. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (convictions of store em-
ployees who had made retail sales on a Sunday in violation of the state Sunday closing
laws were upheld after the Court rejected the argument that the statute violated the
establishment clause).
85. 432 U.S. at 90.
86. Id. at 91.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 92.
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would have been necessary for a three-month period, at the end of which
Hardison could have transferred back to his old building, where his
seniority would have been reinstated.89 The costs for an arrangement
over that time period would have been $150,11 a sum which Marshall, in
contrast to the Court, found compatible with the purpose of the statute.
Marshall also took aim at TWA for its failure to seek out actively
an employee who would have been willing to trade shifts with Hardi-
son.9 The reason for that failure was denounced by Marshall (although
clearly accepted by the Court): any trade, whether voluntary or not,
would have violated the collective-bargaining agreement which author-
ized only transfers to vacant jobs.9 In addition to the possibility of a
voluntary trade, Marshall proposed two other options that he believed
would have satisfied the statutory requirements. The first was that TWA
could have paid overtime to a voluntary replacement and passed on the
cost to Hardison, who would earn it by working overtime at regular
pay. 3 The second option would have called for TWA to transfer Hardi-
son immediately back to his previous department in Building 1, where
he had attained sufficient seniority. 4 Marshall fully recognized that
both solutions would have abrogated the collective-bargaining contract:
the first, because of a provision directing that any employee who worked
overtime was to receive premium pay; and the second because the agree-
ment prohibited employees from transferring more often than once
every six months.95 However, he inferred that the statute required resort
to such options, arguing that neither of them would have deprived any
other employee of his rights under the agreement or violated seniority
expectations of others.96 Furthermore, although he conceded that both
solutions would cause some administrative inconvenience to TWA, he
argued that such a burden would not make the statute violative of the
establishment clause.97 The Court, he stressed, on numerous previous
occasions, had approved of exemptions from state-imposed duties that
placed "not inconsiderable burdens on private parties."" Citing
89. Id. at 92-93 n.6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 93-94.
92. Id. at 94 n.10.
93. Id. at 95.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 95-96.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 96 n.13.
98. Id.
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Selective Draft Law Cases,99 an old decision with recent implications,
he attempted to buttress his argument that the statute did not violate
the Constitution merely because it gave preferential treatment to Hardi-
son. That case held that to excuse conscientious objectors (whose rea-
sons for objecting were religious in nature) from military service during
time of war forces non-objectors to serve in their place, but that such
exemptions would in no way cause a violation of the establishment
clause.10° Certainly, Hardison's desire to be excused from work one day
a week at the expense of his fellow employees could not, in Marshall's
opinion, be as radical a proposal as being excused from combat duty at
the expense of one's fellow citizens. Marshall also cited Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Market,' which upheld a law prohibiting private citi-
zens from engaging in certain activities within fixed distances from
places of worship, to support his contention that the law often discrimi-
nates against private parties to uphold special religious interests.0 2
One unpursued avenue of relief that Marshall mentioned, but sur-
prisingly did not emphasize, was that TWA could have brought Hardi-
son's problem before the Union Relief Committee after realizing that
Hardison had made no attempt to do so himself."°3 Marshall noted that
the record indicated that the function of the Committee was to alleviate
problems caused by the seniority system, and that it had at least on one
occasion arranged for a permanent transfer outside the seniority sys-
tem. 04
In his conclusion, Marshall called the decision a tragedy-not
99. 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918).
100. Id. at 389-90.
101. 366 U.S. 617, 627 (1961).
102. 432 U.S. at 96 n.13. Although they seem impressive, these two cases do not
supply the persuasive argument in favor of Hardison that Marshall hoped they would
because the essential component that determined their outcome was lacking in Hardi-
son's case. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court indicated why
it has respected the interests of conscientious objectors: it is for the "valid secular"
reason that it is hopeless to try to transform such individuals into effective fighting men.
Id. at 453. With regard to laws that restrict certain activities on Sundays, the Gallagher
case revealed the judicial attitude by citing, at 630, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 450 (1961), which upheld Sunday closing laws because they serve the "legitimate
secular interest" of the State, not to aid religion, but to provide one day a week for
people to rest, recreate, and recuperate. In Hardison, there was a marked absence of a
"valid secular" purpose behind § 701(0). It was the absence of such a purpose that led
the Court to its refusal to enforce the statute.
103. 432 U.S. at 94 n.10.
104. Id.
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merely because one employee had been deprived of his livelihood for
following the dictates of his conscience, but because of the impact the
case would have on "thousands of Americans like Hardison who could
be forced to live on welfare as the price they must pay for worshipping
their God."' 5
The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
nullified Section 701(j) of the Act, i.e., the duty to make "reasonable
accommodations" short of "undue hardship," without finding it uncon-
stitutional. The Court accomplished this by merely refusing to enforce
the law. Paradoxical as this decision might at first appear to be, it is
perhaps understandable. Mr. Justice Marshall, in his two-pronged ex-
amination of the statutory language' 0 and the legislative history, 07
argued convincingly that the only way to reconcile the statute and the
facts in Hardison's situation would have been to find that TWA had not
attempted to meet its duty of accommodation, and that it should, there-
fore, be required to take steps to do so. Marshall, however, overlooked
a crucial factor that the Court recognized: the duty to consider and
weigh the competing equities.' In Hardison's case, to apply a statute
that called for accommodation on the part of the employer would have
resulted in an accommodation by Hardison's fellow employees. Except
for the payment of premium wages by TWA, none of the proposed
accommodations would have had the slightest impact on the employer,
but they would have been fundamentally unfair to the other employees.
To erode the expectations of many blameless workers, whose rights
were based solely on satisfactory and often long service, would have
been to ignore the practical realities and necessities of the business
world.
Another justification for the Court's refusal to permit TWA to
violate the agreement with the union is historical. At one time, employ-
ers were free to ignore the interests of their employees, if they so
chose. 09 Subsequently, the emergence of a strong labor movement in
105. 432 U.S. at 96-97.
106. See text accompanying notes 62-65, supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 66-73, supra.
108. 432 U.S. at 79-81.
109. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968), where the
author notes in the introduction:
Until the fourth decade of this century, American workers often fought govern-
ment as well as employers in their efforts to unionize. While there were earlier
beginnings, it was in the 1930's that government changed sides and began to foster
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this country successfully raised the public's conscience regarding the
inequality of bargaining power between labor and management. Con-
gress' reaction to this situation was the passage of legislation"" which
placed pre-eminence upon unionization and the collective-bargaining
agreement. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Court in Hardison
chose not to undermine the integrity of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment and its seniority system.
But how this decision came about is not as significant as how far
it will extend. Indeed, its application is more universal than its narrow
holding that a collective-bargaining agreement's seniority system is not
required to yield to an accommodation of a particular employee's reli-
gious observances. As Marshall predicted, members of minority reli-
gions' whose rights are unprotected by typical collective-bargaining
agreements are in at least theoretical danger of losing their jobs.I, Even
in the absence of a union contract governing work-scheduling at a busi-
ness, an employee observing the dictates of his religion will be entitled
to no accommodation by his employer if the employer merely speculates
that to accommodate him would cause a minor morale problem among
the other employees. The language of the decision, which is at total
collective bargaining as a method for solving such problems as ...working
conditions. . . and the psychological frustration of the modern worker. Since the
thirties, collective bargaining has come to occupy a position at the center of
national labor policy.
Wellington further contends that the courts stalwartly blocked the tides of reform
legislation favoring unionization and employee bargaining power, by citing Final Report
of the Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., I,
38-61 (1916); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (New York,
Macmillan, 1930), note 29 at 52053 n.19: "The growth and development of unions and
of collective-bargaining was wrongly impeded, the courts were rightly viewed as instru-
ments of the employer class. . . ." H. WELLINGTON at 26.
110. National Labor Relations Act, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970)).
111. Senator Jennings Randolph, in introducing Section 2000eo) as an amend-
ment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated:
There are approximately 750,000 men and women who are Orthodox Jews in the
U.S. work force. . . .There are an additional 425,000 men and women in the
work force who are Seventh-Day Adventists. There are . . .5,000 individuals
within [the Seventh-Day Baptists] . . .denomination in the work force.
118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972). This enumeration, of course, represents only a partial
estimation of the number of persons whose jobs can be adversely affected by the decision
in Hardison.
112. 432 U.S. at 96-97.
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variance with the language of the statute, indicates that, at least in the
area of religious needs, if the rights of the majority are even indirectly
adversely affected, the rights of the minority must yield.13
At a time when white males are filing reverse discrimination cases
against minority-weighted admissions practices in law"4 and medical"-
schools and are questioning the right of women and racial minorities to
receive improved job and educational opportunities which are not made
available to white males-e.g., "affirmative action"-the Hardison de-
cision must not be overlooked. The basic issue in all these cases, which
will ultimately mold our society, is the same issue that was decided in
Hardison: To what extent can the law be applied to give preference to
the rights of a minority group member over the rights of the majority?
Hardison established that, absent a valid secular purpose supporting a
statute designed to implement an individual's religious freedom, the
rights of the minority will be subordinated to the rights of the majority
if the latter's interests are affected. The reverse discrimination cases
mentioned above do not, of course, deal with statutes that lack valid
secular purpose"' and, in that sense, they can be distinguished from
Hardison. However, the rationale behind the Hardison opinion demon-
strates that the Court is sensitive to the plight of white males who claim
that their validly earned expectations of success in the fields of higher
education and employment are being thwarted by "affirmative action."
Their plight is not very different from that of Hardison's fellow employ-
ees at TWA who had labored diligently to attain their position in the
seniority hierarchy. How the Court will ultimately resolve the reverse
discrimination cases remains to be seen, but it is evident that preferen-
tial treatment for minorities to the exclusion of the majority is not an
attractive proposition in the eyes of an equity-minded Supreme Court.
Marilyn R. Schwartz
113. See note 102, supra.
114. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
115. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1977), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
116. The purpose of the "affirmative action" programs is to accomplish the
integration of minority groups into the working force, the professions, and society as a
whole. See 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1977) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
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Constitutional Law: First Amendment Guarantees
Lawyers Limited Right to Advertise Fees:
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
The Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Bates v. State Bar ofA rizona'
involved the right of two young attorneys with impressive academic
credentials 2 to advertise their legal services in a local newspaper. 3 The
attorneys had sought to create what they termed a "legal clinic" which
was, in fact, a low-budgeted law office handling exclusively low-cost,
non-litigable legal matters such as uncontested divorces, changes of
name, and adoptions.4 Their objective was to provide such services to
moderate-income clients for a comparatively low fee.' By cultivating
and reaching a high volume of clientele through advertising, the attor-
1. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
2. Attorney John R. Bates was named the outstanding student of his class by his
law school faculty, and attorney Van O'Steen graduated cum laude. Both are graduates
of the Arizona State University College of Law class of 1972. Id. at 2693 n.2.
3. Id. at 2694. The attorneys claimed in their advertisement that they provided
"legal services at very reasonable fees," and went on to list their services as including:
-Divorce or legal separation-uncontested
(both spouses sign papers)
$175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
-Preparation of all court papers and instructions
on how to do your own simple uncontested divorce
$100.00
-Adoption-uncontested severance proceeding
$225.00 plus approximately $10.00 publication cost
-Bankruptcy-non-business, no contested proceedings
Individual-$250.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee
Wife and Husband-300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
-Change of name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee.
Id. at 2710 app.
4. Id. at 2694.
5. Id.
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neys could service their clients with a minimum amount of expense due
to the lack of research and preparation required to fulfill their needs.'
The lawyers' advertisement appeared in the Arizona Republic
newspaper on February 22, 1976, and included the quotation of fees for
specified services.7 As a result, an action was brought against them by
the President of the Arizona State Bar8 for violating the A.B.A. Code
of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) as incorpo-
rated by Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona.9 It was the
decision of the Special Local Committee, which originally heard the
matter; 0 of the Board of Governors of the State Bar, which reviewed
the bar committee's action;" and of the Arizona Supreme Court,'12 that
the attorneys were in violation of that rule. 3 The attorneys petitioned
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court," which
reversed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court 5 and HELD that
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech precluded the State
Bar from banning the appellants' limited type of legal advertising. 6
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2695.
9. 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). The pertinent part of the
rule provides that:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the
city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall
he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
10. At this hearing, pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 36, 17A ARIz.
REV. STAT. (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), a three-member committee recommended that
the attorneys be suspended from the practice of law for not less than six months. 97 S.
Ct. at 2695.
II. The Board of Governors, upon review pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court
Rule 36, 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), reduced the committee-
imposed sanction to a one-week suspension. 97 S. Ct. at 2695.
12. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), where the court, pursuant to its rule 37,
17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (West 1973), reviewed the Board of Governors' action. 97 S. Ct.
at 2695. The court reduced the sanction to a censure "[blecause the court. . . felt that
[the lawyers'] advertising 'was one in good faith to test the constitutionality of DR
2-101(B) .... 1 .Id. at 2696.
13. Id. at 2695.
14. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 429 U.S. 813 (1976).
15. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
16. Id. at 2709.
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Appellants' argument was based upon two contentions: (1) that the
state court ruling violated the Sherman Act 17 and (2) that the ruling
infringed upon rights protected by the first amendment. 8 The Court
first considered, but rejected, the appellants' arguments-based on the
Sherman Act-that they had a right to compete in the market place
without undue governmental interference. 9 In suimmarily dismissing
this argument,"0 the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that "[tihe
regulation of the State Bar . . . is an activity of the [state] acting as
sovereign, ' 21 and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.2 2 In sup-
port of its ruling the Court cited the case of Parker v. Brown,3 which
held that the State of California could regulate competition among the
state's raisin growers, as this regulation by the State, as sovereign, was
a restraint "which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.
' 24
In aligning itself with the Parker holding, the Court distinguished the
case before it from previous cases in which provisions of the Sherman
Act were determined to have been violated by the state.2 Those cases
17. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, §§ 1 & 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1976).
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2695, 2698.
19. Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act provide:
§ I Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any con-
tract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 17.
20. 97 S. Ct. at 2696-98. The Court was in fact unanimous in its ruling on this
aspect of the case, as all the dissenting opinions were directed at other issues. Id. at 2710
(Burger, C.J.); 2711-12 (Powell, Stewart, JJ.); 2719 (Rehnquist, J.).
21. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, ___. 555 P.2d 640, 643 (1976).
22. 97 S. Ct. at 2698.
23. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
24. Id. at 352.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2696.
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involved either outright "price fixing" by the state26 or instances where
the state had no "independent regulatory interest" in the matters af-
fected by state regulation; i.e., the measures taken had not been based
upon correcting "flaws in the competitive market," nor did they arise
out of concerns about public health or safety. 7
Turning to the only other argument of the appellants, the Court,
through the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun, ruled that the
attorneys' rights of free speech under the first amendment were pre-
eminent over the constraints imposed on them by the State Bar's Disci-
plinary Rule. 2 In so ruling, the Court analogized the present case to that
of another, Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,29
involving the right of a pharmacist to advertise the price of prescription
drugs. 3 The Court recalled that in Virginia Pharmacy it had ruled that
the first amendment guaranteed the pharmacist the right to advertise his
wares, even though the advertisement had not reported "any particu-
larly newsworthy fact" or commented upon "any cultural, philosophical
or political subject."' 31 Such speech was deemed to be commercial in
that its sole purpose was to attract business.32 The Court then cited a
list of its prior analogous decisions holding this type of speech to be
protected. 33 It continued that "such speech should not be withdrawn
26. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), involved a minimum fee
schedule for attorneys that was enforced by the State Bar.
27. 97 S. Ct. at 2697. The case involved is Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976), in which defendant, a private electric utility regulated by a state agency,
distributed light bulbs to its customers as part of its service. The Court held that the
mere fact that a state regulatory agency approved of such practice did not provide "a
sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for that
program." Id. at 592-93, 598.
28. 97 S. Ct. at 2698-709 (full discussion of first amendment claims).
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. 97 S. Ct. at 2698. The pharmacist had been accused of "unprofessional con-
duct" in violation of a Virginia statute. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Court struck down, on the basis of
the first amendment, the portion of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended in 1974, which imposed a ceiling on expenditures by political candidates); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Court held, inter alia, that an expression
did not lose constitutional protection, under the first amendment, because it appeared
in the form of a paid advertisement); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (Court
struck down a city ordinance which made a bookstore owner absolutely criminally liable
for possessing material which was judicially determined to be obscene; the statute was
held to violate the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment);
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from protection merely because it proposed a mundane commercial
transaction." 34
Aside from the right of the speaker to advertise for purely commer-
cial purposes, the Court also found a concurrent first amendment right
on the part of the public to be informed. 5 Just as with the pharmaceuti-
cal regulation statute contained in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court found
that the Arizona disciplinary rule "serves to inhibit the free flow of
commercial information and to keep the public in ignorance."3 By
upholding the right of the public to know, in addition to that of the
lawyer to inform, the Court effectively disarmed the Bar's argument
that the ban on lawyer advertising protected both the interests of the
public and the image of the legal profession. The Bar contended that
the public would lose respect for the legal profession, because if advertis-
ing were permitted the profession would appear over-commercialized."
The Court responded that the appellants were accomplishing the desire
of the American Bar Association that attorneys should discuss fee ar-
rangements with clients as a first order of business.38 The Court added
that since neither bankers nor engineers have suffered any discernible
loss of dignity as a result of price advertising,39 there seemed to be no
valid reason why the legal profession should suffer. Moreover, the Court
held that to "condemn the candid revelation of the same information"
by an attorney to a prospective client before he enters his office that he
would be ethically bound to give him afterwards is equally invalid. 0
Indeed, the Court expressed the view that the lack of information on
the part of the public as to legal fees may actually deter people from
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (ordinance was struck down which
required Jehovah's Witnesses to procure a city license before they could solicit people
to purchase religious books and pamphlets); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (statute struck down which required a prior determination by the secretary of
the public welfare council that people seeking to solicit support for their cause were truly
representing a religious cause).
34. 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2700.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
38. Id. The Court stated: "[T]he American Bar Association advises that an attor-
ney should reach 'a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to
be made,' and that this is to be done '[als soon as feasible after a lawyer has been
employed.' Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-19 (1976)."
39. 97 S. Ct. at 2701-2.
40. Id. at 2701.
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seeking legal assistance out of fear that an exhorbitant fee will be ex-
tracted from them.4'
As to the Bar's contention that the advertising of a fee is misleading
because fees are determined by the particular facts of each client's case,
the Court held that those services advertised by the appellants were all
routine matters and, therefore, subject to a set fee schedule which could
be honestly advertised prior to individual consultation with a client."
The Bar also argued that advertising would not advance the role of the
attorney as a diagnostician;" that it would leave potential customers
with a less than complete picture from which to choose a lawyer;44 and
that it would stir up fraudulent claims.45 The Court, however, thought
that the benefits of advertising outweighed whatever merit these argu-
ments contained. It concluded that permitting a limited type of advertis-
ing, such as that put out by Bates and O'Steen, would serve to "facilitate
the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making
legal services fully available."46 Ironically, the Court took these very
words directly from the American Bar Association's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.47
The Court also rejected the argument of the Bar that overhead
expenses will necessarily rise to cover the added costs of advertising,
resulting in higher legal fees for the consumer.48 Instead, the Court
opted for the counter-argument that a healthy competition for clients,
increased by advertising fees, will probably lower legal fees and provide
the public with the opportunity to compare advertised prices.49
Regarding a possible second consequence of the added costs of
advertising, the Court also disagreed with the argument that new attor-
neys would have an economically difficult time penetrating the estab-
41. Id. at 2702. The Court then referred to a footnote in a report which found
that middle-class consumers have overestimated lawyers' fees for drawing up a simple
will by 91%, for reading and advising on a two-page installment sales contract by 340%,
and for a thirty-minute consultation by 123%. Id. at n.22.
42. Id. at 2703. The Court noted that the Arizona Bar itself sponsored a Legal
Services Program in which participating attorneys performed services like those adver-
tised by Bates and O'Steen at standardized rates. Id.
43. Id. at 2704.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2704-5.
46. Id. at 2705.
47. EC 2-1 (1976).
48. 97 S. Ct. at 2705-6.
49. Id. at 2706.
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lished market. The Court said, in fact, that advertising would probably
serve to aid young lawyers who are seeking to make themselves known
in the market place."0
Finally, the Court considered and rejected arguments that the qual-
ity of legal services would decline51 and that enforcement difficulties
would increase if any relaxation of the present advertising ban were
allowed. 2 The Court stated that "[r]estraints on advertising. . . are an
ineffective way of deterring shoddy work." 53 The Court refuted the
Bar's argument that "an attorney who advertises a standard fee will cut
quality" by pointing out that the Bar itself had set standard fee sched-
ules in its own Legal Services Program.54 As to the enforcement prob-
lems, the Court indicated that it was confident most lawyers would
continue to conduct themselves honorably. 5 For those who did not, the
Court felt that the desire of the members of the legal profession, as a
whole, to preserve their good name would cause them to join together
in "weeding out those few who abuse their trust."58
Understandably, the Court sought to base its decision on the nar-
rowest possible ground and to preserve partially the State Bar's goal of
preventing the defrauding of the public and the concomitant degrada-
tion of the legal profession. It was, therefore, carefully pointed out in
the opinion that misstatements of fact, or deceptively-worded advertise-
50. Id. The Court compared the plight of a new attorney who would have to pay
some additional advertisement costs to that of an attorney who would have to rely on
the more traditional methods, such as contacts and social connections. It found that a
ban on advertising would serve "to perpetuate the market position of established attor-
neys. Consideration of [market place] entry-barrier problems would urge that advertis-
ing be allowed so as to aid the new competitor in penetrating the market." Id. The Court
did not consider, on the other hand, the potentially negative impact of advertising upon
those new attorneys who each year seek clerkships with established firms. Such posi-
tions, as a result of increased costs due to advertising, could become a luxury that law
firms can no longer so easily afford.
51. Id. The Bar argued that advertising would cause the offering of a legal
"package" at a set price, and that lawyers would "be inclined to provide, by indiscrimi-
nate use, the standard package regardless of whether it fits the client's needs." Id.
52. Id. The Bar claimed that a public which "lacks sophistication in legal matters
• . . may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers."
It feared that no regulatory agency would be able to shoulder the burden of monitoring
the advertised services and comparing them to those actually rendered. Id. at 2706-7.
53. Id. at 2706.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2707.
56. Id.
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ments, could in no way be sanctioned by the Court's ruling. 7 As the
Court concluded:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent
the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement con-
cerning the availability and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply
that the flow of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore
hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appellants to
be violative of the First Amendment.58
In separate dissenting opinions, both Mr. Chief Justice Burger and
Mr. Justice Powell5" agreed that the price of certain routine legal mat-
ters may safely be advertised without foreseeable detriment. Neverthe-
less, they found that the majority had failed to define adequately what
type of legal services could be considered routine. Specifically, the Chief
Justice took the majority to task for failing to acknowledge that an
uncontested divorce, which was one of the advertised items involved in
this case, could easily cost a great deal more than the $195 ($175 fee plus
$20 court cost) claimed by the attorneys-appellants in their newspaper
advertisement. 0 As the Chief Justice explained, the cost of a divorce
could vary drastically depending upon whether alimony, child support,
or a property settlement were involved.61 For this reason, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger found that the task of enforcing the ruling of the Court
permitting certain unspecified types of legal advertising is an impossible
one to perform." As a corrective measure, the Chief Justice would have
required qualifying statements in legal advertisements to the effect that
fees for such non-litigable matters could vary over a broad range, de-
pending upon individual circumstances, so as to "insure that the expec-
tations of clients are not unduly inflated."63
The dissent of Mr. Justice Powell echoed the Chief Justice's con-
cern that the parameters of legitimate legal advertising, based on rou-
tineness, were ambiguous and arbitrary. Mr. Justice Powell felt that if
lawyers were to be allowed to advertise their services and prices, "the
57. Id. at 2709.
58. Id.
59. The latter was joined in his opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2710.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2711.
63. Id.
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public interest [would] require the most particularized regulation."" He
hinted at the danger that attorneys would view the decision as conferring
a license to wage a potentially deceiving campaign for clients. He envi-
sioned that the majority's opinion would result in lawyers using such
adjectives as "fair," "moderate," "low-cost," or "lowest in town." He
also feared that the Court's failure to pronounce more definitive guide-
lines would unduly inhibit states from carrying out their proper function
of regulating legal advertising.65
Nor did Mr. Justice Powell agree with the Court's primary assump-
tion that the Arizona disciplinary rule and rules similar to it from other
states are inconsistent with first amendment guarantees. He distin-
guished away the Court's finding in Virginia Pharmacy, as did the Chief
Justice, that the ban on advertising of a pharmaceutical product is
unconstitutional.66 The distinction between pharmaceutical products
and legal services is significant to Mr. Justice Powell for two reasons:
first, there is a greater risk of deception in the selling of a service; and,
second, there is a much greater difficulty in monitoring and regulating
the sale of a service which is required by the public interest. 7
The proposition that there is no constitutional right to advertise a
legal service was picked up by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in his separate
dissent, in which he described the free-speech provision of the first
amendment as "a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or
intellectual interest."68 Not even the advertisement of goods should be
included in its protection, let alone that of services, according to Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, for to invoke the first amendment on those grounds
is to demean its very importance.69 He considered the majority opinion
in the instant case, following Virginia Pharmacy by only a year, as a
further step down a "slippery slope," which he viewed as threatening
dire consequences for the sanctity of the first amendment itself.7°
64. Id. at 2718.
65. Id. at 2715. Mr. Justice Powell wrote: "The Court seriously understates the
difficulties, and overestimates the capabilities of the Bar-or indeed of any agency
public or private-to assure with a reasonable degree of effectiveness that price advertis-
ing can at the same time be both unrestrained and truthful." Id. at 2715 (emphasis
added).
66. Id. at 2712-13.
67. Id. at 2713.
68. Id. at 2719.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2719-20.
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This is, of course, in direct opposition to the majority view that
Virginia Pharmacy is controlling. Although a distinction can be made
on the grounds that Virginia Pharmacy involved the sale of goods and
the instant case the sale of services, the Court held the distinction to be
superficial, in view of the fact that the services in question were routine
and readily identifiable.7' The Court, taking the stance that routine legal
services can be freely advertised in the market place, apparently per-
ceives that they can be judged and evaluated by the consuming public
as easily as can a tangible product, with the result that inaccurate or
misleading statements will be discovered and dealt with accordingly. 2
In an effort to carry out the subtle mandate of the Court,7 3 the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association has adopted a
recommendation74 to allow radio and print advertising of twenty-five
enumerated facts75 which pertain to an attorney's professional back-
71. Id. at 2703.
72. Id. at 2699. The Court reviewed its opinion in Virginia Pharmacy, where it
had closely examined the question as to whether a state necessarily furthers its goal of
maintaining high professional standards by prohibiting advertising. It found a
potent alternative to this "highly paternalistic" approach: "That alternative is to
assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means
to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them."
Id., quoting from Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
73. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
74. The recommendation, proposed by ABA President-Elect S. Shepard Tate's
ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, was adopted at the 1977 Annual Meeting of
the House of Delegates in Chicago. 63 A.B.A. J. 1410 (Oct. 1977).
75. 46 U.S.L.W. 5 (Aug. 23, 1977). Those facts which may be advertised in a
"dignified manner" under DR 2-101 are (Proposal A):
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional asso-
ciates; addresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a
statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement that
the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the extent
authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching position;
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ground and current legal practices. The ABA points out that it is impro-
per for an attorney to imply through advertising that "the ingenuity or
prior record of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer partici-
pates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request for a written schedule of fees and/or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR2-106(C) provided that the state-
ment discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of
costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that
the specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon
the particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without
obligation to an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print
size equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee
charged will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without
obligation an estimate of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equiva-
lent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services,' the description of which would
not be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that
the quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate
of the fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print
used in setting forth the fee information:
1. The agency having jurisdiction under state law may desire to issue
appropriate guidelines defining "specific legal services."
Id.
John H. Shenefield, assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division in the
Department of Justice, however, has called these recommendations "narrow changes"
which "fail to meet the needs of the public and the dictates of the Supreme Court." He
has described the Bar's response to Bates as one of "fatuous debate, endless word games,
and glacial change." 63 A.B.A. J. 1703 (Dec. 1977).
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principal factors likely to determine the result. 76 Nor may the attorney
advertise as a specialist in fields other than admiralty, trademark, and
patent law where, the ABA contends, "holding out as a specialist histor-
ically has been permitted. 77
Although permitting radio broadcasts after a thorough screening
by the attorney, the ABA does not intend to make any change in its
Code of Professional Responsibility's ban against television advertis-
ing.78 Of course the Bar is under no obligation to make any such change,
as the Court's ruling considered only newspaper advertising. This is
further evidence that the ABA will revise its Code only to the extent
absolutely necessary to comply with the Court's ruling.
Despite these attempts to establish guidelines, it remains to be seen
whether the Court is correct in its assumption that so-called routine
legal services can be advertised at a particular price without misleading
the public and without further eroding public confidence in the legal
profession. If the minority is correct, and there is no effective way to
regulate the advertisement of legal fee requirements, due to the myriad
of unforeseeable factors involved in every legal transaction, then a dam-
aging blow will have been dealt to the profession at a time when it has
already suffered a marked decline in public approbation. On the other
hand, if the practitioners in the profession accept their new-found liberty
responsibly, it is entirely possible that the legal community will be
greatly benefited. This will result not only in increased public esteem for
lawyers, but-more important-in greater opportunities to provide
better and more diversified legal services to the American public.
Gary E. Guy
76. 46 U.S.L.W. 4 (Aug. 23, 1977).
77. Id. at 5. See also DR 2-105, 46 U.S.L.W. at 7.
78. 46 U.S.L.W. 2 (Aug. 23, 1977). The stated reason for this ABA policy is that
"[tihe problems of advertising on television require special consideration, due to the
style, cost, and transitory nature of such media." Id. at 3. However, the new code
provisions go on to state that "[i l f the interests of laypersons in receiving relevant lawyer
advertising are not adequately secured by print media and radio advertising, and if
adequate safeguards to protect the public can reasonably be formulated, television
advertising may serve a public interest." Id.
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Constitutional Law: Expectation of Privacy
Invokes Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause
Protection for Search of Sealed Footlocker:
United States v. Chadwick
On May 8, 1973, Amtrack officials in San Diego observed Gregory
Machado and Bridget Leary loading a brown footlocker onto a Boston-
bound train. The trunk was unusually heavy and leaking talcum powder,
a substance often used to disguise the odors of marihuana and hashish.
Their suspicions aroused,' the railroad officials reported the circum-
stances to federal authorities who in turn relayed the information to
their counterparts in Boston.2 Two days later, when the train reached
Boston, federal narcotics agents were waiting at the station. While they
had not obtained arrest or search warrants, they had with them a police
dog trained to detect marihuana.3 The agents released the dog near the
footlocker and, without alerting Machado and Leary, the dog signaled
the presence of a controlled substance inside. Joseph Chadwick then
joined Machado and Leary and they moved the footlocker into the
1. United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2479 (1977). Machado matched a
profile used by the Amtrack officials to spot drug traffickers. Profiles are used exten-
sively in connection with airport searches and are especially used for the detection of
potential hijackers. See generally United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972);
Note, The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search-or Seizure, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 1261 (1973).
2. Agents also sent detailed personal descriptions of the two suspects and the
footlocker. 97 S. Ct. at 2479.
3. Id. The courts are unsure as to whether the use of a canine's olfactory sense
constitutes a search. In United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), a canine
was used to detect marihuana in defendant's suitcase at an airline terminal. The Second
Circuit held that the canine's "sniffing, nipping and biting at the defendant's luggage"
did not constitute a search. Id. at 461. A California case, United States v. Solis, 393 F.
Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976), originally held the use
of a canine to be a search, but was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. The cases purport to
speak to the reasonableness of the defendants' expectations of privacy, i.e., whether the
defendants had taken steps to protect their privacy, and also the degree of intrusion
involved by the use of the canine. See generally Comment, 42 Mo. L. REV. 331 (1977);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 973 (1976).
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trunk of Chadwick's waiting automobile. While the trunk of the car was
still open and before the car engine had been started, the officers ar-
rested all three.'
Chadwick, Machado, and Leary, together with the footlocker and
car, were taken to the federal building. One and one-half hours after the
arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and found in it a large quantity
of marihuana. The three suspects were subsequently charged in a two-
count indictment with possessing marihuana with intent to distribute, 5
and with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute.6 Prior to their
trial, the defendants moved to suppress evidence of marihuana seized
from the footlocker.7 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court
ruled in the defendants' favor. 8 It later reaffirmed and amplified its
ruling after hearing the Government's motion for reconsideration.'
4. 97 S. Ct. at 2479. The dissent noted that "[pirobable cause for the arrest was
present from the time. . . the agents' dog signalled the presence of marihuana." Id. at
2489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 2480. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(1970) provides: "Except as authorized...
it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance."
6. 97 S. Ct. at 2480. 21 U.S.C. § 846(1970) provides: "Any person who attempts
or conspires to commit any offense. . . is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both
which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commis-
sion of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
7. 97 S. Ct. at 2480. Marihuana was also found in suitcases carried by the re-
spondents. Id. at n. 1. The federal authorities sought to justify the search of the locked
suitcases as "inventory searches" according to established DEA procedure. United
States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1976). The court of appeals sup-
pressed the evidence, finding no justification for the warrantless suitcase search. Id. The
petition for certiorari was framed only on the question of the footlocker search, i.e.,
whether a search warrant was required before federal agents could open a lawfully
seized footlocker when there was probable cause to believe that the footlocker con-
tained contraband. Therefore, the Court did not discuss the legality of Chadwick's
arrest or the search of the suitcases. 97 S. Ct. at 2480 n. 1.
8. United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1975), noting that
"[wiarrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few carefully delineated
and limited exceptions." Id. at 771. The court rejected the automobile exception analogy
as well as the exception applicable to a search incident to an arrest, saying that the
footlocker was not part of the area from which the respondents might gain possession
of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 771-75.
9. Id. at 773. "The Government's original opposition to defendant's motion to
suppress the fruits of the footlocker search was based exclusively on the automobile
exception to the search warrant requirement. (See [Id. at] 767-68). The Government
now asserts that [the] search should be justified as one incident to arrest." Id. at 774.
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A divided First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression
of the seized marihuana.'" While the court agreed that the agents had
probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained a controlled
substance, it held that probable cause alone was insufficient to sustain
a warrantless search." On the premise that warrantless searches are per
se unreasonable unless they fall within some established exception to the
warrant requirement, the court of appeals agreed with the district court
that the footlocker search was justified neither as an automobile search
nor as a search incident to a lawful arrest.' 2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD: (1) the
warrant clause does not protect only dwellings and other specifically
designated locales; (2) by placing personal effects inside a footlocker,
the defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would re-
main private; (3) the footlocker's mobility did not justify the application
of the warrant exception which applies in cases involving automobiles;
and (4) a warrantless search of luggage or other property confiscated
at the time of arrest cannot be based on the exception which applies to
a search incident to an arrest if the search is remote in time or place
from the arrest or if no exigency exists. 13
There is no constitutional rule under the fourth amendment 4 more
basic than that which makes a warrantless search unreasonable except
in a few "jealously and carefully drawn" unique circumstances.'" The
first clause of the fourth amendment requires that all searches and
seizures-even without a warrant-be reasonable. Reasonableness
The district court, in a supplemental opinion, disagreed with this latest contention and
reaffirmed its opinion of Jan. 13, 1975, denying the motion to vacate. Id. at 778.
10. United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976).
11. Id. at 778-82.
12. Id. at 782. The court of appeals conceded that personalty shared some charac-
teristics of mobility which support warrantless automobile searches, but felt that a rule
permitting a search of personalty on probable cause alone had not "received sufficient
recognition by the Supreme Court outside the automobile area. . . for us to recognize
it as a valid exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement." Id. at 781.
13. 97 S. Ct. 2476.
14. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring),
quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). See Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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implies a weighing of the interests presented in each case. 6 The fourth
amendment's second clause provides for the issuance of warrants only
upon probable cause. 17 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that a law enforcement officer's own determination of probable cause
to search a private place for contraband or evidence of a crime should
excuse his failure to procure a warrant beforehand.' 8 Mr. Justice
Jackson explained this principle in Johnson v. United States:
Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disin-
terested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers
in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a
nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers. . . . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of a search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or a government agent. 9
While a warrant from a "neutral and detached" magistrate is pre-
ferred,"0 there are a few well-recognized exceptions permitting warrant-
less intrusions where circumstances make it impossible or impractical
to obtain a warrant.' The Chadwick decision discusses several of these
exceptions to the warrant requirement, but, more important, it generally
traces the extensive history of search and seizure. The majority opinion
can be readily divided into three areas: (1) the reasonable expectation
of privacy; (2) the automobile exception; and (3) the search incident to
an arrest analogy. The latter two areas are also directed to issues of
privacy.
The Court first turned its attention to the question of whether the
16. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
17. The Court has not attempted a definition of probable cause more precise than
the one in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925), where the standard was
defined as "facts and circumstances . . . such as to warrant a man of [reasonable]
prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed."
18. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 450; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967).
19. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
20. Id.
21. The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are (1) hot pursuit,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (2) plain view doctrine, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); (3) stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
(4) automobile search, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (5) consent,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); and (6) search incident to lawful
arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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warrantless search of the footlocker was reasonable. The Government
contended that the fourth amendment "protects only [those] interests
traditionally identified with the home," and in this context, "the deter-
mination [of] whether a search or seizure is reasonable should turn on
whether a warrant has been obtained." 2 According to this argument,
the Government asserted that seizures of personal effects outside the
home, based on probable cause but without a warrant, are not
"unreasonable." 3 The Court disputed the Government's claim by not-
ing language in Katz v. United States:u "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."' Stating that the warrant clause does not
protect only dwellings and other specifically designated locales, the
Court wrote:
[TIhe Warrant Clause does not in terms distinguish between searches
conducted in private homes and other searches. There is also a strong
historical connection between the Warrant Clause and the initial clause
of the Fourth Amendment which draws no distinctions among "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" in guarding against unreasonable searches
and seizures.6
22. 97 S. Ct. at 2481.
23. Id.
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The landmark case of Katz established the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test to determine whether a particular intrusion comes within the
fourth amendment. In Katz, the petitioner was convicted of transmitting wagering
information by telephone across state lines. The conversations were overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the telephone
booth from which the calls were made. The Court held that the Government's activities
violated the petitioner's privacy and thus constituted a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 350-53. However, Katz stated that the fourth
amendment could not be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy. While
people, not places, are protected under the fourth amendment, "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth
amendment protection." Id. at 351. "But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2481. The Chadwick Court accentuated the fact that the fourth
amendment protects people from unreasonable governmental intrusions into their legiti-
mate expectations of privacy and that the warrant clause contributes to that protection.
Id. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974), citing Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 498 (1958). No concise definition of "expectation of privacy" was offered,
nor has the Court concretely defined it in the past. Long ago, the Court in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), did say that "constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed."
26. 97 S. Ct. at 2482.
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Analysis of past decisions involving search and seizure situations
reveals that "[tlhe ultimate standard set forth is reasonableness. 2 7 And
in examining the fourth amendment, the Court has considered whether
a search and seizure is reasonable under the circumstances.2 In Camara
v. Municipal Court it stated: "[T]here can be no ready test for determin-
ing reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails. 129 Further, "[t]he test of reason-
ableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on
its own facts.""° Justice Frankfurther wrote in his vigorous dissent in
United States v. Rabinowitz:
To tear "unreasonable" from the content and history and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment . . . is to disregard the reason to which reference
must be made when a question arises under the Fourth Amendment ...
The test by which searches and seizures must be judged is whether con-
duct is consonant with the aim of the Fourth Amendment. The main aim
• . . is against invasion of the right of privacy to one's effects and papers
without regard to the result of such invasion.3
The Court in Cady v. Dombrowski said:
In construing this command [for reasonableness], there has been general
agreement that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases a
search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. '3 2
27. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). See Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 528-29.
28. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967).
29. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37. In Camara, the appellant was charged with violating
the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing, after efforts to secure his consent, to
allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which were used for residen-
tial purposes. The Court held that warrantless administrative searches cannot be justi-
fied on the grounds that they make demands on occupants; that warrants in such cases
are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function under reasonable
search warrant requirements. The Court wrote: "The warrant procedure is designed to
guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable public
interest. . . . [R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard. . . . It [the warrant]
merely gives full recognition to the competing government and private interests . . .
and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy." Id. at 539.
30. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 509-10 (Black, J., concurring, and
dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439, quoting language from Camara v.
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In this context, the Chadwick Court looked to the role of the
judicial warrant and the safeguards that a neutral magistrate pro-
vides.3 The Court has always emphasized the preference for a warrant
issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate." It wrote in McDonald
v. United States:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police. . . . The right of privacy was deemed to be too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and arrest
of criminals. . ..
In Chadwick, the Court stressed that the judicial warrant protec-
tions are effective whether applied in or out of the home .3 As such,
judicial warrants have been required for searches in areas other than the
home.37 These instances "reflect the settled constitutional principle
. . . that a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safe-
guard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate
privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four
walls of the home."' '
In recognizing that a citizen's privacy interests extend beyond the
home, the Court pointed out that by placing their personal property
inside a double-locked footlocker, the defendants had "manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from public examina-
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
at 454-55.
33. 97 S. Ct. at 2482.
34. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
35. 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
36. 97 S. Ct. at 2482. The Court has considered warrantless searches in a variety
of settings, further emphasizing that the fourth amendment is not limited to dwellings.
See, e.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (first class mail search);
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (package search).
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2483. The Court cited Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(electronic interception of conversation in a public telephone booth); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (automobile on private premises); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964) (automobile in custody); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (hotel room); Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (office).
38. 97 S. Ct. at 2483. See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), where
Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."
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tion."39 The Court wrote: "No less than one who locks the doors of his
home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in
this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause."4 Since the Government could find no exigency calling for an
immediate search, the Court felt "it was unreasonable for the Govern-
ment to conduct [the] search without the safeguards a judicial warrant
provides."'"
While examining the warrantless search of the footlocker, the
Court also looked at the issue of whether the warrantless search fit
within one of the exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a war-
rant.4" The Court has held on numerous occasions that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."43 The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn,""
requiring "a showing by those who seek exemption. . . that the exigen-
cies of the situation made that course imperative. '45
In Chadwick the Government sought to justify the warrantless
search of the footlocker under the so-called automobile exception46 and
alternatively as a search incident to arrest.47 It argued that since the
39. 97 S. Ct. at 2483.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A search without a warrant can be justified if it meets the criteria of some
exception to the warrant requirement: (1) hot pursuit or exigent circumstances; (2) plain
view; (3) stop and frisk; (4) automobile search; (5) consent; and (6) search incident to
lawful arrest. See note 21, supra.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, quoted in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29; United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
44. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
45. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2483-84. The lower courts noted that there was no nexus between
the search and the automobile, merely a coincidence. Both courts emphasized that the
search was of a footlocker, not an automobile; and the search itself did not take place
in the automobile. 393 F. Supp. at 772; 532 F.2d at 778. After finding no exigency that
would justify the search based on the automobile exception requirement, the district
court wrote: "To rule otherwise would be to establish a per se rule permitting a warrant-
less search any time an automobile was even remotely involved in an arrest." 393 F.
Supp. at 773.
47. 97 S. Ct. at 2485. In dealing with the Government's argument that the foot-
locker could be searched as incident to arrest, both lower courts found that the 200-
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vehicle itself could have been searched without a warrant, so could the
footlocker, as it was "analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes."4 The Government drew this analogy by arguing to the
Court that both automobiles and footlockers are mobile "effects." 49 The
Government's other argument was that since "the footlocker was seized
contemporaneously with the defendants' arrests and searched shortly
thereafter, such a search should be viewed as falling within the exception
of a search incident to arrest."9 0
In examining the Government's two contentions, the Court first
focused on the automobile exception analogy. The history of the auto-
mobile exception" cases is intricate and extensive. Beginning with
Carroll" and the exigent circumstances of mobility, 3 the Court has
pound footlocker could not be encompassed in the phrase "area within his immediate
control." The courts pointed out that (1) the footlocker was not hand-carried luggage
and (2) at the time of arrest the defendants had been handcuffed and surrounded by law
enforcement officials. 393 F. Supp. at 775; 532 F.2d at 780.
48. 97 S. Ct. at 2484.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2485.
51. The automobile exception is one of the six exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures ofAutomobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV.
835 (1974).
52. The "automobile exception" was specifically established in 1925 in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In this case, George Carroll and John Kiro were
stopped by federal prohibition agents on a road between Detroit and Grand Rapids,
having been suspected of carrying contraband liquor. They had been seen traveling the
same road before, and two of the agents had previously tried to buy liquor from the
two suspects. Having stopped the car, the agents searched it and found bottles of gin
and whiskey stashed inside the seats. The Court held that the "facts and circumstances
within [the agents'] knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy informa-
tion were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and
searched." Id. at 162.
53. In Carroll, the moving car on an open highway created exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search and seizure. Id. at 153. The "automobile exception" has
since been well-delineated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) and Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.443. Coolidge, citing Chambers, mentioned the established
Carroll doctrine: exigent circumstances justify the warrantless search of an automobile
stopped on the highway, where there is probable cause, because the car is "movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant
must be obtained." The Court emphasized that the "opportunity to search is fleeting."
Id. at 460.
In Chambers, the Court seemed to expand Carroll by implying that potential
mobility of the car was sufficient to create exigent circumstances. The petitioner was
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continued to expand the area of automobile search and seizure in the
recent cases involving state forfeiture statutes54 and automobile inven-
tory situations.55
arrested after the auto in which he was riding was stopped by the police shortly after
the robbery of a service station. The car was driven to the police station and was later
searched. The Court validated the search, saying that exigent circumstances existed
because the car was readily movable. 399 U.S. at 51. Mr. Justice White claimed that
"[tihe probable cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility
of the car .. " Id. at 52.
In Coolidge, which also established the doctrine of plain view and the requirement
of inadvertent discovery, the decision asserted that there had to be some real possibility
of the car's being moved in order for Carroll to apply. The Court wrote: "The word
'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears." 403 U.S. at 461-62. In Coolidge, the petitioner was being held in jail
on a first-degree murder charge and his car, suspected of being an instrumentality of
the crime, was parked in the driveway of his home. The Court felt that no amount of
probable cause could justify a warrantless search or seizure in the absence of exigent
circumstances. Since the petitioner had no access to his car and the police had ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant, the seizure was held unconstitutional, as was the search
of the car at the station house. Id. at 472-73. In this case, contraband, stolen goods, or
objects dangerous in themselves were not involved.
54. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court held legitimate a
search conducted long after any exigency had passed on the basis that the police had a
possessory interest in the vehicle under a state forfeiture statute. The defendant was
arrested for violation of narcotics laws, and his automobile was seized by police officers
pursuant to a California statute authorizing any state officer making an arrest for a
narcotics violation to seize and deliver to the State Division of Narcotic Enforcement
any vehicle used to store, conceal, transport, or facilitate the possession of narcotics.
The vehicle was then to be held as evidence until a forfeiture had been declared or a
release ordered. The Court held that in the particular circumstances involved, the police
did not violate the fourth amendment by conducting a search of a car which they validly
held for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 61-62.
55. In an inventory search, the contents of the car are thoroughly cataloged and
criminal evidence is seized, if discovered, without a warrant. The police seek to justify
their intrusion as based on a benign purpose, i.e., the protection of public safety, protec-
tion of the driver's property, or the protection of the police from danger against theft.
See Lawfulness of "Inventory Search" of Motor Vehicle Impounded by Police, 48
A.L.R. 3d 537 (1973); and Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Automobile: A Willing
Suspension of Disbelief, 5 U. OF BALT. L. REv. 203 (1976).
The Court held in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, that warrantless searches
are permissible to "discharge community caretaking functions" and found the search
of the car justified by reason of concern for the safety of the general public. Id. at 447-
48.
In this case, the police arrested an off-duty policeman for drunken driving, after a
late-night accident. The vehicle was towed to a private garage at the police's direction,
and the trunk was searched pursuant to standard procedures of that police department.
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Throughout the automobile exception cases, the Court has drawn
a distinction between automobiles, homes, and offices. Although auto-
mobiles are "effects" and thus within the reach of the fourth amend-
ment,51 warrantless examinations have been upheld in circumstances
where a search of a home or office would not be. 7 The reason for this
While no probable cause existed to indicate that the vehicle contained fruits of a crime,
the protective search was instituted because the local police were under the impression
that the incapacitated Chicago police officer was required to carry his service revolver
at all times; the police had reasonable ground to believe a weapon might be in the car
and thus susceptible to vandals. In the process of the search, the police uncovered blood-
stained objects which led to Dombrowski's conviction for murder.
The Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), divided 5-4 on the
issue of whether an inventory of a car towed in for multiple parking violations was a
search. The opinion indicated that even if the inventory was a search, it was reasonable.
Id. at 376. The Court's determination of the reasonableness of the search was predicated
on the assumption that inventories were standard procedure in the police community.
Id.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell indicated that "routine inventories of
automobiles intrude upon an area in which the private citizen has a 'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy'; thus despite their benign purpose when conducted by government
officials they constitute 'searches' for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
377 n. I.
In Opperman, the Court upheld the warrantless seizure of an item from an un-
locked glove compartment. The search occurred while the police were inventorying the
personal items in an automobile which they had impounded because it was illegally
parked. The inventory was prompted by the presence of a number of valuables inside
the car which were in plain view. The Court addressed itself only to the inventory of
the unlocked glove compartment and did not deal with the question of inventorying
locked or closed containers found in the vehicle. (This unsettled question came back to
haunt the Court in the Chadwick decision. Mr. Justice Brennan briefly discusses it in
the concurring opinion, 97 S. Ct. at 2486 n.1.) However, the reasoning applied by the
majority and Mr. Justice Powell would permit inventories of locked or closed containers
for security purposes if the vehicle was to be impounded for a significant period of time.
56. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439.
57. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (plurality opinion). See Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439-40; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 48. In Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court read Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964), as dealing primarily with a search incident to arrest and cited that case for the
proposition that the mobility of a car may make the search of a car without a warrant
reasonable "although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store,
or other fixed piece of property." 386 U.S. at 59.
In Cardwell, law enforcement officers interviewed the respondent in connection
with a murder and viewed his automobile, which was thought to have been used in the
commission of a crime. Several months later he was questioned again at the office of
investigating authorities. At this time, he had parked his car at a nearby public commer-
cial parking lot. After his arrest his car was impounded and later examined.
169 112:1978
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distinction is two-fold. First, the inherent mobility of automobiles cre-
ates exigent circumstances which, as a practical necessity, make strict
adherence to the warrant requirement impossible.58 The Court has also
sustained warrantless searches where no immediate danger existed that
the car would be removed from the jurisdiction.59 Besides the exigency
of mobility, other reasons exist to justify the application of less rigorous
warrant requirements to automobile searches. For one thing, the expec-
tation of privacy in a car is significantly less than in one's home or
office.6" Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to governmental reg-
ulations such as licensing and inspections." In the interest of public
safety and as part of what the Court has called "community care-taking
functions," automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. 2 Po-
lice will also remove and impound automobiles which violate parking
ordinances, thereby jeopardizing both public safety and the efficient
movement of traffic.63 The expectation of privacy is further diminished
by the public nature of automobile travel. 4 The Court noted in Cardwell
The warrantless search revealed that tire-prints taken from the scene of the crime
and paint samples from the victim's car matched those found on respondent's car. While
there was only a remote possibility of anyone's destroying the evidence or moving the
car, the Court reasoned that the automobile was located in a "public place where access
was not meaningfully restricted." 417 U.S. at 593, following Chambers but distinguish-
ing Coolidge. Citing from Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court said that
the primary object of the fourth amendment is the protection of privacy, but the search
in this case, made on the basis of probable cause, infringed no expectation of privacy.
417 U.S. at 591-92.
58. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54; Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. at 459-60.
59. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441-42. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 48; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58; and Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975)
(auto exception case reasoned on the rationale of Chambers).
60. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 590-91.
61. "In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that a warrant was required to effect an
unconsented administrative entry and inspection of private dwellings or commercial
premises to ascertain health or safety conditions. In contrast, this procedure has never
been held applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes." South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367-68 n.2.
62. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441.
63. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. See Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968) (inventory situation), where the Court held that an intrusion was
justifiable since it was "taken to protect the car while it was in police custody." Id. at
236.
64. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 591.
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v. Lewis:6 "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldoms serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects. . . .It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." 6"
In the present case, the Court would not analogize luggage to
motor vehicles, even though both automobiles and the footlocker could
be termed "effects" under the fourth amendment." In stating that a
"person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially
greater than in an automobile,"" the Court distinguished between the
diminished expectations of privacy in an automobile and the fact that
luggage contents are not generally open to public view (except as a
condition to border entry); nor is luggage required to be regularly in-
spected; and finally, luggage (unlike a car) is intended as a "repository
of personal effects."69
The Court also rejected the argument that by "analogy to the
automobile exception" the footlocker's mobility justified dispensing
with the need for a search warrant. 70 While the Court noted that the size
65. 417 U.S. 583.
66. 97 S. Ct. at 2484.
67. Id. The Court would not broaden the moving vehicle exception to include
other mobile chattels. It noted that automobiles are typically subject to wide regulation
but that locked trunks are not.
68. 97 S. Ct. at 2484. In its reasoning, the Court cited to many "automobile
exception" cases which illustrate the various factors and situations wherein the expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles is diminished. However, the Court did not specifically
analyze any particular case in relation to the situation presented in Chadwick.
69. "[The defendants'] principal privacy interest in the footlocker was of course
not in the container itself, which was exposed to public view, but in its contents." Id. at
2485 n.8.
70. Id. at 2484. The First Circuit Court of Appeals examined the mobility of
luggage and wrote: "Admittedly baggage or goods in transit present some of the same
characteristics as automobiles." United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d at 781. The court
of appeals noted that other circuits had liberalized luggage search rules, drawing heavily
on the rationale underlying the automobile search exception in Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42. Those courts would allow the warrantless search of luggage for contraband
upon the individual officer's determination of probable cause. (The Chambers automo-
bile search exception itself is of a somewhat broader character than other exceptions; it
does not, for example, require an accompanying arriest.)
However, the First Circuit argued that Carroll and its progeny had not mentioned
baggage as being comparable to vehicles and further noted that exceptions to the war-
rant rule are "specially established" and "well-delineated." 532 F.2d at 781.
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and inherent mobility of a vehicle make it susceptible to theft or intru-
sion by vandals,7 it wrote in Chadwick:
[OInce the federal agents had seized it [the footlocker] at the railroad
station and had safely transferred it to the Boston federal building under
their exclusive control there was not the slightest danger that the foot-
locker or its contents could have been removed before a valid search
warrant could be obtained. . . . With the footlocker safely immobilized,
it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of
a search without a warrant."
Secondly, the Court examined whether the footlocker search in
Chadwick could be viewed as being a search incident to arrest. A search
incident to a custodial arrest has long been recognized as an exception
to the warrant requirement.73 Chimel v. California,74 overruling the
earlier decisions of Harris v. United States75 and United States v.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2484 n.7.
72. Id. at 2484-85. See also n.8, distinguishing Chadwick from Chambers.
73. Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems to have
been first articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392 (1914). Weeks made no reference to any right to search the place where
the arrest occurs, but was limited to a right to search the person.
In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), citing to dicta in Carroll and
Weeks, the Court wrote:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons
lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to
effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted.
Id. at 30. See also the cases following Agnello involving search incident to arrest:
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
74. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the petitioner was arrested at his home for
the burglary of a coin shop. While the police had a valid arrest warrant, no search
warrant had been issued. The officers looked through the three-bedroom house, direct-
ing Chimel's wife to open drawers in the master bedroom and sewing room. After they
completed the search they seized numerous items-primarily coins, but also medals,
tokens, and other objects. The Court held that the scope of the search was unreasonable
under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, as it "went far beyond petitioner's person
and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him." Id. at 768. Chimel pointed out that
what is "reasonable" in a particular situation "must be viewed in the light of established
fourth amendment principles." Id. at 765.
75. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Harris was arrested in his apartment, having allegedly
been involved with the cashing and interstate transportation of a forged check. The
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Rabinowitz,76 held that an arresting officer may search the arrested
person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that
phrase to mean the area from which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. 71
In Chimel the majority sought to establish guidelines for a search
incident to an arrest. In doing so the Court used two previous decisions,
Terry v. Ohio"5 and a companion case, Sibron v. New York, 7 conclud-
officers, in an attempt to recover two cancelled checks thought to have been used in
effecting the forgery, undertook a thorough search of the apartment. In the course of
the search, the officers found altered Selective Service documents, and Harris was later
convicted for violating the Selective Service Act of 1940. The Court rejected Harris's
fourth amendment claim, sustaining the search as "incident to arrest." Id. at 150-51.
76. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). This case introduced the "broad scope" search incident
phase which replaced the "narrow scope" phase of Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948). The theory formerly espoused by the Court held that a search warrant must
always be obtained, unless it was impractical to do so. Trupiano set forth the "necessity"
rationale.
Rabinowitz was arrested at his office by federal authorities who had been informed
that the defendant was dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints. At the time of the
arrest the officers searched the desk, file cabinets, and safe in the office, seizing a large
number of stamps with forged overprints. The Court held that the search in its entirety
fell within the principle giving law enforcement authorities "[tihe right to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime. . . " 339 U.S. at 61 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). According to the lan-
guage of Rabinowitz, the ultimate fourth amendment test "is not whether it is reasona-
ble to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id. at 66.
Chimel defined Rabinowitz as standing for the proposition that "a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in
the possession or under the control of the person arrested." 395 U.S. at 760.
77. Id. at 762-63. The Court applied the basic rule that the "search incident to
arrest" is an exception to the warrant requirement and that its scope must be strictly
confined in terms of the "justifying" exigent circumstances. The exigency in question
arises from the dangers of harm to the arresting officer and of destruction of evidence
within the reach of the arrestee.
78. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court upheld a protective "stop and search"
of the petitioner where it was limited to a pat-down of the defendant's outer clothing.
Id. at 29-30. Terry dealt with a permissible "frisk" incident to an investigative stop
based on less than probable cause to arrest. A police officer stopped Terry and his
companions because they had been behaving "suspiciously." The officer questioned the
men and, believing them to be carrying weapons, engaged in a pat-down of their outer
garments. The Court held that the search is reasonable if the officer concludes that the
person may be armed and dangerous and that preventive action is necessary to protect
himself and others. Under these conditions, the officer is entitled to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing for weapons. Such a search is constitutionally
privileged, even though the officer does not have probable cause to effect a search.
12:1978
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ing that a search incident to a custodial arrest must be related to the
purpose for which the arrest was effected.8"
The Chimel opinion also addressed itself to the issue of contempo-
raneity,81 meaning the search should occur at the time and place of the
arrest. The Court had previously discussed the contemporaneous re-
quirement in Preston v. United States,2 where a parked car in which
the defendants were arrested was later towed to the police garage and
subsequently searched. There the Court noted that the justifications for
a seizure in accordance with a search incident to an arrest are "absent
where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest."' '
Several years after Chimel, the trend became somewhat different.
As evidenced by the recent case of United States v. Robinson" and its
companion 'case, Gustafson v. Florida," the Burger Court seems to have
retreated from Chimel. In the Gustafson and Robinson cases, illegal
drugs were seized during a full search of the defendants following an
arrest for a traffic violation.86 These two cases seemed to reduce the
79. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Sibron, the Court invalidated a seizure of heroin
resulting from a police officer's going beyond an exterior pat-down and thrusting his
hand into defendant's pocket when the officer had no probable cause to arrest and no
reason to believe defendant was armed and dangerous. Id. at 63-65.
80. The Chimel Court wrote: "Only last term in Terry v. Ohio. . .we empha-
sized that 'the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure' . . . and that '[tihe scope of [a]
search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible."' 395 U.S. at 762.
81. 395 U.S. at 764.
82. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
83. Id. at 367. In the same term as Preston, the Court noted in Stoner v. Califor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483, reh. denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964), that "a search can be incident to
an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous* with the arrest and is confined to
the immediate vicinity of the arrest." 376 U.S. at 486.
84. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
85. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
86. In Robinson, a police officer, having probable cause to arrest the respondent
for driving while his license was revoked (as a result of his having previously checked
respondent's operator permit, made a full custodial arrest). In the pat-down search of
defendant's body, the officer found a crumpled cigarette package containing heroin in
his coat pocket.
In Gustafson, the defendant, driving a car with out-of-state license tags, was ob-
served by a policeman on a routine patrol. It appeared to the officer that the car was
weaving back and forth across the center lines of the road. After being stopped, the
petitioner could not produce his driver's license, explaining that he was a college student
and that his license was in his dormitory room. The officer took the petitioner into
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Terry rationale that a search must be related to the circumstances sur-
rounding the arrest, since the searches in Gustafson and Robinson were
unrelated to the circumstances of the arrests, and the officers had no
reason to believe the defendants were armed and dangerous.81 The Court
in Robinson relied upon a "reasonableness test," not unlike the one
used earlier in the Rabinowitz decision," and found that a custodial
arrest is a "reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment [and]
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification." 9
The Court again broadened the scope of the search-incident excep-
tion in United States v. Edwards," where it loosely interpreted the
requirement that a search and seizure be contemporaneous with the
arrest. In Edwards the clothing worn by the defendant was seized ten
hours after his arrest and incarceration.91 Mr. Justice White, writing for
the majority, said that "[a] reasonable delay in effectuating [the seizure]
does not change the fact that [the defendant] was no more imposed upon
than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immedi-
ately upon arrival at the place of detention. 12
In Chadwick, the Government argued that the Constitution permits
a warrantless search of any property in the possession of a person
arrested in public as long as there is probable cause to believe that the
property contains contraband or evidence of a crime. The Court re-
jected this argument by finding no exigencies which would have justified
custody for further questioning and engaged in a pat-down search of the defendant,
placing his hand inside the defendant's belt and pockets. A cigarette box containing
marihuana was found in the petitioner's left front coat pocket.
87. 414 U.S. at 228; 414 U.S. at 264.
88. 339 U.S. at 65-66.
89. 414 U.S. at 235. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is
not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but
is also a 'reasonable' search under the Amendment.
90. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
91. The defendant was arrested and charged with the attempted breaking and
entering of a United States Post Office. He and a companion were seen walking near
the Post Office after police had been notified that a secret alarm had been activated.
Edwards was arrested, and ten hours after his incarceration his clothes were seized
without a warrant and paint chips were found on the clothing which matched those
samples taken from the Post Office.
92. 415 U.S. at 805.
93. 97 S. Ct. at 2485.
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an immediate search. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, distin-
guished searches incident to an arrest (as in custodial arrest) and those
searches where items are seized contemporaneously with the arrest.94
Referring to Robinson and Terry, the majority opinion stated: "The
potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless
searches of items within the 'immediate control' area reasonable with-
out requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weap-
ons or destructible evidence may be involved."95
The Court pointed out that the situation in Chadwick was different
from that of Robinson and Terry. Since the luggage was in the exclusive
control of the law enforcement officers and no danger existed that the
arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy
evidence, a search of that property was no longer incident to the arrest.96
Expanding its reasoning further, the Court cited Preston v. United
States97 and said: "Warrantless searches of luggage or other property
seized at time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest
either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest.' "98
The Court emphasized the fact in Chadwick that the search was
conducted more than an hour after the agents had gained exclusive
control of the footlocker.9 As a consequence, the Court could not view
the search "as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exi-
gency."1 0° Because there was no exigency which would have supported
the need for an immediate search, the Court reasoned that the defend-
ants were entitled to the protection of the warrant clause. 0' In conclu-
sion, the Court said that in this case an evaluation by a neutral magis-
trate was needed before the defendants' privacy interests in the contents
of the footlocker could be invaded. 0 2
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2485. The Court mentioned justifications for a warrantless search of
luggage taken from a suspect at the time of his arrest; for example, if the officers have
reason to believe that the luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality
such as explosives. Id. at 2485 n.9.
96. Id. at 2485.
97. 376 U.S. at 367.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2485.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2485-86.
101. Id.
102. Id. The Court distinguished searches of possessions within an arrestee's
immediate control and searches of the person. The Court said that the defendants'
expectation of privacy in possessions (contents of the footlocker) was not reduced or
1176
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The dissenting members,' ° applying the rationale of the warrant
exceptions concerning automobiles and searches incident to custodial
arrests, would hold generally that "a [search] warrant is not required
to seize and search any movable property in the possession of a person
properly arrested in a public place."'0 4 The dissent distinguished
Camara v. Municipal Court"5 and United States v. Watson"' by saying:
"A search warrant serves additional functions where an arrest takes
place in a home or office. . . .But a warrant would serve none of these
functions where the arrest takes place in a public area and the authori-
ties are admittedly empowered to seize the objects in question."'0 7
The dissent then suggested that a clear-cut rule be adopted permit-
ting property (seized in conjunction with a valid arrest in a public place)
to be searched without a warrant.'
While the dissenting members agreed with the majority in their
discussion of the privacy interest generally,0 9 they were critical of the
opinion's failure to define explicitly the narrow line between searches of
possessions and searches of the person in relation to expectations of
privacy."10 As a possible limitation to the impact of the decision, the
dissent pointed out that other doctrines are frequently available to sus-
tain warrantless searches of objects in police custody."'
eliminated simply because they were under arrest. Id. n.10.
103. Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, dissenting.
104. 97 S. Ct. at 2487. The dissent relies particularly on United States v. Robin-
son (no warrant is required for the arresting officer to search the clothing and effects
of one placed in custodial arrest); and United States v. Edwards (search of personal
effects need not be contemporaneous with the arrest). The dissent also paid close atten-
tion to the cases'where a car may be impounded and, with probable cause, the contents
(including locked compartments) may be examined without a warrant. See, e.g., Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439-48; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 47-52; Texas
v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(police may follow standard procedures of inventorying contents of an impounded vehi-
cle without any showing of probable cause).
105. 387 U.S. 523.
106. 423 U.S. 411.
107. 97 S. Ct. at 2488 n.1.
108. Id. at 2489.
109. Id. at 2488.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2488-89. The dissent speaks of the routine inventory established by
South Dakota v. Opperman, and also of instances where the impounded object has
dangerous contents. Id. at 2485 n.9. Citing to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
300 ("hot pursuit" exception case), the Court wrote: "[E]xigent circumstances may
often justify an immediate search of property seized in conjunction with an arrest, in
12:1978
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Part II of the dissenting opinion suggested a number of alternative
courses of action that the agents could have followed without violating
the Constitution."' For example, if the agents had waited until the
respondents started driving away before seizing the car, all of its con-
tents could have been searched without a warrant under the automobile
exception." 3 "Alternatively, [the dissent said that] the agents could
have made a search of the footlocker at the time and place of the arrests,
[since] Machado and Leary were standing next to an open automobile
trunk containing the footlocker, and thus it was within the area of 'their
immediate control.' "114
The concurring opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan to com-
ment on the two points made by Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent, stated:
"In my view, it is not at all obvious that the agents could legally have
searched the footlocker had they seized it after [the defendants] had
driven away with it in their car or 'at the time and place of the ar-
rests.'""5
Mr. Justice Brennan argued that it is not clear that "the contents
of locked containers found inside a car are subject to search under [the
automobile] exception."" 6 Secondly, he wrote: "I would think that the
footlocker in this case hardly was 'within [defendants'] immediate con-
trol'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which they
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.""' 7
order to facilitate the apprehension of confederates or the termination of continuing
criminal activity." 97 S. Ct. at 2489.
112. Id. at 2489-90. No decision of the Court is cited directly to support these
conclusions; but the dissent does cite some decisions from the courts of appeals.
113. Id. at 2489. The dissent relies on the fact that "[tihe scope of the 'automobile
search' exception extends to the contents of locked compartments, including glove
compartments and trunks. . . . The courts of appeals have construed this doctrine to
include briefcases, suitcases and footlockers inside automobiles." 97 S. Ct. at 2489 n.4.
114. Id. at 2489-90. Here, the dissent gathers its argument from several view-
points. First, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) emphasized the
established principle that an immediate search of packages or luggage carried by the
arrested person is proper. Such searches have been sustained by the courts of appeals,
even if they occurred after the arrested person has been handcuffed. Finally, searches
under Chimel have also been upheld when a suitcase or briefcase was nearby, but not
touching the arrested person. 97 S. Ct. at 2490 n.5. See United States v. French, 545
F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977) (suitcase within arm's length); United States v. Frick, 490
F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974) (briefcase lying on seat of
automobile next to which person was arrested).
115. 97 S. Ct. at 2486 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at n.l.
117. Id. at n.2, citing from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
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While the Burger Court has been gradually strengthening the hands
of law enforcement officials, especially in the warrantless searches of
automobiles pursuant to arrest, it is significant to note one case in which
the Court finally applied the "brakes" to warrantless searches and sei-
zures. The Burger Court has, in the last several years, changed and
lowered the perception and expectation of the right of privacy. In the
past, the Court has failed to furnish or articulate guidelines applicable
to fourth amendment concerns. Again, as the dissent points out in the
Chadwick case, the Court has failed to accept the challenge to develop
an unequivocal doctrine regarding the permissible consequences of a
custodial arrest.
The Court's opinion in Chadwick merely skims the issues. It fails
to show in any significant way how the Court reached its conclusion.
Rather, it cites to numerous cases in the applicable areas of search and
seizure and leaves it to the reader to determine how these prior opinions
apply to the circumstances in Chadwick. On examining the opinions of
both the district court and the court of appeals, it would appear that
the lower courts did a far better job of analyzing and clarifying the
issues, raising subtle questions which the Supreme Court ignored.
Unfortunately, by failing to write a concise, direct opinion, the
Court left many questions unanswered. The Court did not discuss in any
great detail the problem of luggage mobility. The First Circuit pointed
out that luggage searches have raised many queries in the various cir-
cuits. It hinted that it should be left to the Supreme Court to determine
whether this could ever be a valid exception to the warrant requirement.
Secondly, under the search incident to an arrest exception, the Court
was afforded an opportunity to discus further, as the courts of appeal
have done, when it is proper for the police to seize a suitcase, briefcase,
or package in a suspect's possession at the time of arrest and, subse-
quently, to search the property without a warrant after the person has
been taken into custody. The Court does not explain in its opinion why
a possession carried in a person's clothing is subject to "reduced expec-
tations of privacy"-but not the footlocker. Further, as in South Da-
kota v. Opperman,"8 the Court did not deal with a solution to the
problems of searches of locked containers found in automobiles. Per-
haps the Court found it easier to ignore these issues by rationalizing that
these questions were not directly on appeal. However, these unanswered
118. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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questions appear to detract from the strength of the opinion, since they
underlie some of the basic premises that the Court does examine.
The Chadwick decision seems to take a step backward in time by
attempting again to refuel the fires under the expectation of privacy
doctrine. Like the dissent, one wonders how effective this holding will
be in different circumstances, since so many other doctrines are used to
sustain warrantless searches of objects in police custody.
Robin K. Williams
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